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AN INSIDE LOOK AT SOVIET MILITARY REFORM

Aleksandr A. Kokorin
Susan L. Clark

September 1991

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FOREWORD

This paper offers a look at Soviet military reform from the perspective of an active-duty colonel in the Soviet Army. As such, it provides insights not only into how the Soviet Ministry of Defense has approached reform issues, but also into the very thinking of those tasked with implementing the reform program. The paper itself was completed in early 1991, but since the coup of August 1991, several remarks have been incorporated into the text as of September 1991 to reflect some of the subsequent changes.

Colonel Kokorin assisted in the development of the Soviet Ministry of Defense's reform plan and continues to examine these military reform issues in his current position as Director of the Socio-Military Problems Program at the Russian-American University in Moscow. The University is an independent, non-governmental organization that focuses on international cooperation and social development issues. Staff members of Kokorin's program include professors, scientists, and career military officers.

What is perhaps of greatest value in this piece which Kokorin has written is that it provides us with an important snapshot of the changing relationship between the armed forces and Soviet society. Through his identification of the various challenges inherent in military reform, Kokorin portrays one way of examining the overall political struggle in the USSR to change the military-societal relationship and to change the military and societal institutions themselves. What becomes clear is that even when this work was originally completed--in early 1991--the Russian officer corps had already resolved that it would not allow itself to be used against its own people. Indeed, Kokorin's analysis offers a good illustration of why the coup was doomed to failure.¹

Turning to the specifics of Kokorin's writings, he eloquently conveys the frustrations shared by thousands of Soviet officers as the military has lost prestige in the eyes of Soviet society and as they are confronted with the challenges of reforming their force structure, doctrine, staffing method, and so on. The social problems the military faces are enormous; they have been well documented, both here and elsewhere. From

¹ For Western assessments of these and other military and security issues, see Susan L. Clark, ed., *Soviet Military Power in a Changing World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

severe housing shortages to the breakdown of the conscription system (and related problems such as increasing interethnic tensions, worsening Russian language capabilities among conscripts, rising crime and health problems), these problems are detailed in the following pages. Kokorin also incorporates a variety of public opinion data, most of which is not otherwise available to Western analysts, that illustrates both military and civilian attitudes toward many elements of the military reform effort. All these aspects of Kokorin's analysis provide clear proof of the many fissures existing within the Soviet Armed Forces. In fact, this lack of a unitary military offered evidence that there would be no universal military support for the coup.

In light of the August events, the deepening and transformation of military reform is apparent. First, the pace of military reform is being accelerated far beyond what the MoD reform plan had anticipated. Indeed, no one anticipated the rush of events that has followed the failed coup. Second, the process of reform--like every other aspect of Soviet life--is devolving away from the central government and toward the republics. In other words, previously the issue of military reform was a matter for the central government to resolve in the context of its overall changes. Today, however, military reform is not only an important component in the central government debates, but also a vital issue in the *evolving relationships between the center and republic governments*. In this connection, the majority of reform-related problems and challenges that Kokorin identifies remain quite relevant today, even in the post-coup environment.

Reflecting his training and the system in which he was raised, Kokorin adopts a Marxist-Leninist approach to his analysis. Obviously, some of his assessments, such as the importance of the Communist Party in the Soviet Armed Forces, have largely been overtaken by the rush of events. Yet while many Western analysts have trouble accepting a Marxist-Leninist approach, Kokorin's analysis is extremely important in that it illustrates how Soviet military officers have been trained and how their process of reasoning has developed. Even with a considerable reduction in the officer corps, there will still be many who continue to follow this analytical approach. Indeed, this raises a crucial question about the future relationship between Marxism-Leninism and the evolution of the republics and the Soviet Armed Forces. To what extent will the historical legacies of Marxist-Leninist teachings influence the reframing of the military's role in this society?

As the debate intensifies, the military will play an important role in shaping the new relationships among the various Soviet republics. For many citizens, the military institution remains the last recognizable cohesive force in Soviet society today. How long

this will last is uncertain. As Kokorin has suggested to me, perhaps these reform debates can now be used to shape the future Russian military. One thing that is certain is that defense and security policy will be an integral part of the sovereignty issue between the center and the republics. Indeed, this policy is at the very core of the future distribution of power. Thus, the defense debate will be germane not only to the future of the military--Russian or otherwise--but also to the broader issue of sovereignty in what used to be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The text that follows is written by Colonel Kokorin, who is also a Doctor of Philosophy. I have translated and edited the manuscript. The ideas and analysis are his and do not necessarily reflect my thinking or that of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Susan L. Clark

PREFACE

This paper was prepared under funding from the Institute for Defense Analyses' Independent Research Program fund. It represents a collaborative effort between IDA staff member Susan L. Clark and Soviet military officer Colonel Aleksandr A. Kokorin. Kokorin offers an inside view of the process of Soviet military reform from the perspective of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Ms. Clark has translated and edited the manuscript and has included a foreword which puts this work into the context of today's rapidly changing world.

The authors would like to thank the reviewers of this paper, Dr. John F. Shull of the BDM Corporation, and Dr. Robbin F. Laird of IDA for their helpful comments and suggestions.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD.....	iii
PREFACE	vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ES-1
I. INTRODUCTION	I-1
II. MILITARY REFORM: AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF PERESTROIKA	II-1
A. THE REASONS FOR MILITARY REFORM TODAY.....	II-1
1. Foreign Policy Considerations.....	II-1
2. Domestic Considerations	II-5
3. Military Considerations.....	II-8
B. THE CONTENT, OBJECTIVES, AND PURPOSE OF REFORM.....	II-10
1. Key Features of Today's Military Reform	II-10
2. The Main Elements of the MoD Reform Plan.....	II-13
3. Public Input to the MoD Plan	II-18
C. MILITARY REFORM: ALTERNATIVE PLANS.....	II-19
1. Reasons Behind the Alternatives	II-19
2. A Comparison of the Reform Plans.....	II-21
3. Some Final Considerations About the Two Reform Plans	II-31
III. SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REFORM.....	III-1
A. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR REFORM ARE BOTH REAL AND NECESSARY.....	III-1
1. Different Schools of Thought.....	III-1
2. Additional Resource Requirements.....	III-3
a. Increasing Personnel Costs.....	III-3

b. New Staffing Methods and Associated Costs	III-5
c. Military Reform and Associated Costs	III-6
d. Arms Control, Force Reductions, and Associated Costs	III-8
e. Improvements in Training and Associated Costs	III-12
f. Conversions Efforts and Their Costs.....	III-12
3. Potential Sources of Reform Funds.....	III-13
4. Conclusions: Resources and Requirements	III-15
B. SOCIAL ISSUES RELATED TO CONVERSION.....	III-16
1. Key Trends in Conversion	III-16
2. Attitudes Toward Conversion.....	III-18
3. Benefits and Difficulties of Conversion	III-20
C. MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY.....	III-24
1. Military Concerns and Considerations in the Transition.....	III-24
2. The Plan for the Military's Entry into Market Relations	III-28
3. The Military-Industrial Relationship	III-30
4. The Military and Science	III-32
5. The Military and Foreign Trade.....	III-33
6. Social Guarantees and Living Conditions.....	III-34
7. Conclusions.....	III-35
IV. SOCIOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS OF REFORM	IV-1
A. REFORMING THE DEFENSE COMPLEX IN A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM.....	IV-1
1. Political Organizations and Military Issues.....	IV-2
a. Amidst Pluralism, Military Reform Issues and Perspectives Abound.....	IV-2
b. Prevalent Stances in Soviet Party Platforms.....	IV-3
c. Conclusions	IV-14

2. Changing Attitudes Toward Military Reform	IV-15
B. MILITARY REFORM AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS.....	IV-18
1. Key Trends in Interethnic Relations.....	IV-19
2. The Creation of National Formations	IV-21
3. Changing Demographics and Multinationalism in the Military.....	IV-23
4. Conclusions about Interethnic Relations.....	IV-26
V. SOCIAL ISSUES OF MILITARY REFORM	V-1
A. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIETY AND THE ARMED FORCES.....	V-1
1. Attitudes Toward Military Reform and Military Service.....	V-2
2. Factors Affecting Relations Between Society and the Armed Forces	V-4
3. Conclusions about Society-Military Relations	V-8
B. SOCIAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH FORCE REDUCTIONS.....	V-9
1. Identifying the Problems Associated with Force Cuts	V-10
2. Difficulties in Solving Social Problems.....	V-12
C. SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND MONGOLIA	V-15
1. Scope of the Withdrawals	V-15
2. Problems Associated with the Withdrawals.....	V-16
3. Conclusions about Social Issues Related to Troop Withdrawals	V-20
VI. SOCIAL-LEGAL GUARANTEES OF REFORM.....	VI-1
A. LEGAL GUARANTEES FOR MILITARY REFORM	VI-2
1. Attitudes Toward Legal Guarantees.....	VI-2
2. Proposals for Reforming the Legal Basis of Military Development.....	VI-3
B. MILITARY REFORM AND SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR SERVICEMEN	VI-12
1. The Nature of the Problems Driving Social Protection Activism	VI-12
2. Progress Is Being Made	VI-17
3. Conclusions on Social Protection Measures	VI-19

VII. MILITARY-POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF REFORM	VII-1
A. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR STAFFING THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES	VII-1
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Universal Military Service	VII-2
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Volunteer Force	VII-4
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF A MIXED STAFFING METHOD IN THE USSR	VII-5
1. Difficulties of Continuing a Conscription System	VII-6
2. The Case for a Mixed Staffing Method	VII-7
C. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE: POSSIBLE OPTIONS	VII-10
VIII. CONCLUSIONS	VIII-1

TABLES

Table II-1. Principles Defining Approaches to Reform	II-14
Table III-1. Wage Increases for U.S. Military Personnel and Civilians (percentage)	III-5
Table VI-1. Income for Workers' and Officers' Families	VI-13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the variety of social problems associated with efforts to reform the Soviet Armed Forces. It was written by an active-duty Soviet Army officer, Colonel Aleksandr Kokorin, as of early 1991.

The paper begins by identifying the main reasons--both domestic and foreign--for the current military reform effort in the USSR. It offers a comparative analysis of the two main reform plans that were being heatedly debated in late 1990, one by the Ministry of Defense and the other by a group of USSR People's Deputies headed by Major Vladimir Lopatin. Kokorin emphasizes that the two proposals coincide in the main; the differences lie largely in the amount of time and identification of resources necessary to implement the reforms.

The next chapter then identifies in detail the economic factors that must be taken into consideration: what elements of military reform will cost more money than currently allocated to the defense budget and where might this additional money be found. Kokorin also discusses at length the possible effects--both benefits and difficulties--that conversion and the transition to a market economy may have on Soviet military reform.

Looking at the challenges presented in the USSR's moving to a multiparty system, Kokorin provides a litany of the positions of numerous political organizations on various military issues, from the conscription versus volunteer force debate to the future of nuclear weapons. He also provides a useful overview of the evolution of interethnic tensions and changing demographics, and their effects on the military (including the creation of national formations).

Soviet troop reductions and withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Mongolia present additional problems for consideration, namely from the perspective of the social problems they cause (such as housing shortages and the ability and willingness of society to accept military men into civilian life).

The sixth chapter addresses legal guarantees for military reform and the idea of social protection for service personnel and their families. It becomes readily apparent that there are gross inadequacies in the current legal system for dealing with the reform process.

Kokorin identifies and analyzes the various laws needed to strengthen the legal guarantees for reform and outlines social protection measures needed for military personnel, primarily as related to salaries and pensions.

Finally, Kokorin examines the need to change the current conscription system and explains why a mixed system of conscripted forces combined with more volunteers is the best option available. He discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both systems in some detail. Recent events only increase doubts about the viability of a conscription force, and Kokorin recognizes that a move toward more and more volunteers is quite likely. The chapter concludes with a discussions of options for alternative service and presents data from public opinion surveys on this issue.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is not difficult to understand the widespread interest in military reform in the USSR today. Several related and complementary reasons underlie this interest. First, the process of reforming military structures, which is becoming stronger in Soviet society but also largely unpredictable and contradictory, can and certainly will influence the evolution of world politics and will, as a consequence, bring about changes in the world military-political situation.

Second, military reform in the Soviet Union is a necessary element of the radical changes that are currently taking place in Soviet society. Without this reform, it is unlikely that perestroika will succeed or that the economic, political, social, and spiritual aspects of Soviet society will be renewed; all of these elements are closely connected with military reform.

Third, new political thinking provides, perhaps for the first time in history, a methodological basis for modern military reform. This means that the main focus of reform will be on strengthening the defense orientation of all elements of the Soviet military structure. It is not difficult to understand why there is a special interest in such a process; it is, after all, capable of changing the paradigm of ideas about the process and direction of military development in the USSR, which in turn has positive consequences for the cause of peace.

Fourth, the Soviet people have great hopes for military reform in the country; they see it as a way of solving many of the accumulated problems and contradictions within the Soviet defense complex. In military reform, the people see a way of optimizing military development in the country, reducing unwarranted expenditures, and maintaining defense at a level of reasonable sufficiency. Hence, it is logical for Soviet society to have a special and direct interest in this reform.

While there is certainly additional evidence, these four factors provide sufficient proof of the widespread interest in modern military reform both among the Soviet people and among those who live far beyond the USSR's borders. What is particularly important to understand is that military reform must be approached scientifically. Such was the

primary motive for writing this paper. Much has already been written about military reform in Soviet society, and conferences and international congresses have examined many of its problems. However, this paper approaches the subject of Soviet military reform through sociological analysis and systemic research. It examines all the key components: social, economic, political, legal, and purely military.

This paper is, in fact, the first comprehensive sociological analysis of the subject. It concentrates mainly on the social problems of reforming the USSR's defense complex, these problems having priority in current reform efforts. In other words, military reform has proven to be more socially oriented than one would have anticipated. Indeed, it was impossible to limit the study strictly to the Armed Forces; they are, after all, closely connected with society.

This paper seeks to be factual and objective. By using the results of numerous sociological analyses conducted over recent years in Soviet society and its Armed Forces, it examines the process of reform from the inside, gaining insights that would not have been possible otherwise. Specifically, it uses data from sociological research the author conducted with a group of Soviet military scientists under his supervision. This research began in 1986 and was particularly intensive between 1989 and 1991. The surveys were conducted in five Military Districts and in the Western Group of Forces (Germany). Each survey had between 500 and 1500 respondents. In addition, this paper uses the research findings of sociologists in the USSR Ministry of Defense as well as of civilian scientists and scientific-research institutions in the Soviet Union. This focus on a scientific approach provides an alternative to other populist interpretations of this reform effort, which exist both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

This paper does not answer all possible questions concerning military reform in the Soviet Union. No single work could do so. It does, however, address the most important and significant problems of reform. This process is very complicated and dynamic and therefore requires continued study.

II. MILITARY REFORM: AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF PERESTROIKA

Perestroika, the radical renewal of all aspects of Soviet life, began in April 1985. This process of qualitative change has also encompassed Soviet defense structures, thereby placing on the agenda a military reform aimed at qualitatively renovating the entire mechanism of military development in the USSR.

Social awareness of the reasons and need for military reform in the USSR was not immediate or problem-free. Even today, not everyone looks at this plan in the same way; not everyone understands the need to profoundly and radically transform military development. However, the lack of understanding and skepticism among certain people about military reform cannot replace the objective reasons that are compelling Soviet society to take this very difficult step.

What are the reasons behind the need for military reform in the USSR? This important sociological question lies at the root of all thoughts about military reform. Moreover, it helps to define and distinguish the positions of the "conservatives" and "innovators," optimists and skeptics. All of these schools of thought exist in the USSR. For a number of them, the problems of military reform represent the watershed. But the key issue is not so much a dispute among these people; it is the search for an objective and reasoned answer to the initial question: what are the reasons behind the need for military reform?

A. THE REASONS FOR MILITARY REFORM TODAY

1. Foreign Policy Considerations

Several foreign policy factors, which have helped change international relations fundamentally, indicate the need to reform the mechanism of military development in the USSR. The world has, in effect, become over-armed, causing its leaders to confront a choice: either to go further toward increasing the danger of a world military conflict, which would threaten the destruction of mankind, or to stop this process. Favoring disarmament, the world's leaders have begun a process that has created a number of reasons for military

reform in many states, including the USSR. Following a review of the Soviet Union's strategic security, the USSR pledged unilaterally to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 820 combat aircraft. The Soviet leadership signed the treaty to destroy intermediate-range missiles (INF). It has also initiated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany and Mongolia, and has completed their withdrawal from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In addition, it has developed a comprehensive plan for converting a number of defense industries to civilian use. The implementation of these measures has required fundamental qualitative changes in Soviet military development.

In this connection, it should be noted that new political thinking has come to replace the ideology of the Cold War. Whereas before, countries relied on military means--deterrence and actual force--to resolve international relations, today the world has adopted new thinking, with the emphasis on political means to resolve all matters of international relations. Logically, the armed forces that were built on the basis of the Cold War must be reformed so that they are in keeping with new political thinking. This is the first factor that dictates the need for military reform in the USSR.

The second factor can be summed up in the following way. Today it is possible to say that relations between East and West, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, have undergone qualitative changes.¹ This has required decisive action by the USSR on military issues in at least two ways. On the one hand, there are possibilities of significantly reducing various types of offensive weapons, of cutting spending on their development, and of carrying out a number of other similar steps. On the other hand, it has become necessary to focus the entire mechanism of military development on fulfilling defensive missions. Anyone who is truly familiar with military affairs can easily understand that both types of efforts require military reform. And this reform must not be in the form of cosmetic changes, but radical and profound steps toward reform.

The adoption of a defensive military doctrine came as a result of these objective reasons. Today defensive doctrine, and the efforts to make it a reality, have themselves become factors necessitating military reform in the USSR. In turn, each significant step in implementing military reform requires changes in modern military doctrine. Such is the dialectic of these related phenomena.

¹ When this paper was written (in 1990 and early 1991), the Warsaw Pact had still not been completely disbanded; it continued to exist as a military-political alliance.

The third factor contributing to the need for military reform lies in the fact that the Warsaw Pact has experienced the most radical changes in its history. Relations among the members of this alliance have changed fundamentally. The organization itself has changed from a military alliance to a political one. Furthermore, the intentions of several countries to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact demonstrate the clear trend to destroy this alliance completely. Obviously, this situation fundamentally alters the socio-political and military-political role of the Warsaw Pact in the world. Moreover, it is decisively changing the position of the Soviet Armed Forces in world politics, is changing the infrastructure of their socio-political and military-political relations with other armies, and is causing the adoption of reasonable "compensatory" measures to maintain our country's defense potential at the necessary level. The axis is effectively changing from NATO-Warsaw Pact to NATO-USSR.

The Soviet people are correct to question NATO's military capabilities and to insist on complete and precise information about NATO. This does not mean that they are seeking to repeat the ideological dogma of the Cold War; they are simply being realistic. They are worried about the fact that U.S. and NATO armed forces are maintaining an offensive type of doctrine and a force structure to match.

NATO's offensive capability is enormous. It has more than 6.5 million military men and women, more than 2,500 offensive strategic nuclear weapons, more than 16,000 nuclear warheads, approximately 250 combined arms divisions, more than 14,000 combat aircraft (including 8,600 strike), about 38,500 tanks, 673 major surface ships (including 26 aircraft carriers and 396 ships with long-range cruise missiles), up to 250 nuclear and diesel submarines, etc. That is why military reform must unite what would seem to be opposing processes that cannot be united: reducing the Soviet Armed Forces and at the same time increasing their qualitative characteristics and intensifying their defense capabilities. This is not an easy task, but it must be accomplished.

The fourth reason for military reform is that many armies in NATO and in other countries are now being reformed themselves. The priorities in their reforms include: searching for the least expensive but modern and combat-ready army; professionalizing their personnel; cutting back administrative structures; actively introducing automated systems for troop control; integrating all NATO military structures; and standardizing weapons and combat equipment.

The countries differ in how radical their military reforms are, and at least three interesting tendencies are noteworthy: a natural, evolutionary and permanent reform in a number of countries (the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France); an accelerated evolutionary reform (Japan, the Netherlands, Italy); and long-term radical military reforms based on special programs (Spain, China, Chile). The reform of military structures in these countries is also one of the external reasons for military reform in the Soviet Union. Today, military reform is the USSR's panacea to falling behind in the field of military development.

The fifth consideration relates to nuclear weapons and arms control. The military-strategic parity currently existing between the USSR and the United States has a considerable "reserve." However, with arms reductions this reserve will decrease. Hence, it will be necessary to take into consideration a number of factors that have remained outside the nuclear balance equation. At issue here is the growing nuclear potential of such powers as England, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

By the end of the 1980s, England had some 700 nuclear warheads and France had 500. The potential threat to the Soviet Union from these weapons is certainly significant. Human losses in the USSR as a result of a French nuclear strike could be on the order of 48 to 55 million, while 25 to 40 percent of the country's industrial potential would also be destroyed. By 1995, Paris plans to have nuclear forces capable of killing 81 million Soviet people and of wiping two-thirds of its industrial capacity off the face of the earth. According to the Pentagon's criteria, this means that France alone will be capable of inflicting such "unacceptable damage" on the USSR that it would mean the total destruction of the state. And England has even greater capabilities.

While neither the French nor the British nor the Americans intend to attack the Soviet Union, only the absence of actual forces and equipment can be a complete guarantee that there will be no attack. Unfortunately, these countries are retaining their forces and equipment. Thus, the USSR must find ways to counter this, not by creating new weapons, but by retargeting a portion of what it already has, by reallocating and making more rational use of what it has. Naturally, this is possible only by reforming the military mechanism.

The sixth factor to be considered is the following. Third World countries are responding to military reforms in the USSR by intensifying their efforts to create their own nuclear-missile and chemical arsenals. This development is fraught with unpredictable

consequences, given that countries on the threshold of producing their own nuclear weapons are opponents of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These efforts, augmented by extremism, adventurism, and nationalistic aspirations, represent a real threat to peace, as confirmed by the events in the Persian Gulf during 1990-91.

Finally, another important foreign policy consideration for the USSR is the fundamental change in the place and role of the unified Germany in Europe. In effect, a country has taken shape in the center of the European continent that possesses a large economic potential based on new and modern technology, that is capable of producing its own modern weapons if it needs to do so, and that has a sufficiently large mobilization capability. The memory of the Soviet people, especially the older generation, requires that this be taken into consideration. While sociological research indicates that the level of trust in Germany and its foreign policy has grown two- or threefold,² the Soviet people still believe that only concrete political actions by Germany can convince them of this country's true love for peace.

Such are the main foreign policy factors influencing military reform. Public opinion polls indicate that the Soviet people believe that the military danger to the USSR is decreasing and that it is necessary to reform the armed forces in accordance with realities, retaining a defense capability at the level of reasonable minimal sufficiency.

Along with foreign policy factors, the need for military reform is also dictated by processes going on within the USSR. In other words, there are domestic reasons for reforming the military structure as well, as outlined in the following section.

2. Domestic Considerations

As the USSR is undergoing perestroika, bringing qualitative changes to all elements of Soviet life, it cannot possibly retain an unaltered, unreformed mechanism of military development that is directly connected with the economic, social, political, and spiritual aspects of public life. The changes in each of these areas inevitably determines changes in the area of military development. Every sensible person in our society understands that it is necessary to carry out military reform, and the military cadres are no exception. They were probably the first to accept the idea about the inevitability and importance of such reform.

² Research conducted by Kokorin et al. in January 1991, 650 respondents.

While they are quite often reproached and accused of being conservative and of suppressing military reform this is not actually the case.

Thus, the need for military reform is not in dispute; however, the Soviet Union's current economic crisis renders the country incapable of solving its defense requirements by extensive means, as it used to do. Military expenditures in the USSR account for a high percentage of government spending; military reform is helping to lower these expenditures. In essence, what is happening is a qualitative transformation of economic relations between society and the Armed Forces. This is possible only with radical reforms in both the Soviet economy and its military development mechanism.

Correspondingly, the market relations that are gaining strength in the USSR make reform of the Soviet defense complex inevitable. These market relations are radically altering the interaction between the Soviet Armed Forces and society. Financial relations will change, as will the mechanism for supplying the military's food and uniforms, purchases of arms and military equipment will be done differently, and the financing of other articles of defense spending will also change. Under these circumstances, military reform must identify optimal ways of solving the tasks facing the economy and the armed forces. The draft plan for introducing market relations into the Soviet Armed Forces has been elaborated and approved.³

In the same vein, only through radical reform will the defense industrial complex's advanced technology be included in the production of goods for the civilian sector--an element of reform which the Soviet people so desperately need. In a word, the need to convert military production--to change how the population is provided with goods--is fundamental to military reform and is, in fact, a major reason for carrying it out. In turn, conversion as a comprehensive process can be effective only within a system of measures that comprise military reform.

Sociological research has shown that increasing numbers of respondents understand the need for and inevitability of reforming the country's entire defense complex. This research--while not claiming to know the truth to the nth degree, but being closer to the truth than populist judgments about the state of Soviet society--indicates that more than

³ See *Kontsepsiya vkhozhdeniya vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v rynochnye otnosheniya* [The Plan for the USSR Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations] (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1990), p. 62.

80 percent of respondents support military reform.⁴ Moreover, the idea of carrying out military reform is supported not only by the public at large, but also by an overwhelming majority of the political organizations, movements, and parties that currently exist in the USSR. Of these hundreds of groups, the 67 most influential all devote sections in their program documents to military reform. These documents indicate the organizations' attitudes toward the main elements of reform. They do not articulate specific plans for military reform, but (at best) offer only conceptual ideas, defining their vision of and approaches to Soviet military reform. A more or less comprehensive understanding of the process of reforming military structures is set forth in the program documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Democratic Party, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Moscow People's Front, and *Shchit*.⁵ While the intentions of political groups to carry out military reform should not be overestimated, it is important to realize that the activities of these groups stimulate the awareness of certain segments of the Soviet public about the idea of military reform.

Finally, one more domestic reason for advocating military reform is one that is essentially already underway: overcoming the resistance of those who did not accept it and abandoning many theoretical works on this score. There is a great deal of evidence that this process is gaining strength, but the most graphic evidence lies in the changes to the structure of the Soviet military budget. Between 1989 and 1991, expenditures on purchases of arms and military equipment will be reduced by 19.5 percent.⁶ The Soviet Union has declared its readiness to go even further in reducing defense spending. In particular, it has proposed that, given recent priorities on disarmament and consolidating peace, it intends to cut the share of defense expenditures as a percentage of national income by 1.5 to 2 times by 1995.⁷ The first steps toward that end were announced in the summer of 1989. After those declarations, the USSR has consistently implemented its self-imposed obligations.

⁴ Surveys conducted in the USSR's central region and the Far East, with 1150 respondents.

⁵ See *Voennye voprosy v dokumentakh politicheskikh organizatsii i dvizhenii v SSSR [Military Issues in the Documents of Political Organizations and Movements in the USSR]* (Moscow: Russian-American University, 1991), pp. 154-161.

⁶ M. Moiseev, "The USSR's Defense Budget," *Pravda*, 11 June 1989.

⁷ See "Toward a New Model of Security," *Pravda*, 20 June 1989.

3. Military Considerations

It is no secret that the very mechanism of military development in the USSR today has many problems that negatively affect the state's defense potential and that require a solution. For example, recently an average of 60 percent of those called up for the draft received a deferment for one reason or another. In Moscow only 32 percent of those called up serve in the army. Less than half of the men subject to military service actually serve. Today, out of 100 men subject to conscription, only 49 are called up.⁸ The obligation of universal military service has not been abolished in the USSR, but for all intents and purposes this principle no longer operates fully. The resultant contradictions and problems must be resolved during the course of military reform.

In recent years, strained relations among various Soviet nationalities have had their own effect on the state of affairs in the country and its armed forces, helping to spur on military reform.⁹ In the spring of 1990, Armenia filled only 7.5 percent of its draft quota; Georgia, 27.5 percent; Lithuania, 33.6 percent; and Estonia, 40.2 percent. Nor did the situation improve during the fall 1990 draft. While Armenia's figure did improve to 34 percent, the draft percentages in the Baltic republics fell somewhat.¹⁰ To a considerable extent, this draft evasion has been caused by the decisions adopted by the Supreme Soviets in these republics, contradicting union-level legislation, to create their own republic paramilitary structures.

Many specialists view military reform as a way of increasing the educational and intellectual level of soldiers and sergeants. The greater complexity of weapons and military equipment requires such improvement. At present, approximately 20 percent of the draftees have an incomplete middle education (having finished no more than eighth grade). The situation is aggravated by the fact that many conscripts do not have any work experience since they have not worked or studied before being drafted into the armed forces.

⁸ V. Kosarev, "Life Dictates the Decisions," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 June 1990.

⁹ *Editor's note:* For a Western assessment of the problems posed by nationalities tensions for the Soviet military, see Susan L. Clark, "Ethnic Tensions in the Soviet Military," in Clark, ed., *Soviet Military Power in a Changing World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

¹⁰ The figure for Armenia is noted in Yu. Gladkevich, "Only 34 Percent....," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 January 1991.

Editor's note: Subsequent data released in spring 1991 indicates that the results of the fall 1990 draft were actually worse than for the preceding spring draft.

Only through military reform can draft results be improved qualitatively. Sociological research shows that in recent years every fourth draftee, in fact, enters military service with serious educational problems. More than one-fourth of them were raised in an unfavorable family situation. Many young men have broken the law before they are drafted into the army. Every tenth man has been subjected to administrative punishment and arrest by the police. One in every eight has been convicted, and of them more than one-third have served time in jail. In 1989, one-third more convicts were called up for the draft than were called up in 1980.¹¹ As another illustration, there are more than 300,000 Soviet teenagers between the ages of 15 and 17 with psychological problems that have been registered as such in public health organizations.¹²

These and other factors reduce the size of the conscript pool, thereby stimulating the need for military reform in the USSR. Incidentally, qualitative and quantitative problems with the conscript pool apply not only to the Soviet Union, but also to a number of other countries. For example, Italy is confronting a difficult situation with its conscript pool, and military reform is becoming more topical in that country as well. Over the past 20 years, the size of Italy's draft pool has, for a number of reasons, shrunk from 522,000 to 303,000 men. As a result, the prognosis is that by the end of the year 2000, Italy's conscript pool could amount to only 100,000 men.¹³

Returning to the reasons for military reform in the USSR, specialists are well aware that until 1994, the demographic situation in the country will remain very difficult and will directly affect the army. Moreover, it is not easy to strengthen military discipline in the troops. It is also difficult to carry out modern military-technical programs even with large budgets. Morale and psychological training of military personnel has become more complicated. Finally, the daily living conditions for the troops are inadequate. For example, in the army today about 200,000 families of servicemen have not been provided housing.

A catalyst for reform has come in the form of the beginning of troop withdrawals from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia. As a result, numerous questions are being raised, both purely military (strategic and operational-tactical issues) as well as a number of social ones: where the troops will be stationed, how they will be

¹¹ Kosarev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 June 1990.

¹² See V. Litovkin, "Not Just about the Draft," *Izvestiya*, 26 April 1990.

¹³ See *L'Unita*, 22 and 29 March 1990.

provided with housing, and how a whole variety of ordinary social guarantees will be supplied to returning servicemen and their families.

The system of troop management needs to be reformed. For many years, the structure of many military institutions has not been altered. Indeed, the Soviet Armed Forces have, for all intents and purposes, not seen serious reform since the 1960s when the Strategic Missile Troops became a new branch of the armed forces. It has been a long time since then, almost 30 years. Today there are antiquated weapons and equipment that need to be replaced with more modern ones.

In short, the very development of military affairs has led the Soviet Union to the need for military reform. Today approximately 83 percent of respondents serving in the military insist on such reform.¹⁴ Indeed, any sensible person can see the foreign, domestic, and military reasons underlying the need for military reform in the USSR. Those who accuse the military of not adopting the ideas of military reform are misrepresenting the situation. Military men support reform of their organization. Having outlined the reasons for military reform in the Soviet Union, it is now appropriate to focus on the content, aims, and the main purposes of these radical changes.

B. THE CONTENT, OBJECTIVES, AND PURPOSE OF REFORM

1. Key Features of Today's Military Reform

Before identifying the primary challenges for the Soviet military and possible solutions outlined in the MoD's draft Military Reform Plan, several general observations are necessary.¹⁵ First, a large group of specialists, political scientists, military scholars and practical workers, sociologists, economists, representatives from scientific-research institutes, the Ministry of Defense, and various Soviet government departments took part in developing the draft plan.

¹⁴ Research conducted in the Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Far Eastern Military Districts, October-December 1990; 1470 servicemen polled.

¹⁵ See *Kontsepsiya voennoi reformy. Proekt [The Military Reform Plan. Draft]* (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1991).

Editor's note: The original version of this plan was published in *Pravitelstvennyi vestnik*, no. 48 (November), 1990, pp. 5-10. It is translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, JPRS-UMA-90-028, pp. 52-65.

Second, when the draft Plan was being worked out, hundreds of thousands of proposals were taken into consideration; they came from people, organizations, and institutes interested in the problems of reforming military structures. An overwhelming majority of the issues related to military reform were, for the first time in Soviet history, discussed widely and democratically among the public and in the press. There were conflicts of opinion, which were frequently unpleasant, but they helped clarify the content, objectives, and purpose of the reform process.

Third, the main conflict that emerged during the preparation of the draft plan was a clash between a superficial and largely populist vision of military reform and an approach based on a scientific understanding of its content.

Fourth, the Ministry of Defense clearly did not produce the final version of its draft Military Reform Plan immediately. In other words, this document was constantly refined and supplemented by the incorporation of new work on the subject. When the first draft is compared with the last, which was presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the differences are evident. The last draft of the Military Reform Plan is still far from ideal, but it does differ from earlier versions in terms of its depth, greater specificity, and more radical approaches to the proposed transformations in military development.

The draft Military Reform Plan, approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet, proposes the following definition of the content of modern military reform. Military reform is aimed at improving the mechanism for ensuring the country's security and effective development and at bringing the USSR Armed Forces in line with the actual military threat and with the new political, economic, and social conditions.¹⁶

It can be assumed that the formula for the content of military reform will be refined and changed somewhat when it is being ratified by the USSR's highest legislative body. At the same time, it is unlikely that the approach to the content of military reform will be changed. It reflects the need for a qualitative transformation of the Soviet state's military organization in accordance with its defense and security policies, and with the changes in the military-political situation. At the same time, it must adhere to the principle of reasonable sufficiency and be based on the universal renewal of society and the fullest realization of the socioeconomic, political, and spiritual potential of Soviet society.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

Sociological surveys indicate that such an approach to military reform is shared by more than 70 percent of respondents.¹⁷

Those reflecting on the content of Soviet military reform today must not disregard its special features. They make the main purposes of reform deeper and more specific.

Above all, modern military reform is a necessary and important element of current perestroika efforts. In other words, it is one element of the radical transformations occurring in the USSR. This fact distinguishes it from previous Soviet military reforms. The belief that today's military reform is the most profound and radical in the entire history of Soviet military development is confirmed by the fact that radical transformations will be implemented in the military-political, military-economic, military-legal, military-scientific, military-technical, and social spheres of troop life. There are to be profound changes in the structure, size, and management of troops.

Today's reform of the USSR's defense complex has a very definite purpose: to be conducted in the interests of consolidating peace. This is, of course, one of the first military reforms in the world to be so highly focused on ensuring the priorities of universal human values, based on new political thinking. The contradiction in the essence of such an approach will be resolved during military reform. This reform is being carried out not so that the Soviet Union will obtain some kind of unilateral military advantages, but so as to increase the level of universal and national security. This is why the reform includes plans for unilateral reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces and for a particularly defensive orientation in the composition, structure, and equipping and training of military specialists. The principle of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense has become a top priority.

Sociological analysis of today's military reform also identifies a focus on the person. Not one of the previous military reforms conducted in the Soviet Union paid as much attention to military personnel, nor did they propose to resolve a whole host of standard of living problems. Today's military reform is focused directly on these issues. This is reflected in the redistribution of the military budget, which will be addressed later.

Current reform efforts make widespread use of world experience in military development. Ideological barriers that had previously hindered a critical and reasonable analysis of Western experience in military development have now been broken down. Today's reform is using Western experience openly, publicly, and on a wide scale. Thus,

¹⁷ See footnote 14.

for the first time, the mechanism of military reform is dialectically combining domestic and foreign experiences in military development.

Never in the history of the USSR has military reform had such a broad social base. It is being implemented not just as a reform of the armed forces, but as a reform of all elements of society's defense complex, including the defense industry and even the state of the people's social awareness. It is also interesting that essentially for the first time in the nation's history, military reform is being developed with the broad-scale participation of the people and social institutions, not just the military and those who are, in one way or another, connected with military development. As has already been noted, when the MoD Plan was being elaborated, alternative scenarios were promulgated. The highest body of state power in the country--the USSR Supreme Soviet--has the deciding word in selecting the path for military reform. In other words, for the first time in the country's history, decisions on military development belonged not to party structures, but to the nation's parliament.

The features of the USSR's military reform detailed above underscore its largely unique character. At the same time, it would be a mistake to categorize the process of reform in the Soviet Union as a phenomenon isolated from the previous experience of military development in Soviet society, a point underscored by many Western experts as well.

Military reform proposes a wide-scale and long-term program for transforming the state structures that deal with military issues, clarifying their tasks and functions, and developing the necessary legislation to regulate their activity. This is, of course, a task for the highest organs of Soviet power.

2. The Main Elements of the MoD Reform Plan

Today's reform is aimed at replacing the quantitative, extensive way of solving the country's defense missions with intensive, qualitative ways. It proposes a comprehensive and profound democratization of military life, etc. Within the draft Military Reform Plan, the system of principles defining the approaches to reform are noteworthy.¹⁸ They include political, economic, legal, organizational, and social principles, as shown in Table II-1.

¹⁸ *Kontseptsiya voennoi reformy*, pp. 7-8.

Table II-1. Principles Defining Approaches to Reform

Principle	Focus
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making the military conform quantitatively and qualitatively to the level of the actual military threat. • Maintaining a balance of the country's military forces while the balance is consistently being reduced. • Reasonably combining political and military means in ensuring security when the former has absolute priority.
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gradually reducing appropriations for military development. • Redistributing monies, allocating more funds to improve social conditions for the troops. • Converting defense industries.
Legal*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing a package of laws that will form the legal basis for the entire mechanism of military development, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •• USSR law on defense •• USSR law on the status of service personnel •• USSR law on universal military duty and military service •• Regulations on serving in the military •• Statutes for all military personnel
Organizational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combining the cadre organization of the Soviet Armed Forces with universal military service while the number of professional military servicemen gradually increases. • Manning the military to full strength based on the principle of extraterritoriality, with the republics voluntarily delegating authority to the union in national defense matters. • Having an all-state system to equip, protect, and supply these forces.
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guaranteeing social protection to all categories of service personnel in society and in the armed forces. • Making military democratic institutions a reality. • Ensuring glasnost' on issues of defense development.

*Sociological research indicates that 98.3 percent of servicemen questioned and 73 percent of civilians questioned insisted that such legal foundations be developed. A year before, these figures were 2 to 3 times lower. (Research conducted by Kokorin et al. in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia in November-December 1989 with 570 respondents and in October 1990 with 810 respondents.) This demonstrates that the people's determination to live in a genuinely legal state is growing. And, as the data indicate, this aspiration is greater among service personnel than among civilians.

The principles underlying defense reform are organically connected with the objectives and tasks of this process. They are quite clearly defined in the documents prepared by the commission that developed the draft Plan, headed by the USSR Ministry of

Defense. The key point is that military reform must ensure a scientifically based level of defense potential in accordance with the existing social realities.

It has already been noted that today's military reform is not simply dedicated to qualitatively transforming, but actually reforming, the USSR Armed Forces. How and in what ways are they to be reformed? Politicians, scientists, and military experts over the past several years have sought answers to these questions. The results of their work are embodied in the draft Military Reform Plan, which incorporates the following important ideas:

- Reorganizing the organizational-staff structure, composition, and required size of the armed forces.
- Reorganizing the structure of military administration.
- Improving the system of manning the armed forces at full strength.
- Improving the military-technical policy of the Ministry of Defense.
- Reforming the cadre policy and the system of training cadres.
- Improving training and educational work in the USSR Armed Forces.
- Establishing a system of social guarantees for service personnel.
- *Financing military development.*

Practical steps have already been taken to implement these ideas, including the following:

- Withdrawing divisions and units from the combat structure of troop groupings.
- Disbanding--that is, completely abolishing--administrative organs and troops that were being reduced.
- Lowering the combat readiness of divisions and units (significantly reducing how fully they are equipped with personnel and weapons, conserving combat equipment, and putting combat ships into the reserves).
- Reorganizing and reformulating administrative organs, divisions, and units, giving them a defensive type of structure.
- Working with released equipment and arms, including putting them into non-combat capable status, reequipping them for use in the national economy, and dismantling and recycling them.

It is now useful to discuss some of these reform efforts in greater detail. Already troop reductions have encompassed, for all intents and purposes, every branch of the Soviet Armed Forces throughout the Soviet Union and abroad, where Soviet troops are

temporarily stationed. Particular attention is paid to the Ground Troops, above all to the troops and military districts bordering both the West and the East.

During 1989-91, Soviet Armed Forces will be unilaterally reduced by 500,000 servicemen. Of that total, 240,000 troops are to be cut in the European part of the USSR; 200,000 in the eastern part of the country; and 60,000 in the southern part of the USSR. As a result of these unilateral reductions, from the time they began until the end of 1990, the size of the Armed Forces shrank by almost 300,000 men. In addition, the USSR has removed: 9,320 tanks, more than 5,050 artillery systems, and 835 combat aircraft from Europe. Of the tanks, more than 2,000 have been physically destroyed and more than 500 have been turned into auxiliary equipment and targets. The Navy has decommissioned 40 combat ships (including 12 submarines), which are also to be destroyed.

Along with these unilateral measures, the Soviet Union has proposed the following in connection with the draft Military Reform Plan:

- Upon reaching an agreement with the United States to radically reduce strategic offensive arms, decreasing the number of divisions, formations, and units and reducing the size of the Strategic Missile Troops by 30 percent;¹⁹
- Decreasing the size of the Ground Troops by 10 to 12 percent;²⁰
- Decreasing the size (by 13 to 20 percent) and significantly curtailing appropriations and deliveries of arms and military equipment to the Air Defense (PVO) Troops;²¹
- Reducing the size of the Air Forces by 6 to 8 percent by improving the organizational-staff structure;²²
- Decreasing administrative personnel for central, district, and army units by 15 to 20 percent,²³ and reducing administrative organs for divisions, formations, units, and institutions that are not within a branch of the USSR Armed Forces and are not connected with executing combat missions by 30 percent.²⁴
- Reducing the number of military schools and scientific-research institutions.²⁵

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., p. 16.

²³ Ibid., p.17.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 16.

²⁵ Ibid.

It is also proposed to implement other steps aimed at reducing the armed forces as well as their weapons and military equipment. Depending on how the world military-political situation develops, all these measures will make it possible to reduce the size of the USSR Armed Forces to 3 to 3.2 million men.²⁶ This is the most immediate task. In the future, as military reform continues, their number could be cut to 2.5 million men.²⁷

These and other measures that are part of the USSR's military reform are to be implemented in three stages.²⁸ In the first stage (until 1994), efforts will focus on reducing nuclear and conventional arms, completing the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary (1991)²⁹ and Mongolia (1992), and essentially withdrawing troops from Germany. Strategic groupings will be created on Soviet territory to repulse aggression. And the USSR Civil Defense and railroad-construction divisions and units will be removed from the Soviet Armed Forces.

All operational and mobilization plans will be reworked and new legislation will be prepared to regulate military development. Troops will be relocated and weapons and military equipment will also be stationed in the Soviet Union. The program for the social protection of service personnel and their families as well as for those discharged from active military service will begin to be realized.

In the second stage (1994-1995), the reductions in the USSR Armed Forces will basically be completed, the groundwork will be laid for their new composition and structure, and Soviet troops will be completely withdrawn from Germany. The central apparatus will be reorganized, while the internal structure of military districts, the military school system, and a number of other necessary measures will be refined.

In the third stage (1996-2000), a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear forces will be entirely completed. A series of efforts to improve the qualitative parameters of the USSR Armed Forces will continue, and a technical rearmament of the troops and naval forces will be completed in accordance with the armament program to the year 2000. Depending on the military-political situation, the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, troop arms, and administrative organs could be reorganized. The program for the social

²⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²⁹ *Editor's note:* These withdrawals were completed in June 1991, as scheduled.

protection of service personnel and their families will be fully executed. Thus, military reform has quite stringent landmarks both in its content and in its timetable.

These observations about the content, objectives, and purpose of military reform in the USSR hardly encompass all its nuances. At the same time, the observations contained here do provide a detailed overall sociological picture. This should make it possible to understand the gist of the tasks of reform both for the entire defense complex of the Soviet Union and for its Armed Forces.

In terms of looking at future reform plans, the events of 19-21 August 1991 have obviously affected military development issues in several ways. For one thing, there has been an unusual growth in the amount of attention the public is paying to life in the Armed Forces. In addition, the process of military reform has become a practical matter rather than just a theoretical one. Finally, initiatives in military reform have been transferred from the "center" (the union leadership) to the republics. This centrifugal trend raises doubts about the possibility of having a unified, statewide plan for military reform.

3. Public Input to the MoD Plan

In concluding this overview of the Military Reform Plan submitted by the Ministry of Defense to the Supreme Soviet, several observations can be made about work on this plan and the public's participation in its elaboration. For one thing, widespread public participation significantly enriched the work on military reform. Indeed, many proposals, even from non-specialists, are reflected in the Ministry of Defense's Military Reform Plan. Unfortunately, however, most of the proposals by non-specialists were not constructive. In fact, only two proposals out of every 100 suggested were constructive. Most of these efforts criticized the existing state of affairs without offering constructive suggestions. Also, many proposals reflected populist and scientifically ill-founded views of military life.

Public understanding of military reform also tended to focus on only one question: how to staff the armed forces. In fact, up to 85 percent of all the ideas and proposals revolved around this issue. While it is certainly an important question, it is hardly the only one that needs to be addressed in military reform.

Another point is that, especially during the first stage of elaborating the military reform concept, the military-technical and financial aspects of the reform were studied more carefully and extensively than the sociopolitical, legal, and spiritual aspects. Considerably greater attention was paid to these latter questions during the next stage. For example, the

sociopolitical consequences of reducing the Armed Forces and withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe were assessed very skillfully when the last version of the draft Military Reform Plan was created.

As previously noted, the draft Military Reform Plan, worked out in the Ministry of Defense, has been constantly refined and has been enriched by additional research. For example, some changes have already been made even to the content of the draft that was published, which was considered at that time to have been complete.³⁰

Finally, representatives from various social groups and political organizations worked on this plan. Quite logically, a special commission of the Ministry of Defense had the lead in this effort. But priority was not given to this commission *a priori*; the commission won this right based on the thoroughness and scientific validity of its work. Nevertheless, this did not rule out the development of an alternative reform proposal, outlined in the following section.

C. MILITARY REFORM: ALTERNATIVE PLANS

1. Reasons Behind the Alternatives

Many Soviet people have become aware that there are alternative approaches to military reform in the Soviet Union. Available data indicates that 9 out of 10 respondents in the USSR accept the need for such alternatives.³¹ It is not difficult to understand why this idea has taken hold in Soviet society.

The search for alternatives to any societal issue has become a concrete expression and distinctive feature of democratization and glasnost'. In other words, many people perceive the existence of alternatives to be a sociological indicator of the normal development of democracy and glasnost'. Most of those who support an alternative reform plan believe that because the draft Military Reform Plan was prepared by the Ministry of Defense, which is an official state structure, there must necessarily be an alternative scenario for reform created by "democratic" forces.

People are also eager to participate in discussions of military reform since for so long military issues were closed to them. Publications in the press and statements about military problems in other segments of the mass media indicate that the openness of the

³⁰ See "On the Military Reform Plan," *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, no. 48 (November), 1990.

Armed Forces to society has increased in recent years by 6 to 7 times.³² Many Soviet people see a connection between this trend and the existence of alternative points of view and approaches to solving the tasks of military development.³³

The mass media is playing an important role in pushing for alternatives to all military development issues as well. Listening to the radio or television or reading the press, the average person is 1.7 times more likely to hear or read the reform ideas of the so-called "new democratic wave" (where the most diverse group of people are gathered under one banner), who frequently criticize what the Ministry of Defense has proposed.

The increased opportunity for military servicemen to express their own ideas about military reform in the USSR has also contributed to the existence of alternative approaches. It has already been noted that the Main and Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense received tens of thousands of letters, which included the most diverse proposals for reforming the Armed Forces. Some of these proposals contradicted the content of the MoD's reform plan, while others contradicted each other. For example, some of them believed it possible to transition in the very near future to a volunteer system for staffing the Armed Forces, while others opposed this idea.

In addition to servicemen and the media, various political organizations have been quite active on the subject of military reform. Their approaches are wide-ranging: from openly conservative to innovative. For example, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists supports universally arming the people, thereby promoting a view different from all other parties on future military development.³⁴ Those who have rejected universal military service include the youth organization "For Fatherland and Freedom" (Latvia), the Democratic Alliance, and the Democratic Party,³⁵ while the United Front of Soviet Workers and the CPSU assert the opposite position. The Moscow People's Front assumes that universal military service can continue to exist.³⁶ Several organizations advocate transitioning to a professional army: the Democratic Alliance, Democratic Party, Russian

31 Research conducted in January 1991 by Kokorin et al., 530 respondents.

32 This figure is derived through an analysis of 2,000 selected publications in the Soviet press in 1984 and 1989.

33 Based on research conducted in June-July 1990, 890 respondents.

34 See *Voennye voprosy v dokumentakh politicheskikh...*, pp. 146-148.

35 Ibid., p. 149.

36 Ibid., p. 150.

People's Front, the Association of the United Council of Russia, the Belorussian People's Front, and the Liberal-Democratic Party.³⁷ In contrast, the National-Patriotic Front *Pamyat'* is singularly opposed to this idea.³⁸

In short, political groups in the USSR have significantly increased the number of alternative ideas for military reform. These ideas have been manifested in three ways: advancing proposals for reform that are opposed to those contained in the Ministry of Defense's draft; contradictions among proposals advanced by various political structures; and fundamental differences in the approaches to resolving military development issues by particular political organizations.

Finally, the Western mass media worked quite intensely to bolster the idea of having alternatives. Such is their right, and it is difficult to challenge this in a democratic society. In short, the influence of the Western mass media is certainly one of the objective reasons why the Soviet public has come to grasp the reality of having official and unofficial alternatives for Soviet military reform.

2. A Comparison of the Reform Plans

Do alternative military reform plans exist in the USSR? There is no simple yes or no answer. It was noted earlier that two documents have been offered as draft plans for Soviet military reform.³⁹ One was prepared by the Ministry of Defense, the other by a group of People's Deputies. They have both been published.⁴⁰ These documents have more or less integrated and systemic views. Thus, they can be categorized as draft plans and can be compared to determine how much of an alternative they offer.

Besides these two, there have been many proposals about the theory of modern military reform, but these tend to be individual reflections on some particular aspect of military development. They cannot be viewed as an overall plan or as an alternative plan, especially since the concept of military reform represents an integrated system of views and

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 168-170.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

³⁹ When this paper was written, this was an accurate reflection of the state of affairs, in my view. However, since the coup of August 1991, the situation has changed. Various republics--including the Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Georgia--have now proposed their own alternatives to the union-level plan for military reform.

⁴⁰ See *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, no. 48 (November), 1990. (Editor's note: Both plans have also been translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, JPRS-UMA-90-028, pp. 52-70.)

ideas about reforming the country's defense complex. Thus, a comparative analysis of reform plans can be limited to those provided by the Ministry of Defense and the group of USSR People's Deputies.

The comparative analysis contained below mainly seeks to answer the following questions:

- What do the proposals have in common?
- What are their substantial differences?
- What are their strengths and weaknesses?
- What version seems to be the most realistic and preferable in terms of actually being implemented?

Regarding the first question, the two plans do, in fact, have much in common. The underlying premise in both of them is that military reform must be implemented. The reasons for reform are reflected to varying degrees. In both versions, the main purposes for reform are effectively the same: reducing the size of the armed forces; raising the technical level of their equipment; reducing the administrative apparatus; changing the methods for staffing the armed forces; creating a mechanism for social protection of service personnel; searching for an optimal legal basis for military reform, etc.

The two drafts also provide--to a greater or lesser extent--for the coordination of military-political, military, military-economic, and social aspects of reform. This is an important consideration since military reform involves many aspects. Without combining all these problems into one unified system, finding an optimal solution would be difficult, if not unlikely.

Both documents are based on the results of certain sociological analyses, conducted mainly by specialists at the Ministry of Defense, particularly in the Main Political Administration. Admittedly, the completeness of these analyses differ in the two plans.

Another similarity is that both versions presume that the reform process will be implemented in stages. They each focus on three stages, but the time schedules for these stages differ substantially.

Both drafts seek to create the conditions for the democratization of army life and to broadly involve society in resolving questions of military development.

Both versions assume that the areas in which civilian specialists are used in the armed forces will be expanded, especially in the rear services, medical service, financial support, military schools, science, and a number of other areas.

These two drafts are also virtually identical in their structure. They contain the following common sections: the basis of the need for reform; the content of military reform; its financing; and a definition of the stages for qualitative changes in military development.

Finally, both drafts pay considerable attention to further radical changes in living conditions for the troops: housing construction, pensions, increasing wages, working out a mechanism for the social protection of servicemen, etc.

Such are the main aspects of commonality between the two drafts. Based on these common features, the plans can scarcely be viewed as being radically opposed to each other. In fact, they coincide in the main, although they differ in the details. Nevertheless, the sense that they represent alternative approaches has taken hold. How and why has this happened?

Above all, the authors of these two reform packages have not accepted the other's positions. In other words, the differences lie not so much in the content of the drafts as in the positions of the people who compiled them. Opposition between these people on other issues has affected the military reform plan. This was particularly evident in the submission of the People's Deputies' proposal. They submitted it *a priori* and without any analysis as an alternative to the plan by the Ministry of Defense commission; however, it does not seem to be sufficiently different to warrant consideration as an alternative.

Differences between these two versions do exist, but they pertain to unimportant and largely individual issues. To a significant extent, it was the mass media that made these drafts alternatives to each other. Differences between the plans are evident in terms of whether the changes can realistically be implemented. Whereas the deputies' version focuses on 4 to 5 years, the Ministry of Defense's version identifies a longer period of time--until the year 2000. Thus, the process of reform would last 10 to 13 years.

The plans differ as well in how scientifically based their principles are. The Ministry of Defense's draft appears preferable; it is more serious, well thought out, and appropriate to the actual economic potential of the Soviet state. Still, many of its positions could be more deeply and thoroughly elaborated.

The People's Deputies' version appears more radical at first glance. Such was the impression created among the Soviet public and even among certain Western experts. A major reason for this impression is the draft's focus on implementing qualitative changes in military development in a shorter period of time than the Ministry of Defense's version, making a faster transition to voluntary staffing of the military, and making intensive changes to the party-political structures functioning in the military. To that extent, the plan is radical in terms of its time frame. Indeed, it hardly seems possible that this military reform plan could be implemented in 4 or 5 years, particularly given economic considerations.

Military reform requires additional financial expenditures. Yet the state has no spare money sitting in reserve. The money can and must be obtained as a result of optimizing and raising public production, but the latter is currently in a crisis. Additional monies and a considerable amount of time will be needed to get out of this crisis. According to economists' forecasts, it will take more than 5 years to accomplish this. Thus, barring a miracle, in the next few years the state will hardly be able to come up with spare money for carrying out radical military reform. The monies will be found gradually, a fact that underscores the need to quickly reform military structures.

Funding can be obtained in the near term (and a portion of it has actually already been received) by redistributing budget items. But money obtained this way will not be enough for quick, radical changes in the country's defense complex. Moreover, the priority of budgetary allocations in the coming years will be on developing manufacturing and pulling it out of its crisis. Consequently, it should not be expected that military reform will be first in line for financial subsidies.

In addition, the conversion of military production, the destruction of chemical and nuclear-missile weapons, and conventional arms reductions have proven expensive. Yet these were items that many specialists were counting on to obtain additional financial resources.

Finally, it is absurd to believe (as some proposals argue) that the monies for military reform will appear in the next 4 to 5 years from personnel cuts in the armed forces. Savings will certainly accrue, but not that quickly. Therefore, it is difficult to accept such arguments voiced by both specialists and non-specialists in military affairs. The following is an example of typical reasoning on this subject.

A reduction in the armed forces, say by 1.5 million men, will mean that these people will return to public production. Each of them will produce 25,000 to 30,000 rubles worth of goods. This creates additional national wealth, a portion of which should be used to carry out military reform. This is what Deputy Viktor Podziruk said in an interview with the newspaper *Shchit* in the first issue of 1990.⁴¹ At first glance, the logic is convincing. However, an analysis of how to actually implement it shows otherwise.

In order for people either cut from the Armed Forces or not drafted into military service to be included in public production, they must be adapted to it. For this reason, schools will be needed to reeducate former military specialists and teach them civilian professions; large numbers of social problems (supplying apartments, kindergartens, nurseries, schools) will have to be solved for the families of servicemen discharged from the armed forces; large numbers of people from certain regions of the country will have to be relocated to other regions, etc. Each such step initially requires new expenditures as well as society's readiness to accept demobilized servicemen. Is society ready to do this now or in the near term? Apparently not. Here are just a few reasons.

First, the resources still have not been allocated to help servicemen adapt to civilian life after they have been discharged in keeping with the decision to unilaterally reduce the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men. Unfortunately, all the possible scenarios for the evolution of this process were not fully thought through, and in the near term issues such as legal guarantees have not been completely worked out. In a word, society is finding it difficult to resolve the problems associated with current troop reductions; because of its unpreparedness to help those discharged from the Armed Forces adapt to civilian life, the reductions will take up to 3 years to complete. It is hardly likely that society will be able to solve the problems associated with a second stage of reductions more easily or effectively.

The second reason is that a new, significant cut in the Armed Forces will compound existing social problems that have not been fully resolved, and more money will be required. Funds are needed for housing, and three-quarters of the wives of officers and warrant officers have not been placed in jobs and do not receive necessary compensation for this. For several years, these problems have not been resolved because of a lack of funds, and the new problems created by force reductions make a rapid resolution seem uncertain at best.

⁴¹ *Editor's note:* *Shchit* is also the name of one of the military's political organizations, translated as Shield.

The third reason is that a new cut in the Soviet Armed Forces and placing servicemen in public production will be complicated by the fact that this would occur simultaneously with the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe and Mongolia. This scenario raises its own set of problems, the resolution of which will again require additional monies. In a word, there is hardly cause for optimism that discharged servicemen could be rapidly placed into production roles or that they would soon produce material benefits, let alone that the additional resources they might create could be used to carry out military reform.

The fourth reason is that finding places for discharged servicemen in the public sector will be made difficult by the transition to a market economy and by possible unemployment, which will, of course, also affect a portion of those people discharged from the Armed Forces. Incidentally, sociological research indicates that 58 percent of the servicemen responding view the transition to a market guardedly, 31 percent believe that this process will be difficult and will be both positive and negative for servicemen, while only 11 percent expect an improvement.⁴²

The fifth reason is that the claim that each worker in our country produces an average of 25,000 to 30,000 rubles worth of goods each year is simply erroneous. In reality, this figure is much lower.

Thus, while sharing the aspiration of those who would like to reform Soviet military development in a short period of time, the author finds it difficult to agree with those who think this can be done very quickly. Accelerating the process of reform without the necessary financial base threatens to destroy the entire reform effort, and the people will not accept this. The question about the length of time necessary for reforming the USSR's defense complex cannot be used in a struggle for political power or for public opinion. Nevertheless, certain political forces frequently try to use it for just this purpose, claiming to be innovators and tying the label of conservatism around those who approach the question of the possible pace of reform not in a populist way, but seriously and on the basis of reason.

A shift in public perceptions and attitudes toward the two proposals has been evident. In early 1990, the People's Deputies' reform plan gained 8 to 10 percent every

⁴² Research conducted by Kokorin and other military sociologists in December 1990, 910 respondents. Research conducted by the same people in May-June 1991 showed that 84 to 87 percent of the servicemen responding believe that a transition to market relations is now inevitable.

month, reaching the peak of its popularity in July-August. But then a reverse process began, and belief in this plan began to fall at approximately the same rate as it had risen. The plan began to be openly criticized for its contradictions, and frequently for superficiality and incompetence. Vladimir Lopatin, one of the main initiators in creating the People's Deputies' plan, was subjected to serious criticism. All the military delegates who met with President Gorbachev on 13 November 1990 expressed their distrust of Lopatin's reform option. However, following the August 1991 coup, interest in this option for military reform began to increase once again.

The results of sociological research indicate that, in early 1991, only 8 to 12 percent of military respondents believed in the ideas of the People's Deputies' plan. Admittedly, this does not mean that they accepted unconditionally all the ideas of the Ministry of Defense's plan. Still, after the MoD draft was published, the number of its supporters among civilian respondents increased by 17 to 21 percent, and among military people by 39 percent. Yet in the aftermath of the August 1991 events, these trends are not so important. Ideas from both proposals are now being implemented.

The Ministry of Defense's version rejects the possibility of creating national-territorial formations, while the People's Deputies' version allows for this. Here, then, is one of the differences between the two plans. The creation of such formations would apparently be a new step toward democratizing military development in the USSR and a means of solving certain contradictions mainly in relations among various Soviet nationalities; such tensions have been vividly manifested in the Soviet Union recently. However, it must also be taken into consideration that politicians and nationalist leaders, especially in the Baltics, Caucasus, and Moldova have used armed paramilitary formations for their own ambitious interests. What actually happens will show which proposal is closer to reality.

The plans also differ in their approach to how Soviet military development will be administered. The Ministry of Defense sees it as a prerogative of the Union; the People's Deputies' plan allows that the republics could have their own Ministry of Defense (or committee). This idea is not very clearly reflected in the text of the People's Deputies' draft. It is considerably clearer in reality, however, where security and defense committees have been established in a number of republics, such as Russia. It is not difficult to see that such a step contributes to the movement to create republic armed forces. Even today some of these committees are insisting on divvying up the Soviet Armed Forces, including the Union's nuclear-missile potential. The many dangers associated with such actions are

obvious, dangers that the West understands. It is one thing to have one nuclear power in the form of the Soviet Union. It is another thing to have 15 nuclear countries, or even more (since several autonomous republics are in the process of being organized into union republics). Such actions would certainly weaken world security, given that nuclear-missile weapons would be found in the hands of certain political dilettantes, including extremists and nationalists.

The People's Deputies' plan specifically raises the idea that the Minister of Defense should be a civilian, a subject that the Ministry of Defense's plan does not address. This represents another difference between the two plans. The main argument of those who support having a civilian minister rests on the experience of other countries, above all that of the United States. Without minimizing this experience, for the USSR's military development, the uniform the Minister of Defense wears is not what is important. What is important is what kind of decisions he will make and his capacity to lead the country's Armed Forces, including their reform. Sociological research largely confirms the viability of such an approach for the Soviet Union. Ten to 12 percent of respondents actively support having a civilian minister of defense, 28 percent are undecided, and 38 percent do not consider it to be a relevant question, believing that what is important is that those involved in military development be professionals and people knowledgeable in military affairs. Of the servicemen questioned, 93 percent support having a military officer as Minister of Defense, but one who is genuinely capable, politically knowledgeable, and a specialist who understands military affairs well.⁴³

The two drafts also differ in their approaches. The Ministry of Defense's draft includes sections that are not contained in the People's Deputies' draft (such as the USSR's military cooperation with foreign countries); the former plan is more complex and has more elements. The MoD's plan devotes less attention to proclamations and focuses more on the substantive issues related to reform. Most important, this plan answers three vital questions: what must be done, how much will it cost, and who will pay. The People's Deputies' version charts what has not been done and what must be done, in the deputies' opinion. It does not answer the question of how military reform will be financed and by whom. Such appear to be the most substantial differences between the two reform plans.

In summary, the strengths and weaknesses of each plan are as follows, beginning with the strengths of the People's Deputies' plan.

⁴³ Research conducted in June-July 1990.

- It reflects quite well all the social problems that must be solved during military reform.
- It uses the results of selected sociological research.
- It divides the leadership and control of military policy into proper political, administrative, and military levels and it creates a system for interaction among them.
- It transfers military development from the party to the state leadership on a legal basis.
- It demands that the military budget be concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of Defense.
- The plan aims to humanize army life and to strengthen its legal basis.
- It provides some interesting proposals concerning the training of reserves within the context of switching the army to a volunteer-professional structure.
- It reduces administrative apparatus within the military.
- It calls for reform to be implemented in stages.
- It contains proposals for helping servicemen discharged into the reserves to adapt socially and economically.

These merits are to a considerable extent weakened by the shortcomings of the People's Deputies' plan. The most fundamental of these shortcomings are the following:

- The plan provides no foundation for each of the proposals identified in the plan, it frequently relies on unverified data, and it fails to use well-known information from official state services and institutions (for example, ideas about the military budget).
- The tone in selecting the directions of reform is highly declarative, authoritarian, and categorical. For instance, it is not explained why the territorial principle should prevail for army and reserve units. As a rule, assertions are made without explaining how the ideas can be implemented.
- The plan focuses on Western experience, paying less attention to the special features and history of military development in the Soviet Union. Yet it is in the USSR that the reform process will occur.
- The concentration is mainly on the social aspects of reform; there are virtually no proposals for military-technical reform. Although the former aspects are extremely important, the latter cannot be ignored.
- There is considerable focus on proclamations and less emphasis on constructive ideas.

- The plan fails to take full account of the dynamics of the military-political situation. The People's Deputies treat this as a constant, which is hardly justifiable.
- There is widespread use of indefinite concepts, such as "significantly reducing the number of personnel" (what does this mean, by how much, who will do this?).
- Despite a certain degree of radicalism in the deputies' reform plan, it does not address many very important issues. For instance, it neglects the issue of alternative service, which has become unusually important for the country.

What merits does the Ministry of Defense's plan have?

- Its proposals have validity and it identifies possible financial costs. In short, it is more realistic.
- This is the first plan in the history of Soviet military development that is so open. It identifies all the principal measures that will determine military policy right up to the year 2000.
- It organically connects the problems of reforming virtually all aspects of society: political, economic, social, military, and spiritual. It is based on current Soviet reality. The plan is sufficiently radical, and the degree of its radicalism is basically well-founded.
- To a greater extent than ever before, these documents work out social problems and issues concerning the social protection of servicemen. This plan testifies to the fact that the USSR Ministry of Defense is taking a serious and well-founded step toward professionalizing the armed forces.
- The plan is realistic in that it considered the difficulties that are truly impeding reform. Sociological research indicates that it is these characteristics of the plan that most impress 68 percent of respondents.⁴⁴

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense's plan has had its own inadequacies and a number of aspects require further elaboration.

- It took an unjustifiably long time to prepare.
- It was not published for a long time, which made the public think that the Ministry of Defense was adhering to conservative positions, as it had before.
- While working out the plan, a great deal of time and effort was put into military and military-technical problems, while less effort was put into the issues of

⁴⁴ See footnote 31.

social protection for servicemen and members of their family. Only the plan's later versions address this important group of questions.

- The plan does not fully consider the fact that military reform will occur in a multiparty system. It does not contain a mechanism to solve the reform tasks under such circumstances.

3. Some Final Considerations About the Two Reform Plans

Obviously, neither of these plans can be implemented in a vacuum. The tensions created by deteriorating relations among Soviet nationalities and republics cannot be underestimated. They are capable of impeding the realization of the best ideas contained in these military reform plans.

In concluding this comparative analysis of these two plans, several points must be kept in mind. First, the analysis is based on independent expertise, but this cannot eliminate the author's own attitude toward the content of these two plans and singling out what is most vital.

Second, the author is aware of all the arguments connected with the content of the plans and their evolution. In its last version, the Ministry of Defense's plan became immeasurably more radical, while the People's Deputies' plan became more moderate and, therefore, more reasonable and well-balanced.

Third, the author conducted the sociological research accompanying this comparative analysis of the two plans, which made it possible to reflect people's attitudes toward these plans more objectively than is done in the mass media. At the same time, the results of this research should not be regarded as absolute since the situation in the Soviet Union is so dynamic that it often changes radically in the course of a week.

Finally, the fact that the Ministry of Defense's plan has priority is corroborated by the actions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which approved it after suggesting some slight clarifications. These clarifications have already been incorporated into the plan's text. It is thus likely that in the near term the MoD Plan will be adopted as the official document of state policy on reforming the Soviet Union's defense complex.

III. SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REFORM

How to finance military reform is, of course, an important and fundamental question. Numerous reform plans--some more radical than others--can be developed, but they will not materialize unless they are economically sustainable, as world experience has shown.

The problem of financing Soviet military reform is now at the center of public attention. Recently supporters of deep, radical reform of the Soviet Union's defense complex launched an intensive search for the best and fastest way of implementing military reform with the least expense. It was especially important to determine the country's real financial potential and to correlate that potential with the expenses inevitably associated with transforming the entire Soviet defense complex. The task proved far from simple. Various approaches were developed and the proponents of each were passionate in their stance. A sociological analysis offers an understanding of the different points of view about financing military reform.

A. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR REFORM ARE BOTH REAL AND NECESSARY

1. Different Schools of Thought

There are at least four schools of thought regarding the financing of reform. According to proponents of the first school, the USSR is fully prepared to implement military reform. The process can be completed in a short 4 to 5 years, they contend, and it does not require additional material or financial expenditures. As a rule, such a viewpoint is not argued seriously, but in the best traditions of a populist approach, it is proclaimed at meetings, in disputes, and in numerous publications. And if it is argued, it is done very superficially. An example of such a line of argument was given by Viktor Podziruk in the January 1990 issue of the newspaper *Shchit*, discussed in Chapter II, above (see footnote 41 and related text).

The second school includes people who believe that the USSR is not economically ready to implement military reform; they caution against beginning to implement reform

without first amassing the necessary resources. Such concerns have some validity, but at the same time, categorically stating that the Soviet Union has no financial reserves and that no new potential will open up is just as untrue as the claim that reform can be carried out easily and without any problems. Selected research shows that 8 to 9 percent of respondents support the first "extremely optimistic" approach, while 11 to 12 percent of respondents support the second, pessimistic approach.¹ In other words, a relative balance has been established between the two extremes.

The third school is the one most widely represented in Soviet society. It is supported by 61 to 62 percent of the respondents, according to available data.² Advocates of this approach reason that military reform should be implemented even though the country is not fully ready for it economically. They believe that using available resources to resolve the tasks of economic reform will, at the same time, strengthen the material base for military reform. Such an approach is the most realistic, although it is not without its problems. According to numerous estimates, the difficulties in implementing military reform will be considerably greater than can be assumed from its first steps.

Finally, the fourth group of people includes those who have no real opinion about possible approaches to military reform or its economic foundations (17 to 20 percent of respondents).³ Their ambivalence is largely justified because the Soviet Union's financial position is actually very complicated. However, this fact does not eliminate the need to determine the real and necessary economic foundations for Soviet military reform.

Given the disparate viewpoints among the Soviet population and the need for a convincing answer about economic readiness and the economic problems associated with military reform, it is necessary to do two things. On the one hand, one must synthesize the conclusions of Soviet and foreign economic experts on this point; on the other hand, one must do one's own economic analysis since available information on this subject is lacking in both volume and depth. The author undertook the latter effort using a methodology wherein he:

1. Determined which items in the MoD's reform plan would require additional expenditures and which items would provide financial resources.
2. Made a comparative analysis of these items and drew conclusions.

¹ Research conducted in November-December 1990 by Kokorin et al., 690 respondents.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

3. Examined the results of this analysis from the viewpoint of the resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense for current and future years.
4. Calculated how military reform would be financed given the USSR's entry into a market economy. (This was necessary because the first steps of transitioning to a market economy have already affected efforts to reform the armed forces.)
5. Used the experience of military reform in a number of countries, including the United States, to help forecast possible expenditures.

2. Additional Resource Requirements

An analysis of the content and basic purposes of military reform made it possible to single out the items that will require additional expenditures. Without pretending to identify all such items, this section describes the main ones, with an emphasis less on the military-technical aspects of the problem than on the social aspects.

a. Increasing Personnel Costs

In connection with the need to improve the social and living standards of servicemen and their families, the need for significant pay increases has been raised. According to data from the Central Financial Administration of the Ministry of Defense, the average salary of officers and warrant officers in the Soviet Armed Forces is 257 rubles per month (in 1990). This figure is lower than the national subsistence wage. Moreover, the fact that civilians with the same qualifications are consistently paid more than military personnel certainly does nothing to stimulate military labor and productivity. Calculations by economists show that, under present circumstances, this figure must be raised to 430 rubles, or an additional 150-180 rubles per month for each officer and warrant officer.

Increases in officers' salaries must begin as soon as possible. Today's situation and the reform process are providing the impetus. Even now some substantial--although insufficient--economic steps are being taken to raise the living standards of servicemen. Nevertheless, looking at the USSR Ministry of Defense's budget for 1991, 19.3 billion rubles out of the overall defense budget of 98,562,846,000 rubles is allocated for personnel expenses.⁴ This is 0.9 billion rubles less than in 1990. In short, appropriations need to be increased, but reality does not allow this. Admittedly, some savings from current and planned reductions in military personnel could be used to raise the salaries of the remaining servicemen. However, these reductions--and hence the savings--will not

⁴ See "How Much Does Defense Cost," *Izvestiya*, 12 January 1991.

happen very quickly since society is not prepared to help large numbers of former servicemen adapt to civilian life.

Moreover, new expenses are inevitable not only for professional personnel (officers and warrant officers), but also for temporary personnel. Spending on each soldier, sailor, and sergeant must be tripled or quadrupled, even without transitioning to a volunteer-professional force. For example, each soldier being discharged into the reserves now receives an allowance of about 100 rubles. This idea alone significantly raises the cost of temporary personnel. In addition, the first volunteer-professional structures will soon appear in the Soviet Armed Forces, as provided for in the Military Reform Plan. They will first be established in the navy in 1991. An economic analysis, conducted by Professor I. Yudin, provides the following data: a soldier and a sergeant in such units must be paid not 9 rubles per month as is now the case, but 200 to 320 rubles; that is, 22 to 36 times more.⁵ However, initial experiments in several units indicate that even 350 rubles a month for a professional soldier is not enough. This pay level will not ensure that military structures will be fully manned. Consequently, the cost for professional soldiers must increase 40 times or more over the existing level; moreover, the number of these professional soldiers will grow.

Finally, in terms of additional personnel expenditures, one must take into account the need to create a permanent material incentive program. Such systems exist in other countries, such as the United States. Tracing the growth of salaries for servicemen and civil servants in the U.S. armed forces, one can see that, beginning in 1973, the money has increased between 2 and 14.3 percent annually, as shown in Table III-1. In the United States, expenditures increased as a result of compensation for inflation and standard-of-living increases for service personnel. These costs can be even greater in the USSR than in the United States since the starting point for the servicemen in the Soviet Armed Forces is worse than it had been for their counterparts in the U.S. military.

⁵ I. Yudin, "The Cost of Chivalrous Expenditures," *Ekonomika i zhizn'*, no. 1 (1 January), 1990.

**Table III-1. Wage Increases for U.S. Military Personnel and Civillians
(percentage)**

Date of the Increase	Military Personnel	Civillians
1 October 1973	4.8%	4.8%
1 October 1974	5.5	5.5
1 October 1975	5.0	5.0
1 October 1976	4.8	4.8
1 October 1977	7.0	7.0
1 October 1978	5.5	5.5
1 October 1979	7.0	7.0
1 October 1980	11.7	9.1
1 October 1981	14.3	4.8
1 October 1982	4.0	4.0
1 January 1984	4.0	4.0
1 January 1985	4.0	3.5
1 October 1985	3.0	—
1 January 1987	3.0	3.0
1 January 1988	2.0	2.0
1 January 1989	4.1	4.1
1 January 1990	3.6	3.6

b. New Staffing Methods and Associated Costs

All these additional expenditures are connected with the current staffing and composition of the Soviet Armed Forces and with the staffing method established in the Military Reform Plan. This plan proposes a mixed method for staffing the Armed Forces: a universal draft and volunteer-professional components.

At the same time, arguments persist in the literature that advocate other staffing options that will affect military personnel costs. The idea of fully professionalizing the Soviet Armed Forces is being studied very actively. Some experts have concluded that the personnel costs for a professional force would not exceed existing costs.⁶ Others believe that the costs would rise to 60 billion rubles, which exceeds by more than 40 billion the

⁶ Ibid.

existing level of expenditures.⁷ The selection of substantially different assumptions for the calculations explains these differences of opinion.

The ones who are most realistic are those who examine not just one but several possible options. Calculations have been made on how many men the Armed Forces will need: option 1--3.877 million men; option 2--3.200 million men; option 3--2.800 million men; and option 4--2.500 million men. In fact, under each of these options, switching to a volunteer-professional staffing system promises to require additional funds. For example, under the third option, personnel costs will inevitably increase by 5.8 to 6.8 billion rubles.⁸ The increase would be somewhat less under the fourth option and would, of course, be more under the first or second options based on the same initial assumptions. Under a mixed staffing system, for any of these options it is certainly necessary to at least double the wages of officers and warrant officers immediately, and to triple or quadruple pay to soldiers and sergeants. For a volunteer-professional force, these figures would obviously be several times higher.

There is every reason to expect that additional resources will be also needed because of the acute problems of manning the Soviet Armed Forces according to the current system. Namely, problems of separatism and nationalism, which have come into conflict with the principle of universal military service, have resulted in additional expenses. Money has been needed for previously unplanned work related to reforming the activities of the military commissariats and draft centers, and to setting up numerous groups to explain military issues.

Finally, some costs, though perhaps not as large as those for other items, are involved in reducing the length of conscripts' service in the Soviet Armed Forces from 24 to 18 months. The rate of draft call-ups and discharges will intensify and, among other things, each soldier and sergeant discharged into the reserves will receive severance pay. This program was initiated last year.

c. Military Reform and Associated Costs

Additional monies have been necessary to promote military reform as well. The USSR must still create a real working system for advertising life in the Armed Forces. This is necessary both because of the declining prestige of the military in society and

⁷ See "Protecting the People's Security," *Pravda*, 22 February 1990.

⁸ See *Armia i obshchestvo* [*The Army and Society*] (Moscow: Progress, 1990), p. 347.

because of military reform efforts. Soviet television has neither a permanently operating channel for the armed forces nor special programs. The hour-long weekly show, "Serving the Fatherland," is not under the control of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but is under the authority of the Committee of State Television and Radio, a monopoly. And while the Soviet Armed Forces need advertising as never before, increasing costs are an important consideration. Until 1 January 1991, a one-minute television ad cost 12,000 rubles to air and another 5,000 to prepare. This year the costs will inevitably rise.

American readers certainly do not need to have explained to them the costs associated with advertising. But what should be noted is that money is being spent to create an apparatus to advertise the Armed Forces. The apparatus is already partially in place, with the founding of the first television-radio association, Radar, which will specifically address military themes, including military reform issues. It should become a leader in illuminating military problems. Obviously, beyond the initial costs, additional money will have to be spent until the association can show a profit.

As a result of the USSR's transition to a market economy and its difficult economic situation, more money will be required to provide the military with the supplies it needs, including food, fuel, spare parts, and uniforms. In addition, the transition to a market economy makes the need to establish a stable and reserve insurance fund for the Ministry of Defense a genuine concern. This is incorporated in the draft Plan for the Armed Forces' Transition to a Market Economy.⁹ To accomplish this vital task, the plan is to take from 2 to 5 percent of total MoD allocations and to use them as a reserve fund. The cost of establishing a state insurance system for servicemen will be about 300 million rubles in the near future. The Soviet Armed Forces do not have these kinds of funds, except for the small annual remunerations to officers which do not exceed 350 rubles.

Incentive funds exist in other countries' armies with good effect. For example, the U.S. Army allocated \$39.4 million in 1988 and \$58.6 million in 1990 to increase wages and expand its incentive programs. Similarly, during the USSR's full-fledged reform, one important task has been to establish funds for the troops' social and material well-being. New services would include social-psychological assistance, military-political information, a public relations office, and a central economic agency for the Ministry of Defense. Funds

⁹ *Kontseptsiya perekhoda vooruzhennykh sil k rynku. Proekt. [The Plan for the Armed Forces' Transition to a Market Economy. Draft.]* (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1991), pp. 21, 32.

will also be required to organize and set up an alternative service program.¹⁰ The money for all these efforts is to come both from redistributing the budget and from searching for additional sources of money.

As is known, the military budget was reduced by 8.5 percent in last year's prices.¹¹ This cut came mainly as the result of reductions in arms purchases and research and development. Without exaggeration, this put the Soviet Armed Forces in a very difficult position. Relying on qualitative parameters of military development while substantially reducing the armed forces naturally and inevitably increases the importance of weapons and military equipment purchases. Moreover, an annual increase in appropriations for arms purchases is a singular imperative in military affairs and fluctuates around 3 to 4 percent per year, generally in constant prices. Given that prices for raw materials and finished products in the USSR will increase by 25 to 65 percent with the transition to a market economy, budget reallocations and increased costs seem inevitable in the near future.

d. Arms Control, Force Reductions, and Associated Costs

Arms reduction and verification agreements also cost the Soviet Union money, rather than saving it. Manpower and weapons reductions are one of the main elements of today's reform. It can be assumed that, if the political process in the world does not change radically, the USSR will not renounce arms control. Today the country must spend additional money for several requirements associated with arms reduction and verification, including the following:

- Recycling military equipment.
- Supporting people specifically involved in developing and implementing the disarmament process.
- Creating effective and modern systems for monitoring the disarmament process in other countries.

Every specialist understands the maze of financial problems involved in arms control. Moving large numbers of military forces, restationing them, and helping them adapt to their new living conditions will soon involve additional costs. From Eastern Europe alone we will dismantle and withdraw the equipment of 12 permanent command

¹⁰ See p. 13 of the draft document. Chapter 7 of this paper addresses the issue of alternative service in greater detail.

¹¹ "How Much Does Defense Cost," *Izvestiya*, 12 January 1990.

posts, 632 communication installations, 31 airfields, and 40 hospitals, as well as a large number of garages and barracks equipment; factories to repair equipment and arms; and the materiel for firing ranges and training centers. Moreover, possible force reductions (of 1.5 million men) and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and Mongolia (1.1 million servicemen, workers, and family members), will require large sums of money from both the state treasury and from the Ministry of Defense's budget. According to available data, adapting one specialist to a new area of work in the European part of the USSR costs 20,000 rubles, while in Siberia and the North, it costs 120,000 to 150,000 rubles.

The claim about the need to allocate additional funds for recycling military equipment and weapons is justifiable. Specialists believe that this task will require about 2.5 billion rubles. Moreover, a great deal of money will also be involved in storing weapons and equipment that are taken out of the inventory but not recycled. It is currently difficult to put a precise figure on this expense since it can be calculated in various ways and may be affected by events and in the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

There are special expenses associated with abolishing nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and consequently with organizing an effective system for radiation, chemical, and bacteriological inspection throughout the country. Clearly, this entails a number of expensive measures, such as training specialists, creating new technical systems, and organizing special monitoring services. In the qualified opinion of specialists, at least 5 billion rubles will be needed to build the enterprises to destroy chemical weapons supplies and the installations to bury the reactors from nuclear-powered submarines.

New expenses are also inevitable in connection with the relocation and creation of fundamentally new defensive groupings of armed forces within the state borders of the Soviet Union.¹² This is a very complex issue that cannot be resolved without money. Here the expenses will be not only military, but also social-welfare costs connected with the troops' living conditions.

In the coming years, additional expenses will emerge as troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and Mongolia are stepped up. More than 186,000 personnel will be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia. One of the most complex tasks facing the USSR Ministry of Defense in terms of the volume of work, the social

¹² This is discussed in *Kontseptsiya voennoi reformy. Proekt. [The Military Reform Plan. Draft]* (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1991), p. 12.

consequences, and the financial costs is the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany over the next 4 years. Because the largest and most powerful group of Soviet forces will be relocated in a short period of time, significant resources will be required. Just for settling the troops being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Mongolia, the areas where they are being stationed require capital investments alone of more than 6 billion rubles. Both the country and the military will have to spend 3.2 billion rubles on maintaining the troops remaining in Europe until the end of 1994. Additional funds are required because troop maintenance costs are now calculated in convertible currency and because the ruble's rate has changed. It would seem that this expense could be avoided if the troops were withdrawn quickly, but accelerating troop withdrawals would actually entail even greater expenses.

Some people in the Soviet Union, as well as abroad, believe that there should be a large return from reducing the administrative apparatus, cutting the number of high-ranking personnel in the military, and abolishing certain military-bureaucratic structures. These changes can and should yield some savings, but they will hardly have the effect these people are anticipating.

Significant reductions in the Ministry of Defense's administrative structures are, indeed, in the offing. In particular, the Reform Plan provides for decreasing administrative personnel at the central, district, and army levels by 15 to 20 percent. Moreover, the Plan proposes reducing by 30 percent the number of administrative bodies, divisions, and units that are not within a branch of the armed forces and are not tasked with combat missions. The number of military-educational institutions and scientific-research establishments will also be decreased.

The reduction in the number of officers and generals in the armed forces can be legitimately viewed as a possible source of revenue, but only to a certain extent. With the withdrawal of Civil Defense and road-construction units from the Soviet Armed Forces, the permanent number of general-officer positions is to be decreased by 1,300; the number of officers, by 220,000; and the number of warrant officers, by 250,000 positions. In addition, consideration is being given to cutting the number of officer positions at supply and service organizations by 15,000 to 20,000, and replacing officers with civilian employees. The United States undertook such efforts during its last military reform, and they yielded considerable financial savings. The potential savings for the Soviet Union, however, are considerably more modest. The reasons are twofold: the relatively low wages of military personnel (officers and warrant officers) compared with wages of civilian

specialists; and the small difference (30 to 50 rubles) in wages between senior and junior officers. Clearly, officer cuts will provide no substantial monies, nor will cuts in the administrative apparatus.

Another recurring proposal that will entail considerable cost is the establishment of a system to extend credit to demobilized servicemen. The USSR now has no such system, but establishing one is all the more important since the draft Military Reform Plan provides that officers can be voluntarily discharged into the reserves after 10 years of service as an officer. This proviso did not exist before. As world experience has shown, without such services it is extremely difficult to provide social guarantees for those discharged from the ranks of the Armed Forces. Pension costs for former servicemen should also be included in these calculations. They will cost the country 4.1 billion rubles.¹³

Soviet society is actively discussing and elaborating proposals for granting interest-free credits to build housing for former servicemen, for establishing a network of learning centers to retrain them in a civilian specialty, and for a number of other ideas aimed at improving the material position of people who previously served in the Armed Forces. The proposals are sensible and are accepted by the public, but they are being implemented slowly inasmuch as they involve additional financial expenditures.

Housing construction requires a large amount of capital investment. The draft Military Reform Plan provides for the following: between 1991 and 1995, housing of approximately 25 million square meters will be built for active military servicemen and their families, as well as for workers and employees of the USSR Ministry of Defense living outside cities or towns. Of this housing, 1.5 million square meters will be for servicemen from divisions and units being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1990-91. Nineteen million square meters of this housing will be built by Soviet MoD military-construction units, and 5 million square meters will be built by local people under the supervision of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Even at current prices, when the average cost of constructing an apartment is on the order of 15,000 rubles, the average annual capital investment would be about 2 billion rubles.¹⁴ But considering that housing prices are rising very quickly, obviously this figure will not be a realistic one for long.

¹³ See "How Much Does Defense Cost," *Izvestiya*, 12 January 1990.

¹⁴ See *Armiya i obshchestvo*, p. 347.

Yet one more monetary issue stands in the way of solving the housing problem: the lack of adequate construction materials. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is forced to increase the capacity of its own production base for housing construction, which means more money.

e. Improvements in Training and Associated Costs

Such additional expenses as improving the training facilities for military education institutions, training cadres for the armed forces under new conditions, and changing the focus and quality of their training must also be considered. The draft Military Reform Plan provides for a transition to a new system of preparing mobilization resources and of training specialists in district educational centers and military institutions, which did not exist before.

Along these lines, it should be kept in mind that expenses are also inevitable as a result of expanding officer training in the most complex and high-tech specialties in engineering faculties; training civilian specialists at military academies for work in the defense industry; establishing preparatory courses (which previously did not exist) in military education institutions; and lengthening the course time in military education institutions to 5 to 6 years.

Reorganizing the system for training warrant officers will also be unmanageable without some initial expenditures. The plan is to increase the duration of their training to 1.5 to 2 years, depending on the type of training. In short, it is not difficult to see that a qualitative reorganization of the training system for military cadres will cause, at least initially, considerable additional expenditures.

f. Conversions Efforts and Their Costs

Expenditures on military production and defense conversion require special economic analysis. The Military Reform Plan provides for developing a system of economic stimuli and benefits for industrial enterprises that fill MoD orders, for making them competitive, for meeting ecological safety requirements, and for undertaking a number of other efforts which are already requiring additional appropriations from the Ministry of Defense.

Over the next few years, the conversion of military industries will not provide substantial monetary benefits. The scope of conversion is already impressive, encompassing more than 400 enterprises within the defense complex and 100 civilian

factories that fill military orders. While it is proper to expect that conversion will bring positive economic effects in the future, experts believe that it will cost money for the next several years. There are various points of view on this score.

Some believe that the overall cost of conversion in the USSR will be approximately 60 billion rubles; others say 41.5 billion rubles. Without delving into the details of the economists' dispute, it is clear that both views confirm the inevitability of additional costs. After all, even imagining a situation where the USSR completely stops the production and sale of all types of arms to the military, O. Baklanov estimates the savings to be 30 billion rubles.¹⁵ Economist V. Potapov believes that conversion will save 26 billion rubles.¹⁶ Hence, the difference between the costs of and savings from Soviet conversion efforts produces a negative balance of 11 to 30 billion rubles, a fact supported by the recently adopted conversion program. The basic financial figures are as follows: from 1988 to 1990, conversion cost on the order of 11 billion rubles; in 1991, it cost another 3.5 billion rubles; and for each subsequent year it is planned to increase appropriations for conversion by about 3 to 4 billion rubles. Thus, additional resource requirements are inevitable, especially in the initial stages of conversion.

This is far from a complete list of all the additional expenses. But each expense cited seems to prove the fact that military reform requires, now and in the future, a reasonable and very large economic base. It is important to mold and skillfully manage it. Today, this is the aim of all those who seriously want reform to succeed.

3. Potential Sources of Reform Funds

An economic analysis of the foundations of reform would be one-sided if the resources that could be used during military reform were not described at least briefly. But while such resources exist, they are not sufficient to compensate for even the basic costs of radically transforming military development.

The MoD's Reform Plan proposes the use of the following resources:

First, profits will accrue from the sale of military equipment that is outdated but that can be used in the civilian economy. The Reform Plan allows the USSR Ministry of Defense to independently sell demobilized equipment directly to consumers--foreign and

¹⁵ O. D. Baklanov, "Everything Begins with the Person," *Pravda*, 9 December 1989.

¹⁶ See *Armiya i obshchestvo*, p. 272.

domestic--on a contract basis. It is anticipated that up to 70 percent of these profits will go toward paying for the expenses the Ministry of Defense incurs.¹⁷

Second, some money will also come from research and development work done by the military for civilian production. As conversion and disarmament efforts continue, this source of money will increase constantly.

Third, curtailing the purchases of arms and military equipment, RDT&E, and other special expenses will bring direct economic savings.

Fourth, the Ministry of Defense receives revenues from its foreign trade activities. The Reform Plan envisions consistent cuts in the volume of gratis and preferential military assistance. Instead, the main emphasis is to be placed on selling modern, competitive types of Soviet weapons, although not to the detriment of the world's collective security system.

Fifth, efforts are underway to determine how the MoD's transportation capabilities can be used effectively in the national economy on a self-accounting (*khozraschet*) basis. Admittedly, experiments thus far have indicated that all transport services except the pipeline are yet unprofitable. Consequently, the search for ways to optimize the use of transportation for profit continues.

Sixth, resources will also come from a whole host of efforts to reduce the size of the armed forces and their weapons and equipment, to expand the commercial activities of the troops, to use mobilization fund reserves, to assist agricultural enterprises, and so forth.

In this connection, several economists have calculated that decreasing the size of the Soviet Armed Forces to 2.8 million men will yield 5.2 billion rubles; that is, it should basically compensate for the possible costs of maintaining this size military force.¹⁸ There has also been talk about the economic effect of reducing the size of the officer corps by 15,000 men. Given that educating an officer in a military school costs 40,000 to 50,000 rubles, then the savings would be at least 600 million rubles.¹⁹

Cutting the size of the Armed Forces by 25 percent will allow spending on weapons and equipment purchases to be lowered by 10 to 15 percent, for a savings of 9 to 11 billion

¹⁷ *Kontseptsiya voennoi reformy*, p. 28.

¹⁸ See *Armiya i obshchestvo*, p. 347.

¹⁹ Ibid.

rubles.²⁰ Specialists keep this, along with many other things, in mind when doing economic calculations about Soviet military reform.

4. Conclusions: Resources and Requirements

Even this brief and incomplete analysis of some of the economic aspects of reforming military structures makes it possible to draw several key conclusions. First, the costs of military reform are higher than the resources available for it. This is due both to the number of radical changes requiring additional monies and to the overall volume of costs. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that many of the allocations still do not provide all the necessary resources.

Second, the financial costs of military reform will decrease gradually. Of particular importance will be the increased potential of defense enterprises being converted to civilian production. When the reform is completed, maintaining the country's armed forces will cost less than it does now.

Third, the first period of implementing military reform involves special expenses. Thus, for the next 3 to 5 years, about 30 to 35 billion rubles will probably be required for the initial financial "injection."

Fourth, the economics of military reform must incorporate a "difficulty factor," based on rising economic costs. These increases have emerged as the result of worsening interethnic relations and the consequent disruption in many areas of economic ties among the republics. These disruptions naturally affect relations among defense industry enterprises, require certain compensatory measures, and affect the ability to supply the military with everything it needs. These are all new costs.

Finally, all economic calculations regarding military reform are relative. The fact is that the USSR is entering into a market economy, but it lacks sufficient experience, has organizational and financial problems, and has a low level of technological and production discipline. Such factors must also be considered when determining all the expenses of military reform. In short, these costs in absolute prices will grow, apparently very intensively. The growth in constant prices will be much less, although at the first stages of reform it, too, cannot be avoided.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 348.

In concluding this section, it might be noted that at the end of 1990, the Soviet public was basically prepared for the fact that military expenditures would increase in absolute prices. According to available data, 57 percent of respondents shared this opinion. Another 32 percent had no opinion on this issue, while 11 percent believed that increases in military expenditures--even in absolute figures--was unacceptable.²¹

Without reconstructing the complete picture of economic problems associated with implementing Soviet military reform, this section has highlighted the most significant ones. What remain to be examined are the sociological issues of converting military production and the effects on military reform of transitioning to a market economy.

B. SOCIAL ISSUES RELATED TO CONVERSION

Defense conversion, a complex and multifaceted process, is a vital part of Soviet military reform today. It is not only an important element, but also a necessary condition for reforming the military mechanism. This makes sense since some portion of the resources (both materiel and finances) that are being freed up through conversion can be used to improve the troops' standard of living, to help servicemen discharged from the military settle and adapt to civilian life, and to increase the quality of weapons and military equipment. In short, it is not only the Soviet public, but also military personnel and people working in the defense complex that anticipate positive results from conversion. At least two social aspects of conversion should be examined: the effects of conversion on the process of reforming Soviet society, and the effects of conversion on the course and outcome of military reform.

1. Key Trends in Conversion

Understanding the general nature, special features, and main directions of the Soviet conversion process makes it possible to provide a sociological analysis. The conversion process is developing in a number of related and complementary ways.

First, conversion in the broad sense of the word has begun. Militarized areas of the economy are being switched to civilian activities, which means fundamentally changing the structure of the national economy and the priorities of national economic policy. One of the first steps was to reduce defense production by 14 percent, and in 1989 alone, the production of weapons and military equipment was reduced by 19.5 percent. According to

²¹ Research conducted in October-November 1990.

economists' calculations, in the near future, reduced defense production will provide the economy with about 10 billion rubles.

Second, along with decreasing defense production, conversion in a narrower sense of the word is also occurring. Hence, in various regions of the country, military factories are switching to the production of civilian goods. More specifically, the conversion plan for Soviet military industry proposes reprofiling 420 defense enterprises in the near future, converting from 5 to 100 percent of their production. The production of civilian goods has always accounted for a certain percentage of the output of the Soviet military-industrial complex, but with conversion this figure is increasing sharply. For example, whereas civilian production at enterprises of the Ministry of Aviation Industry accounted for 35.8 percent in 1988, in 1990 the figure had risen to 41 percent. Civilian shipbuilding production was 42 percent in 1988, but in 1990 it was about 50 percent. Today military enterprises already make about 22 percent of all the non-food consumer goods manufactured in the country (excluding light industry). They produce 100 percent of the televisions, video recorders, sewing machines, and radios, more than 97 percent of the refrigerators, and more than half of the motorcycles. In 1990, the defense complex had to increase its manufactured goods: washing machines by 36 percent, vacuum cleaners by 25 percent, and the number of television sets had to reach 11 million.²² By 1995, the defense complex will produce 60 percent of civilian and consumer goods, compared to 40 percent in 1989.

Third, weapons and military equipment that are being freed up as a result of force reductions are being transferred to the national economy. This is a large-scale process. For example, in 1989-90 alone, more than 45,000 automobiles, tractors and tracked vehicles, as well as radio and telephone communication equipment, fuel, and fuel transport were transferred to the national economy. According to a 1989 estimate by Soviet Prime Minister, V. S. Pavlov, a savings of more than 1.7 billion rubles should accrue just from reduced fuel expenditures, operational expenses, and wages of military units being cut, as well as from sales of military property.²³ In short, the conversion of military goods to civilian uses is underway. The national economy is able to use former military installations, clothing, medicines, and other materiel.

²² *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, no. 18, 1989.

²³ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 44, 1989, p. 6.

Fourth, the conversion process includes the partial and complete exploitation of the defense complex's scientific-technical potential for all of society. In 1991, appropriations for RDT&E for weapons and military equipment will be 15 percent less than they were in 1988. This will inevitably mean that scientists will refocus their work on the national economy.

Fifth, the "conversion" of military personnel is also picking up momentum. This conversion, involving hundreds of thousands of people, means employing former military men in the civilian sector. A system of educational institutions has begun to emerge in the USSR designed to retrain military personnel in civilian specialties.

2. Attitudes Toward Conversion

Soviet society understands and accepts all these components of the conversion process. Sociological surveys indicate that only 7 or 8 percent of respondents do not accept conversion. The remainder support this process, albeit with the stipulations that it be well-planned, balanced, wise, and constructive.²⁴

Attitudes among the public toward conversion are continuing to change. Initially, when public discussions about the need for conversion began, 25 to 30 percent of respondents accepted the idea of conversion.²⁵ The number of supporters then began to grow rapidly, so that by early 1989, the figure had reached 67 to 70 percent. But by this time, mistakes in implementing conversion had clearly begun to emerge, with the result that the number of people supporting conversion effectively stopped growing. It was only after its mistakes were revealed and a state plan for conversion was worked out that trust in and increased support for conversion returned.²⁶

But while people generally agree that conversion is necessary, their attitudes about what conversion will accomplish can be diametrically opposed. Some people view conversion as a panacea, saturating the market with consumer goods, and they are already fighting over how to divide up the spoils. But they have not thought through the practical effects. Others are very skeptical and believe that it is pure propaganda; they predict negative economic effects on society, the loss of strategic parity, and a reduction in the military's combat readiness.

²⁴ Research conducted in January 1991 by Kokorin et al., 530 respondents.

²⁵ Research conducted in September 1986, 760 respondents.

²⁶ See footnote 24.

A State Program for Conversion of the Defense Industry to 1995 is currently being worked out in the USSR. It calls for refocusing the freed-up production and scientific potential of military industry in order to increase the output and improve the quality of non-industrial consumer goods, key types of equipment being refined for the agro-industrial complex, light industry, foodstuffs, medical equipment, and other types of civilian machine building and instrument making.

On the basis of this state conversion program, scientists working in defense RDT&E developed and presented to the USSR Gosplan a draft State Program for Converting the Scientific-Technical Potential of the Defense Complex in the Areas of Materiel and Technology for 1990-2005. This program provides for 25 important national economy projects, including projects on scientific-technical policy, the development of a material-technical base, and social development and security. This program is quite significant since an overwhelming majority of those who had earlier expressed distrust in conversion had argued against it because there was no state plan to implement it.

What do the Soviet people expect from conversion? Opinions and approaches are widespread on this issue. By finding a common denominator among these answers, it is possible to understand how the Soviet people are thinking. Most frequently they say that conversion should, among other things:

- repair the productivity of agriculture, light industry, and trade.
- increase the production of medical equipment.
- develop equipment for ecological programs.
- produce immediately large amounts of consumer goods and saturate the market with them.
- become the structural nucleus for accelerating scientific-technical progress by increasing deliveries of electronics, communication, space, and transportation equipment; that is, increase the scientific-technical level of civilian production.
- reduce substantially the state budget deficit.
- improve materiel supplies in non-industrial areas.
- reconstruct enterprises in the entire machine-building complex.
- expand exports significantly.

These kinds of objectives obviously merge both layman and scientific approaches. Despite differences in the public's objectives for conversion, in all cases the objectives are constructive.

Society is constantly expanding its understanding of conversion's potential. The Soviet people are steadily realizing that the conversion of many enterprises will reduce military-industrial demand for many resources and raw materials, such as high-quality materiel, energy, qualified workers, and equipment. Many people even tend to think that if a former military enterprise produces nothing, many resources and raw materials will be saved for the domestic and international markets. This is an extremely oversimplified approach to defense conversion which few people share. Most respondents support the productive use of what is being converted and advocate searching for the most optimal and rational method of including them in the process of renewing society.

For their part, military personnel take a careful and well-balanced approach to each conversion proposal. An overwhelming majority of them favors conversion: 8 or 9 of every 10 respondents understand the need for conversion and associate it with prospects for military reform in the USSR. At the same time, they look very closely at the validity of each step connected with conversion. Of particular interest to military personnel is whether resources freed up during conversion will be used for them, in particular to solve the host of living condition problems for the troops. Two-thirds of responding officers and warrant officers directly connect their positive perception of conversion with the fact that its efforts are in the interests not only of society as a whole, but also of Armed Forces personnel.²⁷

In this connection, many servicemen are critical of the decree by the First Congress of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, "The Main Directions of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy." It did not contain a provision directly specifying that the results of conversion would be used to help solve social issues for servicemen and their families. Now this is being corrected. There is an increasing public awareness that a portion of the resources freed up as a result of conversion must be given to the Armed Forces to help solve various internal problems, such as constructing housing for families of servicemen; increasing salaries; improving the troops' standard of living; and improving medical care for personnel.

3. Benefits and Difficulties of Conversion

Sociological analysis shows that society has changed its attitude toward certain issues related to the conversion process several times, and the changes have been radical. Such is especially the case with the ideas that conversion will not cost anything and that it

²⁷ Ibid.

will not take long to implement it. Initially, in 1986, the popular belief was that conversion would be implemented at the national level in 2 to 3 years, without additional expenses, and with rapid profits. The idea spread so quickly that after a few months of its being discussed, 28 to 30 percent of respondents firmly believed in the possibility of implementing conversion quickly and without costs. And while 43 to 45 percent doubted that conversion would proceed smoothly, they were still more inclined to believe in a "miracle." Only 25 to 29 percent understood that such a conversion process will not occur in the Soviet Union.²⁸

After the first difficulties in actually implementing conversion, the public became aware that conversion in the Soviet Union would not proceed very quickly and that it would require additional investments. People stopped expecting a miracle, having learned some historical facts. For example, the public came to understand that after the Great Patriotic War, Soviet conversion efforts did not lead to an immediate increase in national output. Moreover in 1946, as a result of changes in the production profile of many enterprises, especially machine-building ones, the country's overall industrial output fell 16 percent below that of 1945. The U.S. conversion process was analogous; in 1946, there was a temporary fall in overall industrial production, and only subsequently did it begin to grow.

The conclusions of scientists and economists have played a big role in making correct and objective appraisals of the prospects for conversion, and interest in these ideas is growing among the Soviet public. The public is also increasingly aware that the costs of conversion will apparently exceed 40 billion rubles, as has already been noted. Initial outlays will considerably exceed the returns from conversion. In fact, calculations show that conversion will only begin to show a return after 2 or 3 years.²⁹ This will be the initial manifestation of the positive effects of conversion. The complete cycle of Soviet conversion will take up to 7 years, according to scientists and economists.³⁰ This length of time is due to transferring and readjusting equipment from defense enterprises to civilian production.

²⁸ See footnote 25.

²⁹ *Armiya i obshchestvo*, p. 274.

³⁰ See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 276.

Soviet economists have distinguished the near-term, mid-term, and long-term effectiveness of military conversion.³¹ For the near term, they believe that no more than 1.7 billion rubles can be gained from conversion, derived from the wages for army units being cut and fuel savings. At the same time, an additional 3.5 billion rubles must be immediately invested for making new equipment and dies, and preparing new designs and technical documentation.

In the mid-term, real returns from military conversion will accrue. Significantly, at this point, series production of civilian and consumer goods will have begun in the enterprises being converted. At the same time, high-tech and competitive production will demand additional capital investments, and efficiency will remain more a goal than a reality.

In the long term, a considerable economic benefit is expected. The economic mechanism of conversion will be perfected, converted enterprises will be fully reequipped, the latest equipment will be operating in civilian enterprises, output will be in serial production, socioeconomic problems will be resolved, and the mechanism for exchanging scientific-technical information will be perfected.

Using sociological research, it is possible to describe the difficulties, problems, and contradictions that conversion will encounter. It should be noted that the Soviet Union began conversion without a concept or detailed program of how to proceed, and inadequate planning led to the dangerous trend of scattering freed-up resources among various ministries. As a result, there have already been massive expenses, although steady efforts are being made to correct the situation.

For example, the foundations for the draft Concept for Economic and Social Development of the USSR to the Year 2005 are being elaborated. During the last 2 years, a great deal of computer modeling has been done on the balance of power and on scenarios for reducing strategic offensive weapons by 50, 75, and 95 percent using the ES computer in the Committee of Soviet Scientists.³²

In this way, a scientifically valid concept for converting military production is being formulated. Scientists and experts assume that conversion can be effective only when it is the logical result of consistently implementing an integrated, valid disarmament concept.

³¹ V. I. Martynenko and S. M. Filipovich, *Konversiya i oborona: voenno-ekonomicheskie aspekty* [Conversion and Defense: Military-Political Aspects] (Moscow: Lenin Political-Military Academy, 1990), p. 18.

³² Ibid., p. 26.

Only a complex analysis of future world developments, realistic military threats, and the future of the Soviet economy and Soviet Armed Forces will make it possible to realistically substantiate the necessary level of military-economic sufficiency and to translate it from theory to practice.

Mistakes were also made when initial conversion efforts focused on enterprises that had the highest quality output. Logic would indicate that it would have been more sensible to begin conversion with enterprises that produced the worst quality goods. This is especially clear given what has happened since. For example, titanium shovels, girders, steel fixtures, high-alloy steel brackets, and many other things have appeared in the stores, which has caused justifiable surprise and indignation among the Soviet people.

Inept use of the scientific-technical potential of the enterprises being converted has also been a serious problem. Today Soviet scientists are insisting that the defense industry be focused on producing technologically advanced civilian goods, although it has been suggested that high-tech civilian production can be lower than that for defense production. There are many social issues that must be resolved such as workers' wages and qualification levels. RDT&E still must be aimed at raising the quality of the country's defense potential and compensating for military force reductions. Sociological surveys indicate that the Soviet people understand such an approach and accept it.

Another difficulty is that defense RDT&E has not accelerated scientific-technical production in the economy as much as civilian research and development has. Scientists believe that one reason for this is the absence of a mechanism for transferring the results of defense RDT&E to the civilian economy. Also, it is commonly known that the high-tech level in military production is 20 times greater than in the civilian sector. At the same time, 5 to 20 percent of military RDT&E is actually used for peaceful purposes, as Soviet conversion has shown.³³

The issue of reequipping military enterprises to produce civilian goods has been raised, but it requires considerable investment. Moreover, the investment process will be prolonged and will require large sums of money.

³³ S. Veselovskii, V. Potapov, and O. Salkovskii, *Insane Squandering* (Moscow: Progress, 1988), pp. 21-22.

It is fairly difficult to transfer military technology to civilian production. In effect, the Soviet Union does not have the structures to competently solve this complicated question.

Attention should also be paid to the fact that conversion has not been completely written into the new economic mechanism, into the transition to a market economy. The consequences of this are not difficult to estimate. As a result of new wholesale prices beginning in 1991, the cost of weapons, military equipment, and RDT&E will be considerably greater. For example, the cost of a modern tank will increase 1.5 times; of a combat aircraft, 1.6 to 1.7 times; and of an artillery system, 1.4 times. For certain types of weapons, the prices will increase even more.

Finally, socio-psychological problems cannot be overlooked, and they are already evident. In particular, people who have worked in defense enterprises for many years are dissatisfied. As these enterprises refocus their efforts, frequently the employees face radical changes as well. Curtailing defense production naturally increases the probability that people will not find work in their area of specialization and at their level of qualification.

All these factors create new social issues. Not all have been resolved, nor are they being resolved as quickly as the situation demands. At the same time, such difficulties do not erase the need for defense conversion.

C. MILITARY REFORM AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY

1. Military Concerns and Considerations in the Transition

A sociological analysis of modern military reform and its social aspects would be senseless without taking into account that the country is entering into market relations. The proposition that the USSR needs to switch to market relations is capturing public attention. Surveys show that as recently as 1989, only 18 to 19 percent of respondents accepted the idea of a market economy, 30 to 32 percent were undecided, and 48 to 51 percent saw no real prospects for a market economy.³⁴ But by the end of 1990, the number of supporters of a market economy had almost tripled. Admittedly, an overwhelming majority of Soviet

³⁴ Research conducted in May-June 1989 in the Kiev and Belorussian Military Districts, 890 respondents.

people still have certain reservations about a market economy, reasoning that such a transition must be well thought out and balanced.³⁵

The first timid, but concrete practical steps toward a market have already been made: joint enterprises, joint-stock companies, new banks, and cooperatives have emerged; contract prices, along with state prices, have been set; and free enterprise zones have been established. Many people have already felt the initial effects of these precursors to market relations, and their experience has not always been positive.

The Armed Forces have also been affected. For example, if the Ministry of Defense had to purchase the land it uses, the cost would be about 40 billion rubles. After long litigation, this issue has been resolved, with the state guaranteeing the Ministry of Defense free use of the land. But this is, of course, just one issue in the transition to a market that was decided in the military's favor. The military has encountered several other difficulties as a result of a change in the way it orders goods for its forces. In the transition to a market and as a result of price changes, in 1989 the military did not receive 43 types of clothing, worth 36.5 million rubles. In 1990, there were 15 refusals by enterprises to deliver clothing to the Armed Forces, worth 250 million rubles. For the first three quarters of 1990, 33 industrial enterprises did not fulfill their plans.³⁶ In short, market relations have already directly affected daily life in the military.

Because of such problems in providing the Soviet Armed Forces with what they need, many servicemen react more sharply to the transition to a market than do civilians. The reason for this lies not in traditional conservative thinking by the military, as some people believe, but rather in a realistic understanding of the situation. Sociological research indicates that 53 to 54 percent of servicemen polled understand the need for market relations and see market relations as a way of getting out of the country's crisis. Only 6 to 7 percent of them reject a transition to a market economy. The remainder, while accepting the idea of market relations, are worried about the lack of a real mechanism for putting it into practice. Others worry more about the problems associated with the Armed Forces entering into a market economy.³⁷ While such figures are the results of selected research and therefore do not reflect the entire sociological picture, they do demonstrate a healthy,

³⁵ Research conducted by Kokorin and other military sociologists in December 1990, 910 respondents.

³⁶ See *Kontseptsiya vkhozhdeniya Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v rynochnuyu ekonomiku* [The Plan for the USSR Armed Forces' Entry into a Market Economy] (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1990), p. 13.

³⁷ See footnote 24.

well-balanced approach of service personnel to this problem. Military personnel will be convinced of the potential of a market economy only if the approach will strengthen, not destroy, the mechanism for the military's economic and social guarantees.

On a broader scale, many worry that the USSR is entering a market economy when political processes are outdistancing economic ones. There is a sense that the country is moving toward a market economy without a sufficient economic foundation. This is quite evident when people actually feel a deterioration, not an improvement, in troop supplies and the material conditions of service personnel.

Thus, servicemen are worried about the armed forces' entry into market relations. The USSR Ministry of Defense has worked out a plan for the Armed Forces' entry into a market economy. This plan is not idealistic; rather, it addresses the main and most important issues in this process. It also clarifies the range of problems which the military and its men must resolve, with help from many public institutions, in connection with the country's transition to a market.

On the whole, all experts agree that the transition to a market requires additional appropriations, especially initially, for military development.³⁸ Some of the reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

- Prices are already increasing for virtually all materiel, goods, weapons, and equipment. In 1991 alone--as a result of the introduction of new wholesale prices--weapons, military equipment, and RDT&E will be considerably more expensive.
- Getting workers interested in filling defense orders requires that more money be spent.
- A transition to a market presumes that the Ministry of Defense will pay for goods and services that had previously been paid through other channels.

Despite general agreement that the transition will require additional money, the duration and pace of the transition are points of contention. Supporters of market relations are divided into several relatively independent groups. The first group insists on a rapid transition to market relations in 1 or 2 years. The second group insists on a gradual transition, stretched out over a decade. And the third group believes that the transition must occur at the pace which the situation will allow; that is, it must be economically, politically, socially, and psychologically well-founded. This last approach seems to be the most

³⁸ *Kontsepsiya vkhozheniya Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v rynochnuyu ekonomiku*, p. 9.

productive, and it is the one that most defense economists are using to solve the problems of the Soviet Armed Forces' transition to a market economy. It has recently been the most popular approach among the officer corps as well.

In that context, it is assumed that the armed forces' entry into the market should encompass three stages. Stage one will see the limited introduction of elements of market relations while previous administrative regulators are retained. This period should be as short as possible. All production for the Ministry of Defense's needs will basically be included in state orders. New organizational structures in the USSR Ministry of Defense will begin to take shape (an economic council, main economic administration, and scientific-research divisions to study economic problems). Primary laws on economic guarantees for defense will be adopted. During stage two, state orders for defense production will gradually be replaced by direct economic ties between territorial suppliers and the producers. All necessary laws on economic guarantees for defense will be adopted. Finally, during stage three, state orders will be strictly limited, as determined by the President of the USSR. At this point, all military-economic control bodies will have been established.³⁹

Looking at these stages and prospects for the military's entry into market relations, it is possible to see the problems that can affect the troops most acutely. Obviously, the centralized system of economic guarantees for the armed forces will experience difficulties. Replacing this system with a new one adapted to the market will not be simple. But while difficulties are inevitable, the public (including military personnel) increasingly understands that the main option is a gradual transition from primarily administrative to primarily economic methods of providing for defense.

In the transitional stage, state regulation of wholesale and retail prices will continue for energy resources, raw materials, and transport tariffs; goods produced under state orders; and goods from monopoly enterprises. The costs for the remaining (larger) portion of technical goods will be fixed according to contracts between the suppliers and consumers.

State prices for fuel, energy, and raw material will be adjusted, taking into account the increased expenses of their producers. The rise in these prices will be compensated for in the following way: in production industries, through raw material conservation and the

³⁹ Ibid., p. 10

right to accept free-market prices for their goods or, if prices are regulated on these goods, through stabilization funds; and in non-production industries, through cost accounting.⁴⁰

An obvious difficulty for everyone will be the effects of inflation on military reform, but military personnel are especially concerned because they and their families will likely be impacted directly by any negative consequences. Special work must be done on this problem.

To date, the most tangible problem has been the disruption of inter-republic and inter-regional ties. At least two factors must be taken into consideration here: growing nationalism and separatism evident in a number of regions, and the lack of experience for a planned, well-balanced transition from centralized control of the economy to a market economy.

In this connection, it has already proved difficult for various economic structures to cooperate in providing materiel to the troops. A solution to this complicated situation still must be found. One possible approach, which is examined in the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into the Market, is to create a special system of priorities for military production. This does not mean setting up artificial allocations; market conditions absolutely preclude doing so. Nevertheless, a number of countries have implemented priority systems to neutralize those conditions that are unfavorable to military production which frequently arise in a market economy. Indeed, this Plan has a section that specifically encompasses the experience of foreign countries with regard to problems of the armed forces in market relations.⁴¹

2. The Plan for the Military's Entry into Market Relations

After searching for a long time, the USSR has selected a possible option for adapting its armed forces to market relations. The leitmotif for deciding this issue was: "striving to minimize defense expenditures while considering inflation."⁴² The military's entry into market relations must be linked with a whole series of measures for shifting the national economy to a market. It is also necessary to elaborate a unified, all-union program for the Armed Forces to enter the market, as well as to adopt a number of specific economic

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 23-26.

⁴² Ibid., p. 29.

measures. The following paragraphs outline seven of the most important ones which have been or are being developed.

First, the Ministry of Defense is to have a newly created reserve insurance fund which can be used for unexpected expenses brought about by market conditions. This fund could be created with 2 to 5 percent of the overall sum appropriated to defense.

Second, the feasibility and merit of creating a Ministry of Defense bank are now being analyzed; no such bank exists at present. Many economists are increasingly leaning toward having such an institution since all the finances allocated to the Armed Forces and the nation's defense complex must be vested in one authority: the Ministry of Defense.

Third, it is assumed that there could be a need to open accounts, including hard currency ones, in the Ministry of Defense bank for various branches of the Armed Forces.

Fourth, special attention has been paid to breaking up monopolies in the production of weapons and military equipment, as well as to developing deflators (indices for price increases).⁴³ So far, unfortunately, only the approaches to this important problem have been determined.

Fifth, of special concern is the creation of structures to control the defense complex during the transition to a market economy. Obviously, existing economic institutions today have not done so. The Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations outlines one possible option for new administrative structures.⁴⁴ It proposes reorganizing the control mechanisms for economic guarantees to defense at all levels: state, inter-departmental, and Ministry of Defense. For example, at the state level, along with existing committees and commissions in the USSR Supreme Soviet, the President's Defense Council must create a service for analyzing military-strategic and military-economic issues.

To conclude an agreement on the use of state orders for defense goods during the transitional period, at the inter-departmental level it is advisable to retain the civilian ministries and departments that plan the distribution, provision, and verification of the execution of the USSR Ministry of Defense's orders. In the future, when a State Contract System is created, it is planned to establish a special defense structure within it.

There is virtually no doubt that market relations and the transition to a contract system of state orders requires the creation of a new economic subsection within the

⁴³ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 33-35.

Ministry of Defense: the Main Economic Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Its functions would include: keeping a data bank on customers and manufacturers of military goods; following market trends; signing agreements for developing and testing new types of weapons and military equipment and serial production; making economic appraisals of the State Program for Weapons and Military Equipment Development (subsequently the State Program for Development of the Armed Forces); drawing up a draft defense budget detailing the types of military equipment, branches of the armed forces, and rear services; and guiding the commercial activities of the armed forces in domestic and foreign markets. The directorate is being created without an increase in staff based on existing organizational staff structures.⁴⁵

And finally, it is assumed that the transition to a market economy will require the creation of stimuli for the economic activities of the defense complex. Of special concern here must be the issue of stimulating the work of scientists in the MoD's scientific-research institutions.

Seventh, it is expedient to create educational establishments and a set of economic courses to train and retrain personnel in the economic problems of ensuring the country's defense capabilities, given the constantly changing conditions of military development. These are hardly all of the efforts to improve the control system that are either being implemented or being worked out. However, they do represent its general framework.

3. The Military-Industrial Relationship

The relationship between the Armed Forces and industry in a market economy is a key issue on the minds of specialists and many servicemen. There are many divergent points of view on this issue, but the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations has achieved a certain consensus on the following provisions.

During the economy's transition to market relations, state orders will be retained for all military goods, major construction, and military equipment. Moreover, materiel will be provided under guaranteed state financing. Given that the whole mechanism of military development is changing radically and that defense enterprises are acquiring economic independence, there will be an inevitable need to review state orders for all types of goods produced in the defense complex. In addition, during this transitional stage, organizations to distribute, provide, and verify deliveries of MoD orders will be retained at the center,

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

republic, and local levels. Under market conditions, the functions of these organizations will be turned over to the State Contract System.⁴⁶

The Plan provides for contracts between the Ministry of Defense and defense enterprises. It envisages setting up contract prices to ensure that one enterprise's profits are neither lower than the national average, nor higher than the maximum. Along with this, preferential loan discounts are being established.⁴⁷

Because the enterprises delivering weapons and military equipment are virtual monopolies, the Plan proposes that the prices for the weapons and military equipment be set under the state's control. The state would annually establish the maximum profits for weapons and military equipment, for military-technical property (price list), and for basic materiel and energy carriers.⁴⁸ It is important to note, however, as the MoD Military Reform Plan does, that because some enterprises have a monopoly on development and production of complex weapons systems, the effects of market relations (cost, supply and demand, etc.) will be limited during the transitionally period.⁴⁹

In a similar vein, the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations stipulates that agreed-on wholesale prices for weapons and military equipment can be changed more than once a year only with the customer's agreement. There will be fines for those enterprises that do not meet their contractual obligations, and rewards for those who fulfill their orders on time and meet the quality standards. This Plan identifies "defense expenditures" as one of the "protected" items of the state budget.

The Plan retains the proven practice of a program to develop and purchase weapons and military equipment for a 10-year period. Along with this, there is a possibility of allocating defense appropriations for 2 fiscal years at a time. In this context, the system for the USSR Supreme Soviet to plan and confirm budget appropriations envisages complete, multi-year appropriations for major military-technical programs encompassing the entire duration of the program, with annual confirmation of the allocations.

Of particular importance, the Plan focuses on giving MoD customers greater independence in spending the monies allocated to them. The customers are to decide all

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

spending of the allocated monies, including funds for RDT&E, serial production, capital development, and social issues, as well as for ordered military equipment, based on the missions of the branches of the Armed Forces within the framework of the State Program for Development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Plan calls for a financing regime under which appropriations during the year for delayed RDT&E or insufficient deliveries of military equipment, as well as money saved through price reductions, will remain at the disposal of MoD customers. The customers can use such funds to pay for RDT&E and meet shortfalls in deliveries in the next year, as well as to finance other urgent orders and to solve unexpected tasks. Earlier they did not have such options. It is also planned to allow MoD customers to redistribute, within certain limits, allocations for the development and purchase of military equipment, depending on the plans being fulfilled.

Finally, the Plan contains the possibility of realizing the customer's interest in spreading scientific-technical production to non-defense fields of the national economy, as well as to exports. Such an approach fundamentally differs from the way the defense industry was oriented before.

Thus, many radical changes in the military-industrial relationship are to be carried out in accordance with the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations.

4. The Military and Science

The transition to a market economy requires a detailed elaboration of the scientific provisions for military reform. Science obviously requires large sums of money. The Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations examines several important issues pertaining to the relationship among the military, the market, and science.

First, scientists from MoD scientific-research institutions must not be given any reasons to leave their jobs. To ensure that they do not, they will need to be given greater economic incentives.

Second, it is proposed to reorient freed-up scientific resources to do research work under the leadership of the head MoD scientific-research institutions.

Third, there are increased possibilities for scientists and scientific-research institutes of the Ministry of Defense to conduct scientific research for the national economy on a self-obligating basis.

Fourth, the work of MoD scientific-research institutes is to be accelerated. In particular, the plan proposes excluding from the list of scientific development those programs that can be and are being carried out in civilian research institutions. The plan notes that the success of this important effort to reduce the MoD's RDT&E that has civilian applications will depend on timely information between MoD customers and between customers and suppliers in the national economy. Cooperation between MoD and civilian organizations and institutions in mutually applicable RDT&E will make it possible to avoid duplication of efforts and, more importantly, to save labor, money, and materiel while still achieving the necessary results.⁵⁰

5. The Military and Foreign Trade

Even with the transition to a market economy, the military's foreign economic activity will continue along traditional lines:

- Selling weapons and military equipment and other materiel that meet world standards, but that do not exceed similar types of weapons and equipment made by other countries.
- Training specialists from foreign armies in the Soviet MoD's institutions of higher learning.
- Using Soviet military specialists to service Soviet military equipment sold abroad.
- Helping foreign governments transport various types of cargo by military-transport aircraft and naval auxiliary ships.

There are, however, substantial changes in the substance of these activities. They will be subordinate to the political process; in other words, they must not in any way--even for economic advantages--contribute to heightened military confrontation or to increased world tensions. This is now the military's primary and unchanging priority in its economic activities.

Significantly, the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations also stipulates that a large portion of the hard currency revenue from the military's foreign economic activities will go not to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, but to the Ministry of Defense, mainly to solve living condition problems. Thus, a portion of the revenues can be used to improve the educational and material base for training foreign military

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

specialists, to create comfortable living conditions for them, to reequip our own scientific and production base, to organize on-the-job training of Soviet military specialists in foreign armies, and to improve the living conditions of servicemen and their families.⁵¹

6. Social Guarantees and Living Conditions

The Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations includes a section on social guarantees for servicemen and their families in the context of market conditions. There is a whole array of necessary social guarantees to servicemen, provided not only by the Ministry of Defense, but also by the state. For example, the plan states that all servicemen and their families should have a right to housing, financial guarantees, materiel benefits, pensions, medical services, and job placement.

After they arrive at their place of service, servicemen (except conscripts) and their families are slated to receive housing from the funds of the USSR Ministry of Defense, other ministries, departments, and local peoples' deputies Soviets. In addition, the plan allows for the possibility of giving servicemen (except conscripts) the right to enter housing cooperatives and to have their own housing. To do so, a system will be established for compensating and extending credit to acquire and build housing.

The state intends to provide housing, for a fixed period of time, to servicemen (officers, warrant officers, and extended-service conscripts) who are discharged into the reserves or retired as of the day they arrive in their place of residence. It is also planned to reimburse expenses for renting temporary housing.

Officers who are called up from the reserves for military service for 2 to 3 years and who are under contract for a certain period of time will retain the living quarters they had before being called up. This provision is being extended to conscripts as well.

For families of servicemen who served in dangerous regions and were then discharged into the reserves or retired, the plan allows for putting them at the head of the list for housing, allocating plots of land for individual homes, or guaranteeing preferential rights to enter housing cooperatives.

Aside from housing benefits, improvements are also being made in other areas of social guarantees for the military. With wage increases for workers and specialists in the civilian economy and the change in the cost of living index, adjustments in military salaries

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 58.

are also anticipated and, indeed, necessary. Moreover, officers are guaranteed employment in the military until they have served long enough to receive a pension (except when the officer requests a discharge or because of force reductions).

There are plans to create an insurance system for servicemen which did not exist before. Thus, servicemen and reservists who are called up will have mandatory insurance in the event of their death, serious injury, or loss of health connected with being in military service.

All servicemen, as well as called-up reservists, have the right to free medical care in military medical institutions. The right to medical care in these institutions is also to be extended to the families of officers, warrant officers, and extended-service conscripts. It is guaranteed wherever they live, in whatever union republic. This is unusually important and relevant today, given the acute nationalist tensions. Servicemen can receive emergency medical assistance in any civilian hospital when they are injured during exercises, are being relocated, are on special assignment, or for other reasons are in need of medical assistance. Such flexibility is also allowed when the necessary military medical institutions are not available.

The plan outlines the right of servicemen, including those discharged into the reserves or retired, as well as their families (except families of conscripts) to periodic (not less than once per year) treatment and rest at sanatoria, vacation resorts, hotels and tourist areas, or to monetary compensation. There are also a number of other important social guarantees.⁵²

7. Conclusions

Clearly, the Military Reform Plan outlines many of the efforts, but certainly not all of them, needed to help families of servicemen deal with the transition to a market. This section in the plan is important for emphasizing its human component. Finally, the issue of legal guarantees for the armed forces' entry into a market economy will be addressed separately, in chapter VI.

In conclusion, several fundamental points about the Soviet Armed Forces' entry into the market can be made. First, servicemen are cautious as well as hopeful that many of the problems they face will be solved with the shift to a market economy.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 63-65.

Second, the very fact that a plan exists for the armed forces' entry into the market has resolved a number of important tasks. It has--

- shown how serious the military is about the transition to a market.
- noted the trends in actions by the main MoD structures.
- prepared public opinion for greater acceptance of a market economy.

Third, the virtually simultaneous appearance of two plans--one for military reform and one for the Soviet Armed Forces' entry into a market--and coordination between them establishes the basis for trust in future military development, and in selecting the optimal and least expensive course of reform.

Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that the Plan for the Armed Forces' Entry into Market Relations provides complete protection for servicemen from all possible problems that they could encounter. However, this is the kind of attitude that is taking shape among military personnel.

IV. SOCIOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS OF REFORM

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of economic factors on the course and outcome of military reform. But increasingly, as Soviet society becomes more politicized, sociopolitical processes are also affecting every aspect of public life, including the reform of Soviet defense structures. Among the more notable sociopolitical issues dominating the Soviet public's attention, two are directly relevant to military reform in the USSR: (1) the growing phenomenon of a multiparty system in the country, and (2) complicated interethnic relations, resulting in the emergence within various republics of paramilitary organizations which have not been legally sanctioned.

A. REFORMING THE DEFENSE COMPLEX IN A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

Political pluralism and a multiparty system have become reality in Soviet society. This reality is reflected in many ways--the existence of various political views and ideas; the formation of organizations, movements, and parties holding substantially different political positions; and the resurgence of political structures that had disappeared from society after the revolution. It is within this sociopolitical landscape that military reform is being cultivated.

Sociological analysis indicates that there are more than 1,000 political organizations, movements, and parties of some influence in the USSR today, although hardly all of them are constructive. Their size ranges from 30 or 40 people to several tens of thousands. Still influential, the largest political organization remains the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).¹ Along with the CPSU, another 67 organizations can be singled out that have widespread support and influence. According to available data, 23

¹ After the events of August 1991, the situation has changed sharply in the USSR. The CPSU has effectively lost its ability to influence in any serious way events in Soviet society.

of the most influential organizations are Marxist organizations.² They include all political structures that uphold the idea of the socialization of Soviet society.

Political organizations are taking shape and are being registered virtually throughout the Soviet Union. Their registration shows the heterogeneity of political views as well as the unevenness of the political process in the country. In some republics, hundreds of organizations have announced their desire to be registered (RSFSR); in other republics (Ukraine, Uzbekistan) there have been dozens; while in yet others (Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) there have only been a few.

Political pluralism and the multiparty system are still highly variable and dynamic. The reason is that new political structures are continuing to take shape. For example, in Uzbekistan alone there are more than 360 organizations and movements, although this republic does not appear to be the most politicized one. At the same time, organizations that had emerged earlier are now dying off; frequently they are splintering into smaller organizations because of internal disputes. All of this, to one extent or another, affects the arrangement of forces in society and the course and outcome of military reform.

1. Political Organizations and Military Issues

a. Amidst Pluralism, Military Reform Issues and Perspectives Abound

The political structures existing in the country differ substantially from each other in their attitudes toward the activities and reform of the Soviet Union's defense complex. Some of them have stated their attitude toward military development in their platforms, while others have not. Still others not only have military sections in their programs, but also want to establish their own organizations in the Armed Forces. This last attitude is the most vivid manifestation of political pluralism and the multiparty system in the USSR.

According to data from the Russian-American University, virtually all 67 of the largest and most significant political organizations have expressed fairly comprehensively their attitudes toward military reform and military development in the USSR.³ It must be noted, however, that not all of the platforms contain military sections, but virtually all of

² See *Voennye voprosy v dokumentakh politicheskikh organizatsii i dvizhenii v SSSR [Military Issues in the Documents of Political Organizations and Movements in the USSR]* (Moscow: Russian-American University, 1991), p. 258.

³ Ibid.

the organizations are working quite actively on military reform, either constructively or destructively. Frequently changes occur, sometimes poles apart, so that a destructive approach to military reform becomes a constructive one, or vice versa.

One can identify several polarities in the various plans and perspectives on solving the issues of modern military reform; for instance, those having constructive or destructive attitudes toward military reform; those giving priority to all-union or republic principles; those searching for political consensus in military issues or rejecting it; and so forth. To provide a complete and objective sociological picture, it is necessary to detail some of their positions.

b. Prevalent Stances in Soviet Party Platforms

It is important to consider that certain political organizations are overtly separatist. They give priority to regional and national interests, and insist on establishing republic armed forces. These organizations oppose reform approaches that seek to preserve a united, all-union Armed Forces.

The policy of complete non-interference--militarily and otherwise--in the affairs of other states has become considerably stronger in Soviet politics. An overwhelming majority of truly democratic organizations support this principle. It is contained in the program documents of the Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the CPSU, the Moscow People's Front, and a number of other groups. At the same time, this principle frequently contradicts what the leaders of the political organizations are actually doing. In particular, they call for the use of force inside the USSR. Obviously, violent actions within the Soviet Union can have extremely undesirable consequences on Soviet international relations.

Some organizations--such as the Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union, the CPSU, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia--have even declared their opposition to wars and military conflicts altogether and are in favor of creating a comprehensive system of international security. Although their approaches differ on many other issues, here they have a basis for unity, although even in this unity there is still diversity. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party, which opposes war, gravitates toward pacifism, which the other parties cited here oppose.

In addition, demands to abolish all military-political alliances in the world are becoming increasingly insistent. These demands coincide with hopes for lasting peace and

are included in the programs of the Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union, the Moscow People's Front, and a number of other political organizations. But while this idea seems to be attractive and promising, it is still hardly supported by everyone in the Soviet Union. The abolition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO's continuing strength are increasingly worrying people. Therefore, such demands can become realistic only when all military alliances are abolished. The categorical position of some organizations, which do not consider actual military-political processes, is not completely realistic and evokes considerable opposition among Soviet people who are focused on consolidating peace, but under realistic, constructive, and mutually beneficial conditions. In this connection, demands for the USSR to withdraw from all military blocs should be reexamined (as suggested, for example, by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia). The demand is essentially valid, especially considering that the USSR was a member of only one military alliance--the Warsaw Pact, an organization which has effectively ceased to exist.

The programs of many parties (the Communist Party of Estonia, the Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union, the Democratic Party) reflect their peaceful intents, such as the abolition of all types of nuclear weapons. This principle, like the others cited above, fully coincides with the main trends in current politics and the priorities of new political thinking. It will be true if the leaders of these parties do not turn it into just a populist slogan.

Demands to renounce the export of weapons and military equipment have been persistent and categorical. This demand is largely justified, but a number of factors are working against it. For one thing, the USSR must meet its previous obligations to those countries that do not use and do not intend to use the weapons and military equipment that they acquire for aggressive purposes. Moreover, given the USSR's difficult economic situation, agreements for weapons and equipment deliveries--for which the country receives hard currency--cannot be immediately abrogated. Such action would not completely serve the interests of the USSR, a fact understood by many people in both the Soviet Union and the West. At the same time, Soviet public opinion is increasingly leaning toward finding ways to reduce, and subsequently to completely cease, exports of weapons and military equipment. This is exactly the route that the USSR has adopted.

Demilitarization is another issue that many Soviet political groups are supporting. Many parties and political organizations--such as the CPSU, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union, the Moscow People's Front, and the People's Fronts of Latvia and Azerbaijan--uphold the idea

of a demilitarized society, but their approaches to its implementation differ substantially. For instance, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists insists on the complete demilitarization of society, a goal that is not yet possible. Moreover, there is a contradiction in their stance: while insisting on the complete demilitarization of society, this organization tolerates the concept of defense sufficiency. For its part, the Latvian People's Front views demilitarization in a separatist way, encompassing only the territory of the Latvian republic. Members of this group generally consider the question of demilitarization in the context of Latvia being freed from the Soviet Armed Forces. At the same time, they do not subscribe to the demand to prohibit the creation of armed paramilitary formations in the republic. There are already more than a dozen such formations, with more than 4,000 men under arms.⁴

Similarly, the program documents of many political groups (e.g., the Moscow People's Front, the Democratic Alliance, the Lithuanian People's Front, the CPSU, and the Christian Democratic Alliance of Russia) specifically raise the issue of defense conversion, but they treat it in various ways. Politicians in the Lithuanian People's Front view defense conversion differently from the others. The majority consider conversion to be a cost-free process that can provide immediate results. Reality has already raised doubts about this idea. In addition, they believe that the results of conversion should focus exclusively on the production of consumer goods, an approach that will hardly yield the necessary results. World experience has shown that conversion is most productive when there is an optimal combination: converted enterprises focusing on consumers goods production and new technologies being created to further develop production capabilities.

As part of their program, a number of political structures (the Democratic Party, the Moscow People's Front, the Democratic Alliance) have set forth the demand for the return of all Soviet troops from abroad and some (the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the CPSU, the Moscow People's Front) have ruled out their unsanctioned use both within the USSR and beyond its borders. Once again, the principles are the same, but the approaches are diverse. For example, the Moscow People's Front has adopted quite a moderate approach: "to work out agreements on the withdrawal of foreign troops from all European states," including, of course, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these states. In contrast, the Democratic Alliance calls categorically and uncompromisingly for the

⁴ See *Vooruzhennye i voenizirovannye formirovaniya v SSSR [Armed Paramilitary Formations in the USSR]* (Moscow: Russian-American University, 1991), pp. 11-12.

immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The latter has certainly not considered all the factors involved in the withdrawal process. This process will be very complicated, not only for Armed Forces' personnel, but for the entire country since it raises a whole host of issues that are difficult to resolve.

Force reduction is one of the more prevalent demands in the programs of a number of parties (e.g., the CPSU, *Rossiya*, the Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Party, the Moscow and Russian People's Fronts, *Shchit*). Here, too, the approaches are generally diverse. Some organizations (the Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Party) demand a radical reduction in the Armed Forces to a minimal level; while others (e.g., the Moscow People's Front) approach this process in a more balanced way, blending it into an overall process of reductions; and still others (e.g., *Rossiya*, the CPSU) allow for unilateral reductions, based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Sociological surveys indicate that this last approach has the greatest support of the Soviet people.

The Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union has many military-political interests in this area. Its leaders allow for the possibility of a unilateral initiative in nuclear disarmament. There are various ways to look at this idea, but it certainly seems that it has not been fully thought through. Unilateral nuclear disarmament would not be completely understood by the West.

The platforms of the Latvian and Estonian People's Fronts, *Sajudis*, and the *Nevada* movement contain the demand to prohibit stationing all types of weapons of mass destruction in the republics where these organizations are operating. However, this essentially good intention, to which Soviet people aspire, evokes separatism, and people in other republics do not understand the position of these organizations.

This demand is generally supplemented by the idea of withdrawing military units from some of the republics. Political groups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia support this idea, as does the Assembly of Mountain People from the Caucasus (*Checheno-Ingushetiya*). While the Latvian People's Front allows for the stationing of Soviet Army units on its territory in accordance with treaty obligations, the units are allowed only as a military base. Obviously, such an approach by one state contradicts union laws and, thus, creates additional social tensions in society.

There are several organizations which consistently uphold the idea of reasonable defense sufficiency and support a modern, combat-ready military. It is interesting that political organizations that differ on many other issues, profess such a position. Among

them are: the Moscow People's Front, the United Front of USSR Workers, the CPSU, the Russian People's Front, the United Council of Russia, *Rossiya*, *Pamyat'*, etc.

Some organizations and movements, understanding the need for strong, sufficient defense, are combatting unfounded attacks on the Armed Forces and military officers. This effort has become part of their platforms (the Labor Party, the All-Union Society of Unity for Leninism and Communist Ideals, the Orthodox Constitutional-Monarchist Party of Russia). An analysis of their activities indicates that they differ substantially on how they want to implement this principle.

Judging from their program documents, a majority of political organizations have recognized the need for Soviet military reform. At the same time, their attitudes toward resolving the problems of military reform differ, as does the depth of their work on these issues. For example, several organizations have articulated their main positions on military reform quite specifically; they are the Democratic Party, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Moscow People's Front, *Shchit*, and the CPSU. Nevertheless, although they have worked out the problems of Soviet military reform in greater detail than other political groups, not one of these groups has, in fact, proposed an integrated plan for military reform.

It should also be noted that a number of principles contained in program documents are destructive rather than constructive with respect to military development. This is evident in the demands of the Democratic Party and the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, for example. The latter, in particular, proposes replacing the permanent Armed Forces by universally arming the people. This idea can scarcely be viewed as constructive, given the current economic and political situation in the Soviet Union.

A number of political organizations rightly question the use of armed forces for purposes other than they are intended (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance, the Moscow People's Front, the CPSU, *Sajudis*, the Azerbaijan People's Front, the Confederation of Labor, *Shchit*, and others). There are, of course, differences among these groups in their approaches to and understanding of this matter. In particular, *Sajudis* and the Azerbaijan People's Front insist that citizens from their republics will not participate in military actions. They see this as a guarantee that the military will not be drawn into resolving internal problems. The CPSU proposes that the armed forces be used only in accordance with the law and strictly

according to their purpose. For its part, the Confederation of Labor prohibits the use of the Soviet Armed Forces against its people.

Such opposition to the use of armed forces for purposes other than they are intended is sometimes contradictory, as evidenced by the platforms of some of these organizations. For example, the platform of the Moscow People's Front, while correctly advocating the use of the military only according to their purpose, admits the following: "The Moscow People's Front believes it necessary to establish rapid reaction units in the Armed Forces for ecological and natural disasters." Such services are certainly necessary; there is no dispute about that. But the question remains whether these responsibilities should fall under the purview of the Soviet Armed Forces. In a similar vein, the Belorussian People's Front demands "full compensation for damage inflicted on the environment and population of Belorussia" from the military.

A number of parties, mainly patriotic organizations, support the retention of a unified military. The CPSU heads this bloc of political forces. The CPSU is the force consolidating political structures and trying to maintain and develop ties between the military and the people. Such objectives are contained in the documents of the United Front of USSR Workers, the United Council of Russia, and other organizations.

A number of political organizations correctly question whether the legal foundations of military development have been elaborated (the Moscow People's Front, the Latvian People's Front, the CPSU, *Shchit*, the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation). They are united in the basic demand, but they differ in their interpretation of what is legal. Thus, the platform of the Moscow People's Front allows for not carrying out orders that contradict the law and international rights. This approach raises a whole set of issues. In particular, in every army, not carrying out an order means breaking the basic law of military service. Orders must be given in accordance with the law and international rights and they must be carried out, otherwise the military will lose its ability to accomplish its missions. But behind these orders there must also be judicial oversight. In sum, it is necessary to study this issue in greater depth.

Given the demands for legal foundations to military development, actions by certain parties are incomprehensible; they hinder, and frequently sabotage, the adoption of laws and seek to suspend these laws in their republics. The People's Fronts, supporting nationalist positions, are involved in such behavior. What is written in the program

documents is one thing; what is actually done is quite another. In their programs, they support a legal foundation for military development, but in reality they are against it.

The issue of democratizing life in the Armed Forces has been specifically raised by various political groups (the CPSU, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Russian People's Front). While all agree on the need to raise this issue, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists sees the solution in establishing elected company Soviets. In contrast, the CPSU advocates a whole program of diverse actions.

The greatest disparity among the political organizations' program documents lies in the method for staffing the Soviet Armed Forces. Because of the public popularity of this issue, even political groups that do not have special sections in their platforms on military development have taken a position on this matter. The following conclusions are based on a sociological analysis of this subject.

First, several organizations advocate a volunteer-professional principle for staffing the Armed Forces (the Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party). They want to see a rapid transition to a volunteer-professional military force. Those who see such a transition for the future include: the Democratic Alliance, the Moscow People's Front, the Russian People's Front, the United Council of Russia, and the Belorussian People's Front. The Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists has its own idea: it supports universally arming the people while at the same time allowing the existence of volunteer-professional units.

Second, several political structures assume the possibility of having armed forces based on a mixed staffing principle, that is, combining volunteers with conscripts (the CPSU, *Rossiya*, and a number of others).

Third, there are political groups, such as *Pamyat'*, that oppose having mercenary armed forces. *Pamyat'* is categorical on this point. The United Front of USSR Workers is less categorical in its stance; it opposes indiscriminate attacks on the idea of universal military service, but still allows for changes in implementing this principle.

Fourth, there is a relatively independent group of political organizations and movements that oppose retaining the principle of universal military service. The most zealous proponents of such an approach are the youth organization For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia), the Tashkent and Kazakh branches of the Democratic Alliance, and the Democratic Party. Some of these people demand the immediate repeal of this principle, while others believe it should be replaced gradually with another principle for staffing the

Armed Forces. Several organizations go even further, opposing service in the Armed Forces altogether. The Hare Krishna (*Soznanie Krishny*) in Latvia, a group of supporters of religious and mystical teachings, is one example.

Fifth, some political organizations in the USSR are treating military development in original ways. For example, the Orthodox Constitutional Monarchist Party of Russia essentially proposes returning to the foundations of military development that existed under the monarchy. Obviously this party believes that what happened in the past should be the model for what happens today and has therefore transferred old experience to new conditions. This is inaccurate, at least methodologically.

Another subject which has engendered numerous disputes and discussions in Soviet society has been the problem of introducing alternative service. As already noted, the Ministry of Defense's Reform Plan provides for the introduction of such service. This position coincides with the platforms of several political organizations, including: the People's Fronts of Moscow, Latvia, and Belorussia, *Sajudis*, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Democratic Alliance, and *Shchit*. While these organizations are similar in their approaches to this idea, it cannot be said that they are identical. Some stress religious reasons for introducing alternative service, others stress political reasons, and still others stress nationalist reasons. The justification for alternative service is one of the differences among the groups. The other revolves around the length of alternative service.

Recently the number of organizations that oppose having their youths serve outside their own republics has grown (the Armenian All-National Movement, *Birlik* (Unity) in Uzbekistan, the Latvian People's Front, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Belorussian People's Front, *Sajudis*, the Azerbaijan People's Front). Among these groups, the Belorussian People's Front and *Sajudis* allow for the possibility of serving in other USSR republics, as long as the conscripts themselves wish to do so. Other organizations are categorical and uncompromising in their opposition to service outside the republic.

Since 1989, political organizations in the USSR have focused special attention on the creation of national paramilitary formations. This issue has acquired particular importance because in certain regions, such formations either have been created or are being created. The danger of these formations lies in the following:

- They are generally nationalistic and are overtly supported by separatist political forces.
- The people leading these formations are often unstable extremists. Under their leadership, armed conflict is a palpable possibility.
- These forces are not being used systematically or with popular support, but episodically to carry out various actions, including terrorist acts.
- These organizations are growing in both quantity and size, which causes concern. Membership ranges from several people (7 or 8) to tens of thousands.

Given these considerations, people are hardly indifferent to the prospects for renewing Soviet society and the position of political organizations on creating regional and republic armed formations. Those who support the creation of such formations are: *Sajudis*, the People's Fronts of Latvia, Belorussia, and Azerbaijan, *Rukh* (the Ukraine), the Armenian All-National Movement, the Alliance of National Justice (Georgia), United National Self-Determination (Armenia), the Tallin Young Column, and a number of others. In several republics, each of these political organizations is creating its own armed paramilitary structures. Such a situation significantly increases the danger that they will be used to resolve political disputes among these organizations.

Frequently the right to establish paramilitary structures is proclaimed by the republics' Supreme Soviets. At the same time, the consequences of such actions can force the legislatures to review their decisions. This is what happened in January 1991 in Moldova, where the Supreme Soviet was forced to repeal its article establishing national armed formations and to disband the ones that had already been created. Unfortunately, however, actions by armed formations are not sobering to everyone; extremist-minded leaders of political movements amass weapons and munitions, create schools to train national military cadres, etc.

As a whole, the situation is under control, but there is hardly cause for optimism that events will develop peacefully or that these armed formations will not be used. Moreover, the creation of such forces contradicts the July 1990 Decree of the President of the USSR, which the separatists frequently ignore. Thus, their actions are actually anti-constitutional, which does not promote democratization of our society.

Organizations and parties have "crossed swords" in a political struggle over the depoliticization, departyization, and deideologization of the Armed Forces. Those who insist on depoliticization are: the Democratic Alliance, the Communists for Perestroika

(Moscow), the Democratic Party, the Moscow People's Front, the Confederation of Labor, *Shchit*, the Democratic Platform, and a number of others. Clearly, there are diverse political forces calling for depoliticization (for example, communists and members of the Democratic Alliance, which is a non-socialist organization), but they understand the depoliticization process in different ways. Some see depoliticization as eliminating CPSU party committees from the Armed Forces, others see it as eliminating political departments and changing political education in the Armed Forces, while still others see depoliticization as allowing all political structures and organizations to operate in the military. Hence, the approaches are diverse, as are the objectives. Organizations that advocate abolishing all structures that politically affect military personnel do not appear to be very realistic since Soviet society is becoming increasingly politicized. Even more surprising are those who understand depoliticization to mean eliminating the appointment of *zampolits*, and instead having military personnel elect commissars (the Moscow People's Front).

Contradictions among political groups are even greater in their interpretation of departyization of the Armed Forces. This is insisted on by the following groups: the Democratic Party of Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, *Shchit*, etc. The approaches to departyization, which must be viewed in the context of depoliticization, are also diverse. Some, such as the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, advocate the elimination of all parties from the military; others, for example the Democratic Platform, advocate the elimination of CPSU organizations from the military; others, such as the Democratic Party of Russia, support all parties being able to operate equally within the Armed Forces and other state institutions; while still others advocate banning service personnel from belonging to any party.

There are also organizations that, as depoliticization and departyization continue, raise the issue of deideologizing all state institutions, including the Armed Forces (the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party). On the opposite side are political structures that seek to ideologically influence the military's activity. Moreover, many of them insist on creating their own organizations in the Armed Forces. Along with the CPSU, which retains its organizations in the military, the following groups have incorporated this desire into their programs: the Moscow People's Front, *Shchit*, and the Democratic Party of Russia. If they succeed in doing so, contradictions and problems among these parties will develop with the military collectives. It is not difficult to see that there will be serious complications if effective measures are not taken to guarantee a political consensus among these organizations.

Sociological research identifies which political structures are opposed to depoliticization of the Armed Forces. The logic of these structures is simple: the military cannot be depoliticized, since it is an instrument of policy and is functioning in an increasingly politicized society. This position is adhered to by the CPSU, the Worker's Party of the Soviet Union, and virtually all organizations that want to have their own structures in the Armed Forces.

Political groups have fairly contradictory attitudes toward military-patriotic education of the Soviet people, ranging from open rejection to full defense of the idea. Those who oppose military-patriotic education include the Democratic Party, the Latvian and Azerbaijan People's Fronts, and *Sajudis*. The alternative of retaining military-patriotic education is advocated by: the United Front of USSR Workers, the United Council of Russia, the Congress of Initiatives of the Russian Communist Party, Unity--for Leninism and Communist Ideals, and the CPSU. Many are fairly flexible, not insisting on old dogmas and not seeking to make people aggressive. Their aim is to create a civilian-patriot, ready and capable of defending his country. Approached in this way, all countries have such education, and there is hardly any reason to renounce it in the Soviet Union.

The problem of whether to eliminate or retain military training in institutions of higher learning and in schools has also been in dispute. Here, too, the sympathies of various political structures are diametrically opposed. Those who favor abolishing this training are virtually the same ones who advocate destroying military-patriotic education in the country (the Latvian and Azerbaijan People's Fronts, the Democratic Party, the Moscow People's Front). In contrast, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists favors universal military training in all possible forms.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, as in the country as a whole, questions of social protection and social guarantees for the people are acute. The popularity of these issues has led many political groups to include special sections in their programs on expanding the civil rights of military personnel and their social protection. Both the leftists and the rightists have said virtually the same thing on this score, although, admittedly, neither side has done much to actually solve the problems. Movements whose programs support civil rights and improving social-legal protection for servicemen are: the Democratic Party, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the United Front of USSR Workers, the Moscow People's Front, the Russian People's Front, the United Council of Russia, *Pamyat'*, the Confederation of Labor, *Shchit, Rossiya*, the Belorussian People's Front, and the CPSU. In contrast, other political organizations, such as the Latvian People's

Front, seek to limit servicemen's rights and freedoms, including abolishing their pensions. Such anti-democratic demands cause indignation among the Soviet people.

c. Conclusions

A sociological analysis of political groups' principles on military issues cannot be considered complete without several summary observations. First, an increasing number of diverse political organizations are focusing their activities on supporting a defensive strategy. Here the tone is being set by the CPSU, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, and the Democratic Party.

Second, the number of political structures that support greater openness in military activities is increasing (the Moscow People's Front, the CPSU, the Democratic Alliance in Kazakhstan, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, *Sajudis*, etc.)

Third, there is a growing movement to objectively interpret the history of military development and troop life in both the scientific literature and in the mass media. This has been written into the programs of the United Council of Russia, the CPSU, the Russian Communist Party, and other political groups.

Fourth, varying degrees of politicization throughout the Soviet Union affect attitudes toward military reform. Thus, the political potential of organizations in each region differs, and the intensity of their formation and their political aims is one way of understanding regional influences on military reform.

Fifth, recently many public organizations that were established under the slogan and based on the principles of depoliticization of public life have become increasingly politicized. For example, in Kazakhstan today, there are four political organizations that are the most influential, but more than 2,000 other public, mostly political, structures also exist. It should be noted that the reverse process does not really exist in the USSR, i.e., political organizations and movements turning into depoliticized ones.

Sixth, political forces are continuing to consolidate their views in various platforms, although not yet very quickly. It is important to note that often military reform provides political groups with both a basis for consolidation and a reason for disintegration. Even those forces that do not always find a consensus on other issues frequently find common ground on military reform. Now that the draft military reform plans have been published and discussed in public, there is a stronger basis for consolidating views and approaches to

reforming many political structures. Many regional and republic political forces are pursuing such efforts.

Seventh, it is extremely important that the platforms of many political organizations have become less extremist and more balanced and well-founded. Such a change has also been reflected in their attitudes toward military reform. But while the trends are toward a more balanced and reasoned approach, this is not yet inevitable. Politics is an unusually dynamic arena, and it is necessary to have an especially solid base for processes to be inevitable.

Eighth, the results of sociological research indicate increased activity by the CPSU in the military arena. Everyone can interpret this in their own way, but the CPSU does have strong points, which have fairly broad social support, comprised not only of communists but other segments of the population as well. There are several reasons for the CPSU's increased activity and the growing interest in its activities. Among them are the undisguised incompetency of many new political structures in military affairs; their leaders' egotism, subjectivity and political ambitions; and an extremist, nationalistic interpretation of military reform, leading to the creation of regional and republic armed forces--frequently anti-Russian ones--which has caused concern among an overwhelming majority of the Soviet population. Against this background, the CPSU's position on military affairs appears to be balanced and realistic. At the same time, criticism of the CPSU's position on military issues continues, although not as energetically as before. The reason for this criticism lies in the CPSU's previous activities, which communists themselves now criticize and are distancing themselves from.

2. Changing Attitudes Toward Military Reform

As with any evolutionary process, pluralism and political attitudes toward military reform have undergone several developmental stages. The first stage, marked by the start of perestroika, saw the tempestuous emergence of various political groups which declared their opposition to socialism, the CPSU, and the existing mechanism of military development. Society's reaction to the emergence of these groups was no less tempestuous characterized mainly by support for the groups' basic positions and principles.

The second stage was one of euphoria, delight with destructive actions, and enormous effects on the Armed Forces, with the overt aim of discrediting the military. But even then, many began to understand the unconstructive spirit of these groups' actions.

Political opposition to them emerged within patriotic organizations and movements, not necessarily only Marxist ones.

The third stage saw increased contradictions between political organizations on many fundamental issues, including reform of the Armed Forces. Progress toward military reform added to the constructiveness of attitudes toward military development. Admittedly, this did not eliminate the confrontation between opposing political structures.

In the fourth--and ongoing--stage, the people's resolve to constructively and wisely solve the Soviet Union's problems, including military reform, has strengthened. This does not mean that there are no political forces in society that currently support diverse views on military development. Such disparate views do exist, but a well-founded hope has emerged that military reform issues will be resolved. This hope is based on the following:

- the elaboration and adoption of a state-wide, all-union concept of military reform;
- a certain decline in the influence of extremist political forces, both rightists and leftist; and
- the public's understanding of the destructiveness of actions in military affairs that are based on nationalism and separatism.

In short, there is certainly cause for optimism on military matters. At the same time, there is not enough reason to be completely confident that all aspects of military reform will be implemented, and implemented easily. Standing in the way are conflicts, which are the result of relations among various political parties.

For instance, there are conflicts among organizations in the very way they approach reform. In particular, three approaches can be identified. In one approach, political groups advocate that military development be restored using the same bases and principles as has been used until 1917. According to available data, 3 to 4 percent of all political groups fall into this category. In another approach, political groups support the idea of flexible reform of the existing mechanism of military development. They account for approximately 91 percent of all Soviet political organizations. Finally, there are political groups that advocate the creation of fundamentally new Armed Forces, on a fundamentally new basis. About 5 to 6 percent of the organizations belong to this category.⁵ It is thus apparent that the idea of flexible reform has highest priority, being accepted by the overwhelming majority of

⁵ Analysis conducted by Kokorin in January 1991.

political organizations. However, this does not mean that the forces opposing this approach should be underestimated.

There are also conflicts among those advocating reform. People from various parties do not always understand these conflicts in the same way, yet frequently each claims to have the sole right to the truth. At the same time, more than 69 percent of respondents, representing various political groups, accept the basic ideas of military reform, i.e., a mixed system of staffing the armed forces based on the principle of extraterritoriality; increased professionalism; reductions in the size of the Armed Forces; a decisive improvement in the troops' standard of living; guarantees for the legal and social protection of military personnel, etc.

There are also serious differences of opinion regarding military-patriotic education. Initially, when many political organizations were being formed, they actively rejected military-patriotic education. Some of them gathered many votes on this matter. However, sociological surveys have shown that up to 44 percent of representatives from new groups defended this idea. Up to 23 percent did not mention it in their programs, and the remainder talked about changing and improving military-patriotic education.⁶ Today the situation has changed somewhat. The emphasis is now on the patriotic aspects, rather than the military aspects of this education.

The main danger to military reform comes from those political groups that are based on nationalistic platforms, supplemented by the aspiration--and even practical efforts--to establish their own armed formations in the republics and regions.

This problem is compounded by the fact that the CPSU, long the "manager" of the military development process in the USSR, has lost its controlling influence, but new legislative Soviets (*sovery*)--who now have this authority--have not been ready to assume this role. This is not to say that the old way should be reinstated, but it must be recognized that the changes in priorities in administering military development have added to the difficulties in military affairs. In short, the CPSU must abdicate its management function in military affairs to new governmental agencies, the Soviets. After controlling the levers of military development for such a long time, the CPSU (by an irony of fate) had essentially become not just a party, but a genuine state structure. But as perestroika showed, the party cannot replace the state. As the state structures develop the necessary

⁶ Ibid.

capabilities, it will be logical to gradually transfer control over everything at all levels, including the military, from party to state structures, that is, to the Soviets. However, the Soviets have already started assuming these functions quickly, often hurriedly, even before their institutions have been established.

Also problematic was the Soviets' lack of legislative and administrative expertise with regard to military development. It did not take long to see incompetence in their handling of military reform. Indeed, there was a time when populism and flamboyance began to replace constructive reform efforts. Moreover, the Soviets, which were unorganized and often torn apart by conflicts, were not fully able, in the environment of political pluralism and a multiparty system, to consolidate political forces to constructively reform Soviet society in all its spheres, including the military.

Political pluralism in the activities of the Soviets at various levels is seriously complicating efforts to solve the main tasks of military reform, although attempts are being made to unite such efforts. The main impediments are the increasingly complicated relations among the various Soviet nationalities, separatism, and nationalism. These factors are addressed in the following section.

B. MILITARY REFORM AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

It is impossible to obtain an objective picture of the course of military reform in the Soviet Union without examining interethnic relations. In recent years, the Soviet Union has experienced a host of complex nationalist problems which, in the view of many Soviet observers, constitute a "crisis situation." Indeed, interethnic relations affect the reform of all aspects of society, including the Armed Forces.

But while interethnic relations in the USSR are undoubtedly complex, they are often portrayed in a polarized way, either very simplistically or complexly. It is difficult to agree with these extremes in conducting a sociological analysis of Soviet military reform. Research indicates that all the nationalist problems combined create the main obstacles and impediments to the implementation of Soviet military reform. Given the current situation, it is appropriate to assume that the prospects for military reform depend decisively on the evolution of interethnic relations. In this connection, the main trends in these relations in the Soviet Union must be identified.

1. Key Trends in Interethnic Relations

First, interethnic relations have become increasingly complicated in recent years. This does not mean, however, that such difficulties are new to Soviet society. They actually have been building up over the years, but the new sociopolitical conditions have served as a catalyst to bring all these contradictions to the surface.

The complexity of interethnic relations is reflected in all areas of society: economic, political, spiritual, social, and military. In fact, the situation is such that each aspect of Soviet society is affected by interethnic relations. Thus, these relations are no longer just a political issue, but a broad social problem.

The increasing complexity of interethnic relations is similarly reflected in military life. For example, whereas in 1988, only 10 to 15 percent of surveyed military personnel made note of the effects of interethnic relations on troop life, today one in every four respondents does so.⁷

Second, interethnic relations have appeared not only in the main areas of society, but also in historical, territorial, ecological, family, and interpersonal problems. In short, today every action must not only take account of interethnic relations, but also consider its effect on the degree of national conflicts. Thus all aspects of Soviet society contain national contradictions; at the same time, every social process has a negative or positive effect on resolving national contradictions.

Third, in many regions of the USSR, the idea of reviving national culture, national awareness, and national-republic sovereignty is giving way to one of separatism and nationalism. This has been particularly evident in the republics of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Georgia. As a result, the political activities in these republics and a number of other regions are not always viewed as constructive.

Recently, separatism and nationalism that had been hidden from public view have been openly defended and justified. In and of itself, this trend is similar to the democratization of society, a process which creates the real potential for the revival and further development of the Soviet peoples. As a result, an increasing number of people have come to consider policies of nationalism and separatism as the main barrier to democratization, and sociological research has supported this conclusion. For example, the

⁷ Data from the Center for Social and Psychological Issues under the Main Military-Political Administration of the USSR Armed Forces, January 1988.

popularity of *Sajudis* in Lithuania today is effectively only half what it was a year ago. The main reason for the public's decreased interest in this organization is its overt nationalism and separatism, with all the ensuing economic, social, and spiritual consequences.

Fourth, interethnic relations in the Soviet Union are increasingly politicized. In the republics and in various regions of the country, a growing number of political organizations and movements are determined to uphold the interests of some particular people or nation. This does not mean that all of them are focused on separatism; a small number of movements among them are internationalist. At the same time, there is a concern about the intense growth of groups that put regional and republic interests above union, let alone human, interests. Moreover, the leaders of these groups frequently put their own politics above the economic and social interests of the very people they are supposed to be representing. Such organizations have appeared in virtually every republic, but the most influential and active ones are those in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Georgia.

Tensions in interethnic relations have also created military-economic problems in the USSR. In fact, these tensions are destroying the country's centralized economic system. This, in turn, has obvious implications for the Soviet military. For example, inadequate food supplies for military personnel is an increasingly serious problem. Similarly, in 1990, there were refusals to produce and deliver uniforms, boots, and other necessary clothing for military personnel. During this same time, the troops were also undersupplied with fuel. These and other factors, mainly due to unstable interethnic relations, threaten the reform process and create additional difficulties.

Finally, support for separatism in the area of military development is escalating, as evidenced by the incorporation of its principles into the programs and documents of many political organizations. Basically, these organizations seek to--

- prohibit young people from serving outside their republics (the Armenian All-National Movement, *Birlik* in Uzbekistan, the Belorussian People's Front, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, the Azerbaijan People's Front, the Latvian People's Front, *Sajudis*).⁸
- withdraw Soviet Army troops from certain regions (the Association of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, *Sajudis*, the Latvian People's Front, the Estonian National Democratic Front).⁹

⁸ See *Voennye voprosy v dokumentakh politicheskikh organizatsii...*, pp. 157-158.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

- remove nuclear-missile weapons from these republics (the *Nevada* movement, the Latvian and Estonian People's Fronts, *Sajudis*).¹⁰
- revive their own armed forces, and if necessary universally arm the people in their republic (the Armenian All-National Movement, the Belorussian People's Front, *Sajudis*, the Latvian People's Front, the Helsinki Alliance of Georgia).¹¹

Such programs and actions do not eliminate national tensions, but greatly heighten them. According to sociological data, more than 85 percent of respondents are concerned about these policies. More than 70 percent not only worry about these issues but also condemn them, and approximately 89 percent of Russian-speaking respondents see negative prospects for interethnic relations if such ideas are actually implemented.¹²

2. The Creation of National Formations

Sociological research also provides information on the reactions of servicemen, from virtually all every nationality, to nationalist and separatist actions. This research indicates that 61 percent of conscripts oppose the creation of national military formations in their own republics and that only 14 percent believe such formations can be established. It is noteworthy that servicemen from those republics where separatism and nationalism have been strongest are opposed to the creation of such formations. For example, 60 to 70 percent of those from the Baltics, up to 43 percent from Central Asia, up to 57 percent from the Caucasus, and up to 50 percent from Moldova oppose this idea.¹³ The majority of servicemen surveyed believe that the creation of national formations will lead directly to confrontation, perhaps even to civil war. It would also weaken the country's defense potential, exacerbate the social problems and living conditions of the troops, and hinder the process of Soviet military reform.

In the opinion of Soviet military experts, an opinion which is increasingly supported by the public, the formation of national armed forces in each union republic as if it were a sovereign state is unacceptable since this would undermine existing strategic parity

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 143-149.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 175-176.

¹² Data from the Center for Social and Psychological Issues under the Main Military-Political Administration of the USSR Armed Forces, November 1990.

¹³ Ibid. At the same time, attitudes toward creating national formations has changed radically since many republics obtained their sovereignty (in August-September 1991). The number of people supporting the idea of national formations (national guards) has grown markedly.

and strategic stability in theaters of military action (TVDs). Above all, such forces would create considerable difficulties in strategic and operational planning, and in preparing the national economy for wartime requirements. Moreover, many duplicate types of military equipment and weapons could appear, which would mean that a number of enterprises would have to be reorganized to produce these weapons. The cost of developing and equipping national armed forces with modern weapons and equipment would increase considerably, and there would inevitably be difficulties in training and amassing mobilization resources. All of this would lead to a sharp fall in the troops' defense readiness. In sum, this process of establishing national armies in the Soviet republics can clearly have a negative effect not only on the situation in the USSR, but also throughout the world.

Nevertheless, the idea of establishing such formations has already partially become reality. In several regions and republics, armed paramilitary formations have emerged under the patronage of various, often nationalist organizations. While it is difficult to comprehensively characterize these diverse and changing groups, the following assertions are generally true:

- Armed paramilitary formations exist in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and the Ukraine.
- Their size ranges from several people to several tens of thousands, in single military groups such as the Armenian National Army.
- Many organizations are now already structured and are armed to a certain extent.
- The possibility has been raised of purchasing weapons from abroad and of producing them within the republics.
- Paramilitary formations are generally comprised of the indigenous nationality.
- Paramilitary formations, created by particular organizations and movements, are developing into republic and regional military structures.¹⁴
- Certain terrorist acts that have occurred in Latvia, Moldova, and Georgia may well have been carried out with the participation of members from such groups. This is an issue for lawyers to resolve, but there are foundations for such an assumption.

¹⁴ *Vooruzhennye i voenizirovannye formirovaniya*, p. 308.

In short, such groups are a destabilizing force within the Soviet Union. Given that extremists frequently seize the leadership roles in these organizations and that tensions often intensify, as a result, military confrontation is easily conceivable.

In a number of republics, their Supreme Soviets have established their own bodies for dealing with defense and security issues. For example, in Russia there is the RSFSR State Committee on Public Security and Relations with the USSR Ministry of Defense and KGB; in the Ukraine, the Committee for Ties with the USSR Ministry of Defense; in Lithuania, the Department for Protecting the Territory; in Latvia, the Commission on Defense and Security Affairs of the Republic Supreme Soviet; in Estonia, the Commission on Defense Issues of the Republic Supreme Soviet; in Moldova, the Commission on State Security and Military Issues of the Republic Supreme Soviet; and in Armenia, the Department on Defense and Domestic Affairs of the Republic Supreme Soviet.

These efforts in and of themselves are completely constitutional if they are measured by the yardstick of republic legislation, but to resolve defense policy issues within the framework of the Union, they generate additional difficulties. These difficulties are caused by decisions these bodies make on military issues, which also means military reform. The effects of their decisions have been clearly reflected in the two military drafts for 1990. For example, as of 1 January 1991, Armenia had filled only 28.1 percent of its quota for the fall 1990 draft; Georgia, 10.0 percent; Moldova, 58.9 percent; Latvia, 25.3 percent; Lithuania, 12.5 percent; and Estonia, 24.5 percent. For the country as a whole, by this date the figure was 78.8 percent.¹⁵ These draft results obviously affect the course of Soviet military reform.

3. Changing Demographics and Multinationalism in the Military

As the basis for separatism in approaches to military issues grows, the functioning of multinational troop collectives obviously becomes more complicated. According to sociological data, representatives from 98 nations and Soviet nationalities are currently serving in the military. As a rule, soldiers from 40 to 50 different nationalities serve in one division, while in units and on ships, there are up to 30 different nationalities. Behind these figures lie complex problems of interethnic relations, the special features of each people's national psychology, and a whole host of issues connected with educating the soldiers. Various ethnic groups are unevenly distributed in the military collectives. There

¹⁵ "In the Interests of Defense Capability," *Pravda*, 9 January 1991.

are several reasons for this: the different numbers of people drafted from various ethnic groups; their varied levels of readiness for military service; differences in military specialties; and, finally, demographic processes in the country. The latter factor has had a particularly serious effect on contacts among nationalities in the troop collectives.

In the early 1970s, the percentage of Slavic nationalities being drafted began to decrease, while the number of conscripts from the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan increased. This situation continues today, and it is affecting military reform. The following data speak for themselves: the share of 18-year-olds from republics traditionally of the Islamic faith compared with the same age cohort in the RSFSR was 33 percent in 1970, while in 1990, it had reached 63 percent. Clearly, this demographic shift requires radical changes in the entire military training and education system.

Already this demographic situation has had a number of consequences. Military reform is being carried out with the multinational composition of military collectives continuing to grow; with increased numbers of conscripts coming from the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia and the Caucasus; and with the concentration of these men largely in the Ground Troops.

These are the most difficult issues to resolve in troop oversight and training. Among the contributing factors are: a weak knowledge of the Russian language among many conscripts; an insufficient number of commanders (officers and warrant officers) from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Kazakhstan; and the participation of people from various republics in local nationalist disturbances. Sociological research further illustrates these trends.

According to available data, only 61 percent of the total number of conscripts questioned declared that they are fluent in Russian. At the same time, 21 percent said that they know virtually no Russian, while 18 percent stated that they have certain difficulties in conversing in Russian. The distribution of conscripts who have the worst command of Russian is as follows: 28 percent of the conscripts polled from Azerbaijan, 42 percent from Armenia, 44 percent from Moldova, and 52 percent from Georgia. Characteristically, people from rural areas predominate among those who have a poor command of Russian.

Difficulties in interethnic relations also arise because of the national composition of the officer corps in the Soviet Armed Forces. At the beginning of 1986, 73.3 percent of officers in the military were Russian; 17.8 percent, Ukrainian; and 4.9 percent, Belorussian; combined, this totals 94 percent of the entire officer corps. In 1988, only 42

Estonians, 76 Latvians, 54 Turkmen, 111 Kyrgyz, and 118 Tajiks were serving as officers in the Ground Troops; these numbers constitute a mere fraction of the total number of men from these nationalities serving in this branch. And while in recent years there has been substantial progress in this area (graduating officers from a number of nationalities has increased from 2 to 11 times), it would be a mistake to believe that this problem has been solved.¹⁶ Many officers have shown their readiness to help educate servicemen from various nationalities, but these efforts must be improved further. For example, according to data from the Center for Studying Public Opinion in the USSR in 1989, only 15 to 17 percent of officers questioned could easily establish a rapport with Georgian soldiers, 8 to 14 percent with Armenians, and only 2 to 5 percent with Azeris; the figures are similar for soldiers of other nationalities.¹⁷

Having men in units and on ships who participated in nationalist riots seriously complicates life in military collectives. About 6,500 conscripts from Uzbekistan and more than 10,000 from the Caucasus republics have participated in nationalist-type meetings, demonstrations, fights, and other illegal actions. More than 5,000 families of conscripts from the Caucasus and Central Asia have suffered as a result of actions by extremist groups, further aggravating the mutual hostility among conscripts of different nationalities.

Various separatist groups are intensifying their efforts to influence military reform, mainly in a negative way. This is generally being done by men from certain nationalities, many of whom enter military service and remain members of some kind of political organization. In 1990, approximately 30 percent of conscripts from Lithuania followed this pattern. During that same year--and this is not a coincidence, there were 4.6 times more cases of harassment by Lithuanian soldiers of their fellow servicemen and 10.3 times more cases of soldiers' being absent without leave (AWOL) from their units than there were in 1989.¹⁸ There have been cases where Lithuanian soldiers have deliberately provoked fights and conflicts among different nationalities in military units, thereby fulfilling their mission as leaders of nationalist organizations. They are playing with fire. True democracy will hardly support those who exacerbate nationalist hostilities, both in society and in the Armed Forces; such actions are especially dangerous for everyone.

¹⁶ Yu. Ryazatsov, "Current Problems of Interethnic Relations in Troop Collectives," *Lektoru i propagandistu*, no. 1, 1991 (Moscow: Ministry of Defense), p. 43.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 44.

4. Conclusions about Interethnic Relations

In short, there is considerable sociological data to support the conclusions that scientists are drawing as they analyze military reform in the context of interethnic tensions in the Soviet Armed Forces. But what is important lies not in finding examples of these problems, but in determining the trends that reflect the essence of what is happening in interethnic contacts in military collectives. A few of the main trends are cited here:

- Interethnic relations are becoming more complicated not only in society, but also in the Armed Forces. This point of view is expressed by 60 percent of the officers surveyed, and they have the best understanding of what is happening among the troops.
- New difficulties have emerged in troop combat training as a result of these more complex interethnic relations.
- Interethnic tensions in military collectives have made discipline somewhat more complicated. Research indicates that 20 percent of AWOL offenses are due to insults to the soldier's national dignity. Analysis shows that in many republics where units are stationed, men from the indigenous nationality are more frequently involved in violating the law. For example, Ukrainians--never noted as lawbreakers--perpetrated 50 percent of all the violations in the Kiev Military District in 1989, including 36 percent of all cases of harassment.¹⁹
- Separatists and nationalists are combining with political forces in their destructive efforts against the military.
- Solving interethnic tensions throughout the country and in the military is made more difficult because of actions by certain political circles in the West, who claim they have renounced the "enemy image" of the USSR but will never actually do so.

This analysis has sought to present an objective sociological picture of what has been happening in interethnic relations. The situation is a difficult one, but it should not be qualified as hopeless. There are certain factors that can lay the foundation for constructively resolving nationalist problems; if this can be accomplished, there is also the possibility of attaining the ultimate objectives of modern military reform in the Soviet Union. Six of the factors are identified and described in the following paragraphs.

First, economic factors have begun to impede separatism and nationalism, having roots in an all-union economy. Without overestimating this factor, it can be seen for many

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 45.

as a "sobered soul." This is especially evident when people from many different republics began to distrust those who pulled them into a nationalist confrontation but were not able to solve glaring economic problems.

Second, it does not seem to be the people as a whole, but only some of their leaders and some portion of the population in the republics that are engaged in nationalist confrontations. For example, in Moldova research indicates that only 8 percent of the population participated in such incidents in November 1990.²⁰ While many people may find the results of this research surprising, there is no reason to ignore these findings. They are closer to the truth than the widely published and stereotypical conclusions by many power-grabbing politicians.

Third, in the last year and a half, the prestige and authority of people who have adopted nationalistic and separatist positions have fallen sharply. At the same time, there has been quite an intensive growth and a certain consolidation of political organizations and movements supporting a united Union and united armed forces in the country. Today there is a counterpart to virtually every political structure gravitating toward nationalism. In addition to the CPSU, many movements and fronts operating in a number of republics are also interested in preserving a united Union. The most developed and active movements in the country's "hot spots" are in the Baltics and Moldova.

Fourth, nationalism faces a serious obstacle in that an increasing number of people --both in the Soviet Union and throughout the world--understand the consequences of nationalism for military development. In particular, the ideas of possibly dividing up the Soviet Armed Forces into sections and dividing up its nuclear missiles--i.e., ideas suggested by separatists--have caused serious reverberations in the USSR. In short, the basis for Soviet interest in preserving a united Soviet military has recently been somewhat expanded and strengthened. Indeed, public opinion surveys conducted in 1990 show that the popularity of the united armed forces is quite high. For example, 35 percent of those polled completely trusted the military, which was 10 to 15 percent higher than other state institutions.²¹ Consequently, it can be argued that trust in the Armed Forces is the basis for preserving its unity.

²⁰ Data from the Moldovan Center for Studying Public Opinion.

²¹ G. Andreev, "The Army's Popularity is Growing," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1990.

Fifth, it has already been noted that interethnic relations have considerably complicated the life and activities of military collectives. At the same time, if the results of sociological research are to be believed, these relations are also an important stabilizing factor, which affects not only the unity of the Armed Forces, but of the entire country. The research indicates, for example, that 64 percent of servicemen are satisfied with their relations with fellow soldiers of different nationalities, and more than 80 percent have friends among them. As a rule, the very conditions of military service, joint military activities, and the commonality of objectives and missions contribute to cohesion among multinational military collectives and to strengthening friendship and military comradeship. Of the conscripts polled in 1990, 37 percent declared that they had developed a better attitude toward soldiers of other nationalities. Based on this research, it appears that there is a pattern of expanded contacts among soldiers of various nationalities during their service. Thus, whereas during the first 6 months of active service, only 60 percent of the soldiers have friends of other nationalities, by the end of their service, the figure has reached 90 percent.

Finally, Soviet leaders are determined to solve acute interethnic problems using political methods. As such, they provide a stabilizing factor in these relations and create the necessary basis for reform. Indeed, the fate of military reform primarily depends on the development of interethnic relations in the USSR.

V. SOCIAL ISSUES OF MILITARY REFORM

Reforming the Soviet defense complex naturally affects the interests of both military personnel and the population as a whole. Attention must be focused not only on economic and political issues, but also on the diverse social aspects of military reform. These considerations arise whenever and wherever the interests of people collide and interact. In terms of the social aspects of military reform, at issue are three fundamental problems: relations between society and the Armed Forces, the social effects of force reductions, and issues related to troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

A. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIETY AND THE ARMED FORCES

Soviet society today views world political stabilization, Soviet security policy, Soviet defense capabilities, and prospects for military development through the prism of military reform. The military reform process reflects present-day relations between society and the Armed Forces. Indeed, a number of social factors makes society pay particular attention to military reform.

First, today's military reform has been declared to be the most profound and radical in the entire history of the Soviet state. It is taking place under conditions that are fundamentally new and largely unusual for the Soviet Union, which naturally heightens Soviet society's interest in this reform process.

Second, today's military reform, as already noted, is not only a reform of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is a process affecting all aspects of public life and virtually the entire population. The Soviet people have already effectively become the subject of military reform.

Third, during the reform of the defense complex, the natural connection between the military and society is increasingly clear; without reforming all aspects of society, military reform cannot be successful. It must operate on a solid economic, political, and social foundation. At the same time, the reverse is also true: military reform is a necessary element in reforming all aspects of society. Many people are increasingly aware of this connection, and more and more are taking an active role in the reform process.

Fourth, there are a number of problems which objectively affect the interests of virtually every Soviet citizen, every family, and every social group. These include problems such as finding the financial support for reform, the social aspects of reducing the Armed Forces, and withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe.

Fifth, the Soviet people understand the international importance of military reform. It should, for all intents and purposes, help to effect the resolution of many military issues that are of international significance and are capable of consolidating peace.

Thus, society's interest in military reform and its participation in implementing it confirm that reforming military structures is today one of the central issues of relations between society and the army. There is every reason to assume that this will be the case for the next 9 or 10 years. Indeed, the events of August 1991 have only underscored that this interest, on the part of society as well as various Soviet and republic state structures, is on the rise.

1. Attitudes Toward Military Reform and Military Service

Using sociological analysis, it is possible to single out several aspects of society's attitude toward military reform. As noted earlier, an overwhelming majority of the population supports the implementation of military reform. The degree of support depends on the region, the socio-economic situation, and a number of other factors. Recently one linkage has become quite strong: society has been advocating military reform more intensively as the economic situation in the country has grown more difficult. The main motive behind this support is the hope of finding additional financial resources to help solve the country's economic problems. Many anticipate a cut in defense appropriations as the military is reformed and reduced. However, segments of Soviet society are increasingly concerned about unilateral reductions, which constituted the main focus of Eduard Shevardnadze's foreign policy.

In recent years, the types of people who advocate radical and deep military reform have changed. During the first period of reform, it was mainly the radically minded part of society that supported military reform, primarily office workers and the intelligentsia. Today, an overwhelming majority of laborers, workers, and peasants also support military reform, although the latter are still less active than the office workers and intelligentsia in their support. In addition, young people have become more active in military reform, in contrast to just 2 to 3 years ago when they were fairly passive about reforming Soviet society. Admittedly, there are still some young people who are not involved in the reform

process in the full sense of the word and who do not show particular interest in military issues.

Sociological surveys, conducted by scientists at the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy in late 1989 and during the first half of 1990, indicate that despite decreased interest among young people in military service and in what is happening in the Armed Forces, the overwhelming majority of them intend to fulfill their constitutional military duty. For example, 41 percent of the conscripts declared that they were entering military service willingly, and a similar number recognized the need to fulfill their constitutional duty. In other words, 82 percent of the conscripts consciously opted for military service. Their motivations in this context are interesting. One-third of them see this service as the conscientious fulfillment of their military duty, 51 percent believe that it will help harden their will and increase their physical endurance, 36 percent go into the army wanting to test themselves, and 23 percent seek to expand their knowledge of a speciality or to acquire a new one.¹ Thus, these attitudes of young people toward military service illuminate several aspects of relations between the military and society.

Sociological research provides rich factual material showing that the prestige of the Armed Forces has begun to increase again in the past year, whereas before 1990, there had been a steady decline in its prestige. For example, one recent poll showed that 35 percent of respondents completely trust the Armed Forces and consider the military to be one of society's most solid institutions; this is 10-15 percent higher than previously.² The attitude toward being an officer is also changing. In recent years, the number of those wishing to enter this profession had been shrinking, as evident in the decreased competition to enter military schools (although there is still competition to get into virtually all the military schools and academies). Among conscripts, 1 in every 5 has expressed the desire to enter a military school, and 41 percent consider officers to be in a necessary profession. Also, 44 percent of conscripts allow for the possibility of learning a command specialty in the armed forces. Twelve percent are ready to become political educational professionals in the military, while 19 percent have stated their desire to become military engineers. These and other facts indicate that there has been a turning point in public awareness, which has

¹ Data from the Center for Social and Psychological Issues under the Main Military-Political Administration of the USSR Armed Forces, November 1990.

² See G. Andreev, "The Army's Popularity Is Growing," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1990.

stabilized the prestige and position of the Armed Forces in society, although there is still much to be done in this area.

The population also increasingly understands the need to legislatively regulate relations between society and the armed forces and to create a solid legal basis for military reform, as seen in the demands to adopt the laws "On Defense" and "On the Social Status of Military Personnel." The majority believe that they are a necessary element in reforming the Soviet military. Noteworthy here is the changed position of many People's Deputies, who had previously worked to expose and focus public attention on the many unsolved problems of troop life. Now many of them recognize the need for the legislative Soviets to adopt laws that will direct and regulate military reform.

There has been a considerable expansion in the number of problems that society must address in relation to military reform. There are not only the issues that have already been discussed, such as the way to staff the armed forces, how long military reform will take to implement, force reductions, and the conversion of military production, but also many other, interrelated problems. These newer concerns, to which society is more frequently turning its attention, include creating special institutes for advertising military service, rehabilitating servicemen discharged into the reserves, resolving a host of social and living condition problems, providing social protection for servicemen, reducing administrative components, and searching for optimal structures for controlling the armed forces.

Society has begun to pay special attention to social protection for servicemen. This problem has become a kind of competition among the various social institutions handling it. Moreover, it has become a playing card in political struggles among various forces. There are all sorts of promises to quickly solve these problems, and they are widely circulated throughout the country, but the gap between these promises and actual solutions remains wide.

2. Factors Affecting Relations Between Society and the Armed Forces

The mass media obviously play an important role in shaping Soviet society and its relations with the military. This influence has been particularly evident in recent years. For a long time, the mass media emphasized a negative and critical approach in covering life in the military. Today, this approach is changing as the media increasingly offer alternative views about given military problems. This trend is evident in the Soviet press and in radio and television broadcasts.

Over the past few years, military specialists and professionals have begun to participate more in the mass media as well. Current publications and radio and television broadcasts offer considerably more in-depth and objective portrayals of troop life than were available a couple of years ago. Not surprisingly, sociological research indicates that an overwhelming majority of officers and warrant officers even a year ago believed that the media were largely one-sided and unobjective in their approach to depicting troop life and military reform. In contrast, today the public is increasingly aware of analysis done by scientific research institutes and military scientists on the principles of staffing the military and military reform. Priority is being given to professionals who use scientific methods of analysis.

Another factor affecting society-military relations is the transfer of authority over military issues from the Communist Party to People's Deputies Soviets. A few comments are necessary on this point. As already noted, special institutions have been established in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the republics' Supreme Soviets that are in charge of defense and security issues. On the other hand, the structures specifically dealing with military issues within the CPSU have, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. This does not mean, of course, that the CPSU and other political parties do not discuss military issues at their congresses, conferences, and consultative meetings or express their attitudes toward these issues in their program documents. Indeed, many political organizations have their own ideas and frequently even their own plans on this subject. At the same time, it is the USSR Supreme Soviet and the republics' Supreme Soviets who are the lawmakers, and military issues fall under their purview. Given this situation, society is demanding greater competency and professionalism from those tasked with resolving military issues in general and military reform in particular within these Soviets. The functions among all the institutions having something to do with military development are being worked out. New mechanisms have already taken shape to regulate the interaction between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Main Military-Political Directorate, and other military institutions.

The problem of reforming the political bodies within the military has been a subject of special attention for society and a matter of conflict among political groups. Progress has not been smooth in this area, and the sociology of this issue is complex. There are forces insisting on abolishing political bodies in the military; there are people and organizations supporting the idea of reducing them; and finally, there are those who dogmatically demand that political bodies be retained in the same form as they currently

exist. Society is increasingly rejecting the former and the latter points of view. A growing number of people understand that it is simply impossible not to reform these political bodies when all aspects of society are being reformed. At the same time, the demand that this institution be abolished from military life has been put on the back burner. For example, whereas in February 1990, several sociological surveys showed that about 50 percent of respondents thought these bodies should be eliminated, in April of that year, 61 percent rejected such a possibility. In recent months, the latter figure has become considerably higher. Moreover, this shift comes not so much as the result of ideological or specialized work in specialized institutions, but mainly because of political processes occurring in the USSR and the world.³

Regarding this issue, as well as many others, changes in civilian society are also reflected in the Armed Forces. Today, fewer military officers support eliminating political bodies and political structures from the Armed Forces than did in the not too distant past. Sociological research from recent months indicates that approximately 82 percent of military commanders consistently support radical reform of the political bodies. This percentage is somewhat lower among officers in other specialties (such as engineers) who do not have subordinates.⁴ Those who have worked with personnel for more than a year and who have subordinates view political bodies as institutions designed to professionally solve tasks of military-political education and social protection, to analyze the military-political situation, and to inform the troops about its results. The main point is that the emphasis of political workers has now shifted to carrying out the state's policy in the Armed Forces and to focusing on Soviet military development. These activities are based on the new principles that define the social status and functions of military political bodies in the new political situation in the USSR.

Military sociologists have addressed many issues related to reforming these political bodies. Since military reform began, some have argued that there are too many of these bodies and too much money being spent on them. In fact, political workers in the military make up less than two percent of the total number of servicemen in the military and about eight percent of the entire officer corps. The cost of maintaining political bodies is 72 million rubles per year, which is approximately 0.1 percent of the Soviet defense budget.

³ Research conducted in the Moscow and Far Eastern Military Districts, 1110 respondents. After the coup, the USSR President issued a decree on abolishing political bodies in the Soviet Armed Forces. New structures will be created that will address the social and legal issues of military life.

⁴ Research conducted by Kokorin et al. in January 1991.

The main ways in which the political bodies in the Armed Forces will be reformed have already been determined quite strictly. The number of appointed staffs will be reduced and they will be abolished in a number of units. Concomitantly, their appropriations will decrease, and the purposes and types of activities of political education institutions in the military will change fundamentally. In the context of Soviet society today, with both society and the Armed Forces clearly moving toward further politicization, proposals to completely abolish these political institutions are not very likely to happen. Above all, the increasingly complex situation in interethnic relations presents an obstacle. Political workers are called upon to deal professionally with these relations and to regulate them in the military.

Moreover, the need for political bodies in the Soviet Armed Forces is constructive and is legally encoded in the Presidential Decree of September 1990. Nevertheless, there are forces within the USSR that are increasing their pressure on the state in demanding that political bodies and CPSU party organizations be eliminated from the military. Society has been drawn into this debate. Despite this and all the complexities of the political struggle in society, the Soviet Armed Forces are fairly stable politically. There is no split within them, hence their vitality is guaranteed.

Despite that viability, sociological research shows that the efficiency of the Armed Forces, indeed the whole mechanism of military development, is threatened by educational deficiencies in the conscript pool. In 1965, 41.1 percent of conscripts had at least a middle school education. And while in recent years, this figure has grown to 94.8 percent, there is reason to believe that this figure misrepresents reality. The reason is that school principals have decided to graduate students no matter what and to give them a middle school diploma. Hence, the figures are too high regarding the real level of education among the conscripts. The implications are quite serious, since educational level largely determines a conscript's ability to master modern equipment and weapons, and the performance of draftees in the area has steadily declined. Well-organized training in the schools is currently lacking, and society and middle schools must cooperate to improve this training.

Society also affects the Armed Forces through its ability to produce disciplined and responsible conscripts. Consequently, the steady weakening of the family structure in the USSR cannot help but cause concern. The number of divorces among every 1,000 people increased 2.6 times between 1966 and 1986, and this negative trend has continued over the

last few years.⁵ As a result, approximately 15 percent of conscripts have been raised by one parent--generally their mother. Social research has shown that the absence of a father figure negatively affects a child's discipline as well as his will, sense of responsibility, and other qualities necessary in men. Moreover, unfavorable trends in family life have even been associated with criminal activity. For example, statistics indicate that 30 to 35 percent of all criminal violations in society and in the military are perpetrated by young people from broken homes.

In a similar vein, the increased number of single-child families does not have a positive effect on the quality of the conscript pool. In the USSR, more than 50 percent of all families have only one child, while in Russia 59 percent fit this profile.⁶ In such families, there is a greater danger of the child becoming individualistic, narcissistic, and egotistical--qualities which negatively affect life in military collectives.

3. Conclusions About Society-Military Relations

In short, there are many processes and trends that are having a notable effect on life among the troops. While the factors examined here do not represent a complete sociological analysis of the relationship between society and the military in the context of military reform, it is possible to draw several conclusions:

- In recent years the intensity of relations between society and the Armed Forces has increased significantly. This can be expected to continue as military reform unfolds.
- The relationship between society and the Armed Forces has become more complex, given that new problems have arisen as a result of military reform.
- For the first time in Soviet history, military reform is being implemented under conditions of ideological and political pluralism. This is seriously affecting relations between society and the Armed Forces, with conflicts between frequently opposing ideas for military reform.
- The course and outcome of military reform in the USSR depends to a decisive extent on society's support for it. This natural linkage is increasingly evident in Soviet society.

⁵ *Narodnoe khozyaistvo v SSSR za 70 let [The Soviet Economy for the Past 70 Years]* (Moscow, 1987), p. 404.

⁶ *Uchitel'skaya gazeta*, 22 August 1987.

B . SOCIAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH FORCE REDUCTIONS

Reducing the size of the Soviet Armed Forces is correctly viewed as an important element of modern military reform. It pursues a number of related objectives such as: bringing the size of the Soviet Armed Forces into line with new political realities; optimizing the structure of the army and navy; and reducing the financial cost of military development.

This is not the first force reduction in the history of Soviet military development. The first was the reform of the czarist army after the 1917 October Revolution and the creation of a considerably smaller Red Army. Thus, in 1920, there were 5.5 million men in the armed forces, which represented a significant and radical reduction. However, it was not fully in tune with the country's situation, and certain efforts were soon necessary to bring the size of the forces into line with military-political realities. As of 1 October 1923, they were cut to 516,000 men. But then, in accordance with the 1924-25 military reform, the Soviet Armed Forces were brought up to 562,000. Subsequently, the threat of war from fascism made it necessary to expand the size of the military. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Armed Forces numbered 11,365,000 men, but by 1948, they had been cut to 2,874,000 men. It is difficult to overestimate the efforts that were involved in the "six waves" of reductions which occurred one after the other in a short amount of time, ultimately cutting the force down to one-quarter of its previous size. There were serious changes in the Armed Forces at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, made possible by the "thaw" in East-West relations. In 1960, 1.2 million men were cut during what became known as the "Khrushchev" reductions.

Finally, the most recent personnel cut of 500,000 men was announced by President Gorbachev in December 1988 at a session of the United Nations. The possibility of additional reductions cannot be ruled out in the near term, and they could be on the order of 1 to 1.5 million men. Such reductions would put the size of the Soviet Armed Forces at 2.5 million men. Not surprisingly, the public and military personnel do not have identical attitudes toward this issue.

Sociological research indicates that 78 to 79 percent of civilian respondents accept the need for reductions with certain qualifications. Another 12 to 14 percent remain undecided, and 8 to 10 percent do not believe it necessary to implement reductions under existing conditions. In all the groups surveyed, an overwhelming majority were concerned about two issues: retaining the country's defense potential at the necessary level and society's preparedness to carry out a massive reduction of the Armed Forces.

The picture is somewhat different when looking at the attitudes of officers and warrant officers toward current and future reductions. According to available data, 59 to 60 percent of them understand the need for reductions, but contend that this process must be well organized, well thought out, and accompanied by social guarantees. Another 9 to 10 percent reject further reductions, and 30 to 31 percent believe that new reductions should be implemented only after society proves ready to solve the various social problems that this process raises.⁷ Two-thirds of military personnel rightly point out that their social and living condition problems have not been fully resolved.⁸

1. Identifying the Problems Associated with Force Cuts

Among the issues that worry servicemen most, their primary concern is that all the social problems created by current and possible future force reductions are not being worked through in enough depth. While understanding the need for such cuts, many respondents believe that social protection for those people discharged from the Armed Forces is still insufficient. As a result, they generally appeal to the President, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, and republic-level bodies, explaining the real state of living conditions for military personnel.

Quite a few among them also believe that the experiences from previous force reductions have not been studied sufficiently, especially the poorly planned reductions in the 1950-60s. During those cuts, the state dealt with the problems that the discharged personnel encountered only in a fragmented way. People continue to remember these events; indeed, some officers who experienced the effects of the 1960s reductions are still serving in the Armed Forces today.

There are people who believe that the current cut of 500,000 men was also not fully planned. For many, the main issue is the problem of housing shortages and the difficulties involved in trying to solve this problem. The main reasons for these difficulties are the failure to meet housing construction quotas and, in certain cases, the fact that local officials have ignored special union-level resolutions to provide housing to former military personnel.

People are also apprehensive about the fact that men are being discharged from the military during an economic crisis and while the economy is transitioning to a market

⁷ See footnote 4.

⁸ See Andreev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1990.

economy with the inevitable rise in prices. For this reason, demands are being made to fix prices on basic necessities and to provide social guarantees to those who could be discharged.

People also understand that troop reductions and related social issues merge with the overall set of military development problems, the implementation of military reform, and the resolution of numerous social issues in our country. As a result, there has been a dual reaction. Some believe that the issue of social guarantees for discharged military personnel should receive first-order attention; that is, they should be singled out from all the other problems, but only when there is a possibility of solving them. Others propose that the social problems of those being discharged can be resolved only within the system of all of society's social problems. Which path is correct? Apparently, one that integrates the merits of both proposals.

In discussing the social problems of force reductions, the consequences of these reductions cannot be ignored. They are being widely discussed in society and by military personnel. The reduction plan proposes that officer billets be decreased by 220,000 and general officer positions by 1,300. In addition, the number of warrant officer billets are to be reduced by 250,000. This affects the future of many servicemen and their careers, which many have prepared for and dreamt about.

The departure of many highly trained people from the military will entail difficulties not only for individuals, but society and the Armed Forces as well. Many of those leaving will do so because there will be no demand for their high qualifications and because they get paid relatively little in the military for their work compared with civilian specialists having the same qualifications. In cooperatives, for example, the wages for such specialists are already 3-4 times higher than in the military. In addition, a considerable portion of those discharged will be those who are now serving in Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Inasmuch as society still has not sufficiently resolved the social problems of troop withdrawals, officers and warrant officers with good training will leave. This cannot help but affect the Armed Forces and their defense potential.

Force reductions have also affected the military's prestige in society. Obviously, if there are no proper guarantees that someone will be able to serve in the Armed Forces for the duration of their contract, those who had planned their future in military service will naturally look elsewhere. The effects of this trend are already apparent. Competition to enter military schools has already fallen somewhat, although it remains high enough to

guarantee that all the slots are filled. For example, in aviation, engineer, and airborne schools, there is an average of 10 people for every opening. In military-political schools, there are three to four applicants per opening.

Today, as a result of the large-scale cuts in the Armed Forces, another social problem is the relocation of demobilized servicemen from military posts where they have housing to other regions where they do not. Relocation issues must also be addressed when the demobilized men are left to live on military posts far from major population areas. Relocation problems encompass, but are not limited to, job placement for former servicemen and their families in their new location as well as continuing schooling for their children.

Finally, those discharged can face serious psychological problems. After they are demobilized and move from a garrison to a city, many former servicemen no longer have ties with their previous community, where they had dealt with many social problems. Research indicates that former servicemen rank this problem between number one and number three in terms of importance.

2. Difficulties in Solving Social Problems

In sum, the social problems arising from force cuts are many, and they must be solved. Society is looking for the methods and means to do this, understanding that it is possible only by monitoring the effects of sociological patterns.

First, there is growing understanding about the inevitability of further force reductions. With this, people are increasingly concerned about society's ability to resolve all the problems, not so much the organizational and technical ones, but the social problems involved in cutting the armed forces.

Second, it is the social issues that have become paramount in determining the prospects for reducing the Soviet Armed Forces. Moreover, there is quite a clear pattern of society showing increased interest in these problems. According to available data, just during 1990, 18 percent of respondents say that their interest in social issues related to reducing the size of the military has grown.⁹

Third, during the past year, scientists' interest in these issues has also intensified considerably and the scientific foundation for resolving these problems has deepened

⁹ See footnote 4.

appreciably. Admittedly, expert assessments indicate that the scientific foundation still remains insufficient to resolve these problems effectively, in a short period of time, and with minimal cost.

Fourth, there are obvious contradictions in how the social problems of reducing the Armed Forces are to be solved. There are contradictions between what people say about the need to guarantee social protection for discharged military personnel and the fact that these same people, who frequently have the legislative responsibility, do not do anything; between the need for all republics to participate in solving these problems and the positions of some of their leaders who refuse to participate; and between mere talk and constructive actions in approaches to the problem. On this point, there have been some justified accusations leveled against new organs of power which have actually only further aggravated social problems through their unconstructive actions. For example, virtually everywhere the waiting time for an apartment for military personnel and discharged officers and warrant officers has increased by 1 to 2 years. Whereas before (3 or 4 years ago), the wait averaged 2 to 3 years, today it has risen to 3 to 5 years. The greatest difficulties are in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, and a number of other regions.

Fifth, many social organizations and institutions have become increasingly concerned with the social issues of military development, including the problems of military reform in general and the social aspects of reducing the Armed Forces in particular. Some efforts to resolve these complicated issues frequently have resulted in consensus and compromise among opposing political forces and organizations. Noteworthy are the integrated efforts of state power, the Ministry of Defense, social organizations, foundations, and certain political forces in resolving the whole range of social issues in the Armed Forces, which includes the social problems of discharged personnel.

Sixth, there has been considerable increased interest in how Western countries here resolved social issues of military development. For the first time in Soviet history, this experience is being analyzed critically enough by specialists so that everything of value can be extracted and can be used to resolve the social and other problems of Soviet military reform. Admittedly, within this framework there have been those who have tried to blindly and automatically transfer experiences from the United States, the Netherlands, and Canada to Soviet soil. These attempts have generally not proven successful.

People who try to convince the public that the West can solve most of the USSR's social problems, including those related to its force reductions, are not very popular in the Soviet Union. According to available data, 5 to 6 percent of respondents believe this

completely and 17 percent believe it partially. However, there are actually very few (3 to 4 percent) who reject the possibility and usefulness of Western assistance.¹⁰

Thus, social issues associated with force reductions are of special public interest and the importance of solving them is increasingly appreciated. Nevertheless, their realization is going more slowly than the situation demands. The failure to solve these matters creates problems affecting society and the Armed Forces. Such problems include: worry among servicemen about their future and their increased determination to establish a social base in the civilian world even while still in the service; the servicemen's intensified focus on questions of material support for their families; the increased desirability of service locations where an apartment can be obtained and where those deployed could remain after being demobilized; the desire among some servicemen--generally those who are living in favorable climates--to prolong their service as long as possible. At the same time, because of uncertain prospects after being discharged, some officers and warrant officers increasingly want to be discharged ahead of time so that they can become integrated into the civilian economy. Clearly, the failure to solve social problems resulting from troop cuts is negatively affecting troop morale and relations between society and the army.

Yet despite all these difficulties, the existing situation is not hopeless. Sociological research includes an analysis of proposals and statements about the main efforts aimed at solving these problems. First and foremost, an overwhelming majority of respondents single out the adoption of a state program for social protection of military personnel. The draft for such a program was included as an important element in the MoD's Reform Plan, although it still needs serious additional work to refine it.

Another effort focuses on establishing a solid legislative base for the proposed program. People are worried that this program could go unfulfilled, as has happened before in the history of USSR military affairs. As insurance, they want legal guarantees for the program's execution.

The most important issues of social protection for people discharged from the military are guarantees for housing and pensions, which create the basis for a normal civilian life. The new Law on Pensions has had a substantial positive effect on the social position of those discharged into the reserves. This law provides for a 75 to 100 percent increase in pensions for virtually every category of former military personnel.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Aside from those basic necessities, it has also been suggested--increasingly since 1989--that a system of vocational schools be created to retrain officers and warrant officers and to teach them civilian professions. Such schools, it is argued, would further help those discharged from the military to adapt to civilian life.

Finally, in late 1990 and early 1991, the need to provide foodstuffs to these people was raised much more frequently than before. This reflects the difficulties of the food supply situation in the Soviet Union in recent times.

Thus, of the various social problems arising as a result of reductions in the Soviet Armed Forces, some are specific to the Soviet Union while many are typical for all countries going through the process of massive cuts in their armed forces. This is the kind of methodological matrix that can and must be used when examining what is happening in Soviet society as it implements radical military reform.

C. SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND MONGOLIA

1. Scope of the Withdrawals

The plan for Soviet military reform provides for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Europe and Mongolia. This is in keeping with the idea of new thinking and is completely logical in the context of efforts designed to consolidate peace.

The continuing intensive withdrawal process represents a huge effort in terms of its scope and significance. In terms of the work that has been accomplished and what remains to be done, it is the equivalent of relocating a small country of a million people from Europe to the USSR. Data cited in the MoD Military Reform Plan characterize the scale of the problem and illustrate the complexities. The plan states that the following are to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia: more than 186,000 personnel, including more than 43,000 officers and warrant officers; 77 launchers for operational-tactical missiles; 3,200 tanks; 5,150 armored fighting vehicles; 2,350 field artillery guns; 350 combat aircraft; and 364 helicopters.

One of the most complicated tasks facing Soviet society and the USSR Ministry of Defense in terms of the volume of work to be done and its social consequences is the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany over 4 years. This entails relocating in a short period of time the largest and most combat-capable group of Soviet troops. These troops consist of more than 370,000 service personnel, including

approximately 100,000 officers and warrant officers, as well as 184,200 family members, including 99,300 children. A large quantity of weapons, equipment, and materiel must also be withdrawn from Germany, a process that has already begun. The equipment to be relocated consists of several thousand tanks, 9,500 armored personnel carriers and mechanized infantry combat vehicles, 4,400 field artillery guns, 1,700 air defense missile systems, 620 combat aircraft, and 790 helicopters. The overall volume of munitions and materiel being withdrawn from Germany totals more than 1,660,000 tons.

Moreover, numerous facilities must be dismantled and their equipment withdrawn: 12 command posts, 632 communication installations, 31 airfields, and 40 hospitals as well as a large number of garages, barracks equipment, factories for repairing equipment and armaments, simulation facilities, and educational centers.

2. Problems Associated with the Withdrawals

The withdrawal of troops and the transfer of weapons and equipment in a relatively short period of time creates a number of difficulties and problems. The most important of these are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Research conducted among the troops shows that 93.5 percent of servicemen responding understand the need and ultimate inevitability of withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. At the same time, barely more than 3 percent support a rapid and forced withdrawal. The remainder believe that the withdrawal can and must be carried out, but not until a later time. According to many, the troop withdrawal agreements have not completely worked out the military-political consequences of the withdrawal, nor has the extent of the Soviet Union's readiness to accept, relocate, and adapt such a large number of people to civilian life been considered. Incidentally, 96.7 percent of military respondents question how realistic and accurate the timetable is for these withdrawals.¹¹ Many Soviet specialists estimate that a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany (people, equipment, weapons, and materiel) will require 7 years. The agreement to compress it into 4 years has raised a legitimate question: with what means and at whose expense will the withdrawal process be accelerated? Hence, there are doubts that the withdrawal will be done in an organized way and with a minimum of social problems.

¹¹ Research conducted in the Moscow and Kiev Military Districts and in the Western Group of Forces by Kokorin et al., October 1991 (730 respondents) and January 1991 (850 respondents).

Military personnel have reacted positively to reports about possible assistance from Western countries in resolving social problems. According to available data, which does not claim to be completely objective, 68.7 percent of respondents understand the need for and expediency of such assistance.¹² At the same time, there are some who doubt the sincerity of this assistance and others who believe that such assistance is insulting to the Soviet people. In short, political, social, economic, and psychological problems are increasingly complicated by their simultaneous confluence and contradiction.

A large number of Soviet people are worried about what is, in their opinion, Germany's inadequate financial support for Soviet troop withdrawals. They believe that 12 billion marks does not compensate for the expenses the troops have incurred and does not guarantee the resolution of the basic social problems for the troops being withdrawn. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the troop withdrawal process has involved additional costs as a result of Poland's long-time refusal to allow these troops to transit its territory.

Polls have shown that military personnel--serving both in Germany and within the Soviet Union--are fearful about the growing influence and prestige of the united Germany in Europe and the world. They want one assurance: that the economic potential of this country will never be used for war purposes. Research results on this issue offer largely contradictory data: 98.3 percent of respondents believe that there is reason for greater trust in the policies of a united Germany, the level of this trust being greater than ever before.¹³ At the same time, virtually everyone believes that Germany's politics must be analyzed attentively and critically. This is direct evidence that the Soviet people continue to remember World War II, but it does not cancel out the trend of increased trust between the peoples of the USSR and Germany. Soviet military personnel accept this as well.

While noting this positive trend, it is necessary not to ignore data indicating that the Soviet people's trust in the policies of the united Germany's leadership is variable. As a result of a recent increase in ideological and propagandistic work by the Western mass media, which do not always provide objective information about the troops in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, the Soviet people are increasingly focusing on the sincerity of the political aspirations of Western countries. This does not mean that there has been a radical about-face. It just once again confirms the fact that a political position can be stable only if

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., January 1991 survey.

the actions by both parties participating in the political process are balanced, consistent, and unambiguous. For servicemen being withdrawn from Eastern Europe, this is a fundamental issue. Understanding their withdrawals to be a step toward peace and security, they would like to see identical actions by the West.

Sociological polls can identify the problems that most worry servicemen, their families, and workers who will be returning to the Soviet Union in the future. They rank these problems in a certain way. The most important consideration is when and to what location they are being withdrawn. Of particular concern is the withdrawal of troops to the Baltics, Caucasus, and increasingly Moldova. Officials in these regions are conducting a policy aimed against stationing withdrawn troops on their territory, and realizing this, people do not want to go there. Analysis shows that this issue is of greatest concern to the families, mainly the wives of officers and warrant officers. They are happy to hear reports that troops being withdrawn are being stationed mainly in the European part of the USSR.

The second most important consideration is that of providing servicemen with housing. It is well known that there are already about 200,000 families of servicemen that do not have apartments. This number will increase considerably as a result of troop withdrawals, given that there are units in which 30 to 55 percent of the families of officers and warrant officers do not have apartments in the USSR.

The housing problem involves many other related questions, such as access to schools, nurseries, kindergartens, etc. People want to see an integrated and rapid resolution of these problems. They are particularly worried about the fact that all the details of financing housing construction have not been worked out. This is mentioned by 87.3 percent of the respondents.¹⁴

For many, the third-ranking problem is that of adapting to the new life which awaits the servicemen and their families. This entails various social considerations, such as: the prospects of serving in a new place and a new collective; their wives' ability to find work; finding new friends; maintaining ties with relatives; the climate, etc. For a long time these socio-psychological problems were not specifically analyzed. Research has shown that their significance is considerable. Moreover, it seems likely that their role and importance will further increase as more troops are withdrawn.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Recently the fourth greatest concern has been access to foodstuffs and consumer goods, especially for those serving abroad. Indeed, 91.2 percent of respondents declared that this problem has become particularly relevant to them in the last 2 years or so, that is, since shortages of food and other supplies became particularly acute in the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Judging from the results of sociological research, the Soviet people are increasingly worried about the possible transition to a market economy with all its consequences. While this is a common concern for all Soviet citizens, it is of special concern to servicemen being withdrawn from Eastern Europe, especially from Germany. To a certain extent, they have already encountered market relations during their stay in these countries. These people have diverse attitudes toward a market economy. Many (47.3 percent) declare that they see obvious strengths in market relations. Another 21 percent believe that they were not able to develop an understanding of the market's advantages and disadvantages in such a short period of time. The remainder (31.7 percent) believe that a market economy will not improve the Soviet people's life if it is implemented using Western methods. These percentages are quite variable. Thus, a year ago, there were 2.5 times fewer supporters of a market economy among Soviet servicemen polled in Germany. Nevertheless, 81.2 percent of respondents still supported the creation of a mechanism to guarantee social stability for military personnel under market relations.¹⁶

The picture would not be complete if it were not noted that interest in the financial bases for solving social issues has grown considerably among virtually all categories of people serving abroad. At the same time, their concerns also extend to the matter of legal protection. In sum, servicemen being restationed in the USSR are concerned about the same set of problems as those that worry soldiers already serving in the country.

For many servicemen and their families returning to the Soviet Union, a subject that causes particular anxiety is the growth of crime in the country. For example, approximately 63 percent of the wives of servicemen stated that this is becoming a first-order issue for them.¹⁷ The reason is clear--they worry above all about their children. Hence, those who are returning to the USSR wish to go to the most crime-free regions.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Research conducted in November 1990 and January 1991 in the Western Group of Forces, 1450 respondents.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Research also indicates that many of those who are to be withdrawn are worried about current relations between society and the Armed Forces. Of those polled, 73.4 percent believe that this worsening relationship is one of the main factors substantially affecting the resolution of social issues, which servicemen returning to the USSR encounter. Other social problems involved in withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe and Mongolia certainly could be identified. But the point is not so much to describe them all in full, but to understand the basic trends in social issues related to these troop withdrawals.

3. Conclusions about Social Issues Related to Troop Withdrawals

To summarize the research results, first, there has been a significant increase (of 1.8 times) in the attention and interest of servicemen and their families to the social issues of troop withdrawals.

Second, ties are strengthening between the political and social issues of troop withdrawals. A natural linkage lies in the fact that every political issue affecting Europe is automatically becoming a question of troop withdrawals, and people assess it in terms of its influence on the social aspects of their lives.

Third, troop withdrawals and the related social issues have heightened family considerations considerably for military personnel. This is appropriate, since all the social problems affect not only officers and warrant officers but also their families.

Fourth, from a social standpoint, enlisted personnel and sergeants--that is, temporary personnel in the Armed Forces--are the most calm and untroubled about troop withdrawals. Not surprisingly, officers and warrant officers worry about their effects to a much greater extent. The social problems that worry them affect not only them personally but also their families. Research indicates that the relocation of troops, stationing and setting up military personnel and their families in new places is of special concern to commanders and political workers of all ranks. Naturally, the higher their rank, the greater their concern about the social problems of troop withdrawals.

Fifth, despite the increasing complexity of resolving these social issues, an overwhelming majority of officers and warrant officers place top priority on combat readiness and their ability to execute their main professional missions. Admittedly, in contrast to previous years, today virtually all of them realize that social problems are an important element affecting the troops' combat readiness and defense capacity.

In short, the social problems of withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and Mongolia can be best addressed only in the context of social problems being resolved during the course of Soviet military reform.

VI. SOCIAL-LEGAL GUARANTEES OF REFORM

Like any other type of reform, military reform cannot, for understandable reasons, be implemented without legal guarantees. There are a number of factors, however, that make the legal guarantees of Soviet modern military reform especially important. First, the legal foundations of military development in the Soviet Union are not well-developed and are largely inadequate for the current situation. The reasons behind this inadequacy include the fact that rules are not followed, there is administrative high-handedness, and departments and regions have created their own rules. In addition, there is no system of Soviet laws that would completely and comprehensively address the needs of military development.

The attempt to address all these problems in one law--the Law on Universal Military Service--has proved unsuccessful. Despite its historic role, this law has focused mainly on staffing issues and the discharge of military personnel into the reserves. Thus, many other military matters have remained outside the framework of legal guarantees. The people are certainly aware of this since 81 percent of those surveyed recognized the inadequacy of legal guarantees for military development in general and for military reform in particular.¹

Second, military development is dynamic. It must be especially flexible during reform, when the need for each "reformist" action to have legal foundations increases considerably. On this point, sociological research indicates that since the start of military reform, all types of military personnel have been acutely aware of the need for legal guarantees for this reform. Soldiers and sergeants who had been fairly passive on this issue have recently become more active and are awaiting the adoption of a system of laws that will actually guarantee the implementation of military reform and increased legal protection for all categories of servicemen.

Third, the situation in the USSR today requires the adoption of a package of laws systemically related and complementary to each other. Such a package is seen as the foundation and guarantee that the legal mechanism of reform will work effectively.

¹ Research conducted by Kokorin et al., October-November 1990; 1230 respondents.

Finally, the elaboration of a modern, legal foundation for reform and military development in the USSR will largely be dictated by the laws of international relations, in which the USSR is becoming an increasingly active participant.

Thus, the very logic of Soviet military development and today's military reform focuses on establishing their legal foundations. Many legal specialists correctly question whether the entire system of legal guarantees for military development in the USSR shouldn't be reformed; the idea makes a great deal of sense. And while many steps still must be taken to qualitatively renew the legal foundations of military development, one cannot ignore what has already been done in this area, and what is planned for the near future.

A. LEGAL GUARANTEES FOR MILITARY REFORM

1. Attitudes Toward Legal Guarantees

Based on the findings of sociological research, which reveals the attitudes of civilians and military personnel, it is clear that virtually everyone--conservatives and radicals--recognizes the need for legal guarantees for military reform. They differ only in their ideas of how long it will take to adopt the new laws. The radicals are always in a hurry, while the conservatives are cautious. The preferred position is that of the so-called centrists. They assume that fundamental, well-founded laws to regulate military development must be adopted quickly, but they could subsequently be supplemented and clarified with new legislation. Not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority of military personnel share this view.

There have been fairly persistent public discussions about the need to adopt a "package" of fundamentally new laws to guarantee military development in the USSR. However, various political forces differ in how they think such a package should be developed. Some groups believe the most important law to be the Law on Defense, while others believe it to be the Law on the Social Status of Servicemen, and still others cite the Law on Universal Military Service. It is certainly necessary to begin with these laws in working out a whole system of laws to regulate military development, but it is clear that a "package" of laws must be adopted simultaneously. As this requirement has become increasingly evident, many people in Soviet society and the Armed Forces cannot understand why the USSR Supreme Soviet has acted so slowly, postponing from session to session approval of laws that have already been virtually completely worked out on all

aspects of military development. Of those polled, 93.4 percent were concerned about this.² Some are convinced that there has been a serious and unjustified delay in adopting the laws that are to form the legal basis for military reform.

Interestingly, available data also show that up to 58 percent of respondents recognize the need to study and partially use other countries' legislative experience in military development. At the same time, there are those who categorically oppose such an approach in establishing the legal basis for Soviet military reform. A year ago, this latter category of people accounted for 34 percent of those polled; today, their number has shrunk to 12 percent.³

As a result of increasing glasnost' and the public's involvement in creating laws, both specialists and non-specialists in the Soviet Union have offered tens of thousands of proposals on reforming the legal basis of military development. Some relate directly to establishing the legal foundations for military service. Not surprisingly, given the diversity of their sources, these proposals have been varied and frequently contradictory. Nonetheless, it is possible to single out their commonalities.

2. Proposals for Reforming the Legal Basis of Military Development

Most military lawyers and specialists in military law conclude that the main purpose of military reform is to develop, adopt, and promulgate laws to regulate the development and use of the Armed Forces, the legal position of the army in society and society's relationship with the army, as well as the legal position of military personnel. Several kinds of laws are needed: Law on Defense (better than the Law on National Security), Law on Military Obligation and Military Service, Law on the Social Protection of Servicemen, Law on Officers, Law on Warrant Officers, and Law on Soldiers and Sailors. Instead of regulating military service for each category of service personnel, it is necessary to develop and adopt a USSR Law on Servicemen, which would combine all regulations about military service for each category of service personnel into one act that would have higher judicial authority than the regulations currently in effect.

Laws regulating relations between society and the Soviet Armed Forces are of particular importance and interest. As research indicates, they involve many of the issues

² Research conducted in November-December 1989 (570 respondents) and October-November 1990 (610 respondents).

³ Ibid.

that concern servicemen most. These problems can be resolved only on a legal basis, which has yet to be adequately worked out.

Specialists believe the laws must contain legal rights and legal and social protection for service personnel, an idea that is supported by practically 100 percent of respondents.⁴ This is eloquent testimony to the acuteness of the problems existing in this area.

According to proposals by military lawyers, it is advisable to incorporate into Soviet law the principle that all the rights and obligations of servicemen--established by the rights of all Soviet citizens and by the rights of military personnel given the specifics of military service--determine the essence of legal regulations for servicemen.

It is proposed that the rights and duties of servicemen be divided into three groups and that they be given the status of laws. The first group includes the basic and inalienable rights and duties of servicemen contained in the Soviet Constitution, which define their status as citizens of the USSR and protect their immunity as official persons. These are socioeconomic, political, social, and personal rights and freedoms which cannot be changed or limited by other lesser judicial acts. In other words, no judicial regulations can run counter to the constitutional rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens. It is impermissible for the military command and individual departments to establish various limitations and prohibitions. Only real guarantees for the constitutional rights of servicemen will contribute to the social protection of this segment of the Soviet population.

The second group includes those rights and obligations that extend to servicemen, but unlike the first group, these rights sometimes apply differently to servicemen. For example, with respect to the Bases of USSR and Republic Legislation on Administrative Violations, administrative penalties such as fines, correction work, and administrative arrest cannot be applied to servicemen. This does not limit the legal status of servicemen; there are just special ways of applying these rules because of the specifics of military service.

The third group includes those rights and obligations that apply strictly to servicemen because they are in the military. They are established by the Laws on the USSR Armed Forces and by legal acts based on these laws. These rules define the common, official, and special rights and obligations of servicemen.

⁴ Ibid., October-November 1990 survey.

In the opinion of Soviet experts, the new laws must reflect the status of the Soviet Armed Forces, taking into consideration the changes in the economic situation and the political system, as well as the division of power among legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. As a result, society is debating who has the authority to give the Armed Forces the order to use their weapons. The draft laws stipulate that the Soviet President is to make the decision to begin military defensive actions and to call in the military to fulfill international obligations, but it charges the USSR Supreme Soviet with reviewing the legality of this decision within one month. Another possible scenario is also anticipated: in the event of massive unrest in some region of the USSR, the President of the republic will make the decision to use the army and will subsequently report to the Soviet President; the latter will then make the final decision within 48 hours. In the event that illegal armed detachments appear in areas where a military garrison is stationed, the decision to use force can be made by the head of the garrison; this decision must subsequently be approved by the appropriate authorities. Such ideas are being proposed for inclusion in the new legislation.

Given the current political situation, there are also proposals to change the text of the military oath. Specialists reason that the structure of power and state control changed long ago, when the post of President was introduced, but Soviet servicemen still give their oath to the people and the government, not to the President or the Supreme Soviet. Specialists believe that servicemen should give their oath to the President and to protecting the Soviet Constitution and the Soviet people from foreign aggression and internal mass unrest, as well as to providing assistance in the event of natural disasters. Given the increasingly complicated situation in the country, this proposal is finding increasing public support. Nevertheless, people continue to disagree on exactly how the text of the oath should be changed.

Many experts are focusing on creating a law that would allow the retention of a unified Armed Forces in the USSR. Interest in this has been especially strong in the wake of the all-union referendum. The Union Treaty plays a very important role, since it incorporates special articles dealing with military development. Society correctly views this law as the original element of the entire modern legislative system, including the legal foundations for military development. Sociologists believe that the failure to sign the Union Treaty would significantly complicate the implementation of military reform, as well as the elaboration and adoption of laws forming the legal cornerstone of the Soviet multinational state.

Over the past several years, there has been an active search for optimal legal norms which could be used to help strengthen military discipline and prevent legal violations by military personnel. This search has involved virtually every lawyer, and it has been widely discussed in society. Concrete proposals on this score have been identified. For example, many have proposed adopting a Single All-Military Statute on the USSR Armed Forces, which would have the force of a union-level law, instead of the Statute on Internal Service, the Disciplinary Statute, and the Statute on Garrison and Guard Service in the USSR Armed Forces. In their view, such a law could be worked out and discussed in military collectives and then adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The effort is necessary, they contend, mainly because the all-military statutes in effect are seriously outdated. In fact, these statutes contain articles that were adopted during the military reform of 1924-25, they are felt to be excessively detailed and fraught with all sorts of prohibitions. There are other statutes still in effect that were adopted in 1937-38, which cannot be considered democratic.

A single statute should, in the opinion of legal specialists, significantly reduce the number of legal norms, standardize and improve the rules of conduct of servicemen, eliminate repetition, and abolish inappropriate requirements, among other things. These norms could be established in the general part of the statute, and supplemental acts could address the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of servicemen. Technical norms (such as the maintenance of facilities, samples of documents, and inventory control) could be included in the form of appendices.

There are many constructive proposals, already embodied in draft laws, that seek to further democratize military service. Much has actually been done in this area over the past several years, although the actual laws are still needed. Among the more interesting and realistic proposals set forth are the following recommendations:

- Increase the role and authority of officers assemblies, giving them the right to make decisions about promoting officers, conferring military ranks on and ahead of schedule, providing material assistance, providing housing to individual officers on a priority basis, etc.
- Expand the authority of officers' courts of honor, giving them the ability to examine cases of alcohol abuse, or claims by officers against each other of up to 500 rubles if they agree to have the matter reviewed in such a court.
- Reestablish company-level military courts for conscripts, which had been abolished in 1946 and grant these courts appropriate authority.

- Exclude from the Law on Criminal Responsibility for Military Crimes those crimes for which, under mitigating circumstances, the commander will set the punishment, and include signs of non-regulatory behavior in all articles pertaining to relations among service personnel, including between chiefs and their subordinates.
- Expand the economic rights of the senior commander similar to the rights established in the Law on State Enterprises, reflecting the special features of market relations in the army.
- Grant housing commissions for military units and garrisons as well as various public control commissions the right to make the final decision on these matters, without the approval of the commander of the unit (head of the garrison).
- Democratize relations within the military which could include, among other things, limiting saluting in public places (for example, in the metro, outside the military unit); allowing conscripts to wear civilian clothes when they are not on duty or are on leave; and clearly defining the meaning of phrases such as "fulfilling one's service obligation," "service time for officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel," "the right of the commander to use termination measures," and "the responsibility of the commander for the actions of his subordinates."

Since late 1990, military personnel have been increasingly demanding laws that guarantee a stable position for the Armed Forces in society, and economic protection for each serviceman as the country transitions to a market economy. This has become one of the most important issues. There must be legal guarantees and they will be reflected to one extent or another in the laws.

Legislative provisions for the Armed Forces' entry into a market economy have been addressed fully in the Ministry of Defense's Plan.⁵ In particular, the Plan calls for unified all-union legislation in the area of economic guarantees for defense, based on standardizing as much as possible with existing laws and those being prepared, as well as mandatory coordination with the union's and autonomous republics' laws. The Plan intends to directly address defense issues in economic laws being prepared on--

- A Union Reserve system for the Union, in terms of creating a Reserve Defense Fund.

⁵ See *Kontseptsiya vkhodzheniya Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v rynochnuyu ekonomiku* [The Plan for the USSR Armed Forces' Entry into a Market Economy] (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1990), pp. 66-70.

- A single monetary system, in terms of monetary payments by the USSR Ministry of Defense and its representatives.
- Banks and banking activities, in terms of services provided to the Ministry of Defense, the functioning of branches of the USSR State Bank, and the possible establishment of a USSR Ministry of Defense bank.
- Budgetary arrangements, in terms of determining how to develop and adopt a state defense budget.
- Land reform, in terms of the granting and use of land for defense purposes.
- A fund of Soviet state property, in terms of the formation and use of state property for defense purposes, as well as the use of surplus MoD materiel not for defense purposes.
- Foreign trade and regulation of it, including controlling the export of military equipment and distributing the revenues from these exports;
- The customs system, including the movement of military cargo.

In addition, legislation is being worked out on general defense issues and the problems of the Armed Forces' entry into the market economy. The Law on Defense stipulates that government bodies, enterprises, and public organizations have the responsibility and authority to provide economic guarantees for defense. It also outlines the general rules of economic guarantees for defense. For its part, the Law on the Status of Servicemen identifies the civic rights and freedoms of servicemen (the right to work, to vacation, to housing, to education, to protecting one's health, to receiving pensions and benefits, and to material support). It establishes mandatory health and life insurance for servicemen, as well as a procedure for receiving compensation for health injuries. Similarly, this law details the procedure for military personnel to receive compensation for injuries sustained during their military service because of illegal actions by state and public organizations and officials. In addition, it calls for guarantees for the social protection of the families of servicemen. Finally, the Law on Universal Military Duty and Military Service discusses the provision of funds and materiel for fulfilling universal military service. It addresses the training of pre-draftees and draftees for military service and specifies material guarantees to citizens if they are drafted or admitted into military service, whether as the result of a mobilization call-up or a subsequent call-up during war time.

The legislative mechanism that provides for the Soviet Armed Forces' entry into market relations also includes a package of special laws which details the duties of the subjects of military-economic rights as well as the procedure for satisfying military-economic requirements. The adoption of such laws was necessitated not only by the

above-mentioned reasons, but also because previous legal acts that were under the law⁶ became largely outdated and ineffective as a result of various new laws, especially the Law on Enterprises in the USSR which came into effect on 1 January 1991. For all intents and purposes, the economic guarantees for defense remain without an appropriate legislative foundation.

In the existing situation, specialists propose that first-order attention be given to preparing and adopting the following laws:

- Law on a State Program for the Development of the USSR Armed Forces.
- Law on State Orders, which ideally should be of a universal nature and applicable to all production purchased under state orders. It is possible, however, to narrow the focus to only those orders for the Ministry of Defense.
- Law on the Economic Activity of the USSR Ministry of Defense, including the functioning of its enterprises and commercial issues, such as the foreign trade activities of the Ministry.
- Law on Mobilization Training for the USSR Economy.
- Law on Delivering Defense Products, which should encompass how products are to be delivered, the nature of concluding agreements (contracts), guidelines for setting prices as the transition to market relations is completed, and the procedure for organizing the activities of military representative's offices.
- Law on Priorities in Economic Development, which ideally would reveal the system of priorities throughout the state (in public health, ecology, education, defense, etc.). A special system of priorities on just economic guarantees for defense could be separated out.

The problems of adapting the Armed Forces to market relations will be reflected as well in reworked by-laws, such as the Regulations on the USSR Ministry of Defense, on military-construction detachments, and so forth.

It seems reasonable that during the transitional period, before the appropriate laws are adopted, a Presidential Decree will be published to introduce the main principles of the Plan for Adapting the Armed Forces to Market Relations. This decree will also prolong the effectiveness of a number of by-laws on economic guarantees for defense during the transitional period and will identify the sources for financing defense expenditures.

⁶ Examples are the regulations on military representatives from the USSR Ministry of Defense in enterprises and organizations of the ministries and departments; regulations about the basic conditions for delivering products for military organizations; and regulations about mobilization of the economy.

Among these acts are all those pertaining to mobilization of the national economy and mobilization reserves, as well as regulations on--

- military representatives from the USSR Ministry of Defense in enterprises and organizations of the ministries and departments.
- the basic conditions for delivering goods to military organizations.
- the special conditions for delivering ships and vessels to the Soviet Armed Forces.
- the special conditions for delivering certain types of goods to military organizations.

A sociological analysis of the current process of creating military rules shows that contradictions in current legislation have begun to be resolved. The resolution of these contradictions has led lawyers to formulate specific proposals, many of which are difficult to refute. For example, many emphasize that some currently legal restrictions on military personnel contradict the Soviet Constitution and undermine the status of military personnel. Therefore, state laws should reflect the following: the right of citizens to voluntarily enter active military service; the right of officers to decide for themselves to be discharged from military service (warrant officers and extended-term servicemen have this right now); the right of conscripts to a mandatory annual vacation; the right of servicemen to social protection in the event of health injuries, etc.

Specialists have come up with very interesting proposals on legal guarantees for military reform and for the entire mechanism of Soviet military development in the form of a system of laws. One of the most interesting and realistic options proposes including four groups of laws and legislative acts: laws adopted by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies; laws falling under the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet; legislative regulations adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers; and legislation on defense of the country. The latter can be supplemented by republic-level legislation if necessary and if coordinated with the Union.

The first element of the system, under the purview of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, can formulate the following laws: the Constitution of the USSR, the Decree of the Congress of People's Deputies on the Main Directions of Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy, and the Law on Defense of the USSR.

The second element of the system, under the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet, can include: a law on military duty and the military situation; a law on the status of

servicemen; a law on state pensions and benefits for servicemen and their families; a USSR law on military duty and military service; a USSR law on mobilization and military status; a USSR law on the status of servicemen and those subject to the draft; a USSR law on confirming general military regulations; a USSR law on construction and other paramilitary formations; a USSR law on civil defense; a USSR law on state security; a USSR law on the internal MVD troops; a USSR law on state secrets; and a USSR law on the legal status of foreign servicemen studying in military-educational institutions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The third element of the system, under the USSR Council of Ministers, could include the following by-laws: a USSR law (regulation) on control over military districts, the navy, and the Soviet Armed Forces; a regulation on military-political bodies and military councils; a regulation on military-educational institutions; a regulation on local military control bodies; a regulation on monitoring and inspection services in the Soviet Armed Forces; a regulation on conducting military service; a regulation on officers' assemblies and officers' courts of honor; regulations on military courts; regulations on ensuring servicemen's wages in peace and war time; a regulation on physical fitness and military training of young people for military service; and a regulation on medical examiners called up for military service.

Finally, the fourth element of the system could include a number of pieces of legislation: a USSR law on the general principles of reforming leadership of the economic and social spheres in union republics; a USSR law on leases and leasing relations in the USSR; a USSR law on the rights of Soviet trade unions; a USSR law on youth and youth policies in the USSR; a USSR law on Soviet archive funds; a USSR law on voluntary societies and independent public associations; a USSR law on public security forces; a USSR law on local self-administration and the local economy; a USSR law on the quality of production and protecting consumer rights; a USSR law on the press and other mass media; a USSR law on freedom of conscience; a USSR law on glasnost'; a USSR law on preparing and adopting laws; regulations on judicial service in the Soviet national economy; and a regulation on judicial bodies in the Soviet Armed Forces.

This, then, is one of the options for a possible system of legislative guarantees for military reform. It is far from perfect, but it does show that persistent efforts are being made to find the optimal system that can form the legal basis for reform. Clearly, legal reform will be implemented as a fundamental part of military reform. It is also evident that the proposed systems of legal guarantees for reform include already adopted laws, on-

going legislation, and future laws, which their authors believe must be adopted. Finally, it must be noted that many of the ideas contradict one another, so exploratory work continues.

In concluding this brief analysis of the legal guarantees for modern military reform in the USSR, it should be noted that more than 90 percent of respondents believe that, with the adoption of laws regulating military service and determining the relationship between society and the Armed Forces, the situation in Soviet military affairs will change radically for the better.⁷

B. MILITARY REFORM AND SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR SERVICEMEN

1. The Nature of the Problems Driving Social Protection Activism

With military reform and the democratization of society and army life, problems related to the social protection of servicemen have become especially important. What are the reasons behind the urgency to these problems?

For one thing, over the past several years, there has been a radical change, and not for the better, in the socioeconomic and financial guarantees for servicemen, especially for officers, warrant officers, and all their families. For many years they were one of the most well-to-do groups in Soviet society. But recently, the picture has changed fundamentally. For example, the standard of living and the amount of consumer goods enjoyed by most colonels today is 15 to 19 percent lower than 25 years ago. For the majority of officers, raises they have received as a result of resolutions adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet only partially compensate for inflation, price increases, and higher housing costs.⁸

According to some research data, the sole source of income for 65 percent of officers' families is the officer's wages. This means that many officers' families (47.5 percent) had an average total income of about 100 rubles per month. The average total income of all the officers' families surveyed was 139.2 rubles, whereas in 1989 this figure was 159 rubles.⁹ The Soviet government has taken steps to try to stabilize these wages, however, and as a result the average income in 1990 had reached approximately 165 rubles

⁷ See footnote 2, October-November 1990 survey.

⁸ This information is based on USSR Ministry of Defense data from 1990.

⁹ See *Izvestiya*, 28 January 1990.

per month. Nevertheless, this increase does not radically change the situation. The officer's family still has a considerably smaller share of public consumer funds. Total state subsidies (pensions, benefits, payments) for civilian families are 3.3 times higher than for officers' and warrant officers' families.

Moreover, a significant number of officers' wives--about 63 percent of those surveyed--are forced not to work.¹⁰ And because officers cannot hold down two jobs or do individual or cooperative work, their family budgets are that much worse. Table VI-1 provides comparative data for the incomes of servicemen and civilian families.

Table VI-1: Income for Workers' and Officers' Families (percentage)

Income Sources	Workers' Families, 1988	Officers' Families, 1989-90
Wages	79.1	96.5 ^a
Pensions, Stipends, and Other Benefits from Public Consumer Funds	8.9	2.67
Personal Property	3.3	0.03
Income from Other Sources	<u>8.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Total	100%	100%

^a Of this figure 87.1 percent is from the officer's wages, while 9.4 percent is from wages earned by other family members.

Sources: *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1988g.* (Moscow: Financy i statistika, 1989), p. 91 and *Lektoru i propagandistu* (published by the Ministry of Defense), No. 1, 1991.

Another reason for the sense of urgency is that today's efforts still cannot completely arrest the decline in social protection for servicemen and their families. Sociological data also supports this point. According to the results of research conducted in November 1990, about 80 percent of officers and warrant officers were dissatisfied with the social and legal guarantees they received, and two-thirds were dissatisfied with their standard of living.¹¹ Such reactions are not surprising since, for example, the living space per capita in the USSR averages 15.2 square meters, but for an officer's family, it is 6.7 square meters per capita. Whereas in the USSR as a whole, more than 80 percent of apartments are equipped with running water, a sewage system, central heat, gas, hot water, and a bathroom, only some 50 percent of the garrisons have these basic comforts.

¹⁰ See N. Sakhnov, "On Cooperation in the Armed Forces," *Tyl Vooruzhennykh Sil*, no. 5, 1989, p. 64.

¹¹ G. Andreev, "The Army's Popularity Is Growing," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 31 December 1990.

Furthermore, a significant portion of the USSR Ministry of Defense's housing is outdated and dilapidated. Such poor material benefits create the feeling that society does not appreciate the social value of military work and intensifies the psychological pressure on the officers to leave this profession and to establish more appropriate living conditions for their families.

Access to pre-school facilities for servicemen's children also poses problems. Research results show that whereas in the USSR on average, 10.9 percent of those who need pre-school facilities do not have them, among officer's families, this figure is 24.6 percent. Up to 25 percent of the wives of servicemen cannot work because they do not have access to preschools for their children. Not only are these wives deprived of wages and vacation benefits, but each year their families lose a considerable amount of money which the state pays to keep children in preschools. For example, in 1987 and 1988, the cost for one child was 435.2 and 485.4 rubles, respectively. Of those surveyed, the average officer's family is underpaid by as much as 32 percent.

The monetary status of officers is also made worse by fairly frequent service moves (the average time for an officer to stay in one place is 1.96 years), which create considerable expenses, and the USSR Ministry of Defense payments do not compensate for more than 5 or 10 percent of these costs. Thus, even before the transition to a market economy, an officer's family should be paid an additional 650-700 rubles per year to compensate for its losses. This figure is based on an officer's wife receiving only a minimum wage of 70 rubles per month, not the actual average for the past 10 years of approximately 200 rubles.¹²

A third reason for the greater urgency to social guarantees is that for a long time these matters simply were not addressed specifically. Many aspects of social protection for servicemen were resolved "by a residual principle," that is, they were a last priority. Thus, an analysis of military living standards--even using the methods of the USSR State Statistical Committee (*Goskomstat*), which is constantly studying the family budgets of 90,000 families in the USSR--showed that in wages and benefits, families of junior officers receive approximately 120 rubles less per month than the average Soviet family. Moreover, losses connected with service-related moves and increasing housing problems exceed an average of 600 rubles per year.¹³

¹² See *Lektoru i propagandistu*, no. 1, 1991 (Moscow: Ministry of Defense).

¹³ *Ibid.*

But not all social protection problems derive from the past. Many of them have become worse in recent years. Above all there is the unfounded belief that social protection means only material and economic benefits. According to available data, up to 53 percent of officers and warrant officers polled and up to 61 percent of their wives believe that social protection boils down to guaranteed financial support. Many do not focus on legal guarantees for social protection or other social aspects of this issue.

Many difficulties have also arisen because as society democratizes, various social and political movements and organizations have paid attention to social protection issues for servicemen. In itself, this is a positive sign. However, many of these groups unfortunately have not taken a constructive approach, as the following information illustrates.

Some have sought to solve social protection issues by having meetings and leveling accusations against the USSR Ministry of Defense. While not denying the general need for such actions, such groups have done little to help resolve the actual problems since they have not been able to identify sources of additional resources necessary to raise the troops' living standards. Indeed, these efforts have actually caused more unconstructive criticism and disrespect to be directed at the Armed Forces. So, strange as it seems, ostensible activism regarding the servicemen's lack of protection has greatly worsened their lot: added to the difficulties of military life are now morale problems resulting from indiscriminate and unfounded criticism by certain public elements. On this point, research results indicate that 79.3 percent of servicemen have faced unwarranted criticism, while 29.7 percent believe that their most important concern is not the financial aspects, but the political, legal, social, and spiritual issues of social protection. This is certainly not to say that the Armed Forces cannot be criticized. In fact, up to 98 percent of servicemen believe that criticism of the Armed Forces is necessary and that this criticism should be constructive and focused, meaning it should be directed at those who have the authority to solve the particular problem.¹⁴

Servicemen recognize that the lack of protection in the army is largely the result of problems throughout society; hence, the main efforts must be aimed at stabilizing society. Furthermore, 74.3 percent of servicemen polled are convinced that the Armed Forces do

¹⁴ Research conducted by Kokorin et al., January 1991.

not take in the worst people, but people who are intellectually and morally capable of solving the most difficult tasks.¹⁵

Servicemen are very uneasy about the many public organizations and movements who, under the guise of fighting for social protection for servicemen, are trying to solve their own political problems and satisfy their own political ambitions. There are several *legitimate reasons* for this uneasiness. For one thing, not one organization has actually sought any meaningful increase in financial appropriations to solve these social protection problems, although they all understand that without more money, the problems cannot be solved. Similarly, none of these organizations has proved willing to act as a sponsor for making the necessary contributions to solve these issues. In essence, they only pay lip service to such issues. During political campaigns, such as elections for People's Deputies, these groups actively discuss the need to ensure the social protection of servicemen and their families and even write them into candidate programs. But after the elections, the activity drops off considerably. Finally, it is especially troublesome that numerous groups, apparently supporting the same idea--social protection--cannot generally reach agreement among themselves and do not, therefore, consolidate their efforts. What is preventing them from doing so? The answer is simple: politics.

Thus, the problems of social protection for servicemen and *their families* have remained unresolved. So now--when military reform, force reductions, troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and Mongolia, etc., have reached their height--it is especially necessary to consolidate efforts to realistically solve these problems, beginning with the USSR Supreme Soviet and ending with the smallest organization that has a position on military issues. Unfortunately, the number of groups that advocate an objective and legal solution to social protection issues is not very large, and movement in this area has been slow.

Among officers, warrant officers, and their families, particular attention is focused on the following issues: guaranteeing housing, nurseries, and kindergartens; increasing wages in line with possible price increases due to the transition to a market economy; creating a flexible mechanism for setting certain prices and, correspondingly, adjusting wages; resolving many issues related to pension guarantees; and adopting measures to guarantee servicemen and their families foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Finally, social protection is not possible until the issues affecting relations between society and the Armed Forces are resolved. Here, servicemen and their families are most worried about: interethnic tensions, whose repercussions are felt in the military; the growth of crime in society and all its consequences; unfounded and frequently provocational attacks on the military as an institution and its personnel by certain political forces in Soviet society; the determination to develop a multiparty system within the framework of military development, which most servicemen believe can hurt the country's defense potential; and finally, dilettantism on military issues because of some people's political ambitions, which negatively affects the social protection of servicemen.

2. Progress Is Being Made

Clearly, there are numerous problems associated with social protection for military personnel. Still, progress is being made, albeit slowly. Various laws and declarations that are already in effect or that will soon take effect in Soviet society and in the Armed Forces illustrate this progress.

The Soviet government took a number of steps to increase the financial guarantees to servicemen, effective as of 1 January 1990. They involve additional costs of 227 million rubles per year. Over the past 2 years, officers' salaries have increased by 160-200 rubles per month, and salaries for warrant officers and extended service conscripts have increased by 100-120 rubles. Moreover, supplemental monies paid to servicemen during exercises and additional duty assignments in schools and camps increased from 1.5 rubles to 3.5 rubles per day, meaning another 60 rubles per month. A proposal has been introduced to compensate air defense personnel in a state of combat readiness, set at 10 percent of the officer's wages.¹⁶ Military pilots receive an additional 30 percent of their wages for special service conditions. The one-time payment to officers being discharged from military service is being increased from double their monthly wage to quintuple that amount, while discharged conscripts now receive a similar benefit of 100 rubles, compared with the 10 rubles they had received before. Subsequently, as of 1 July 1990, monetary compensation to the officer corps was given for high qualifications.

¹⁶ Data from the Center for Social and Psychological Issues under the Main Military-Political Administration of the USSR Armed Forces, December 1990.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel who are not provided apartments receive monetary compensation for rent of between 30 and 90 rubles per month, depending on where they are living and the size of their family.

Commanders now have broader authority to make one-time monetary payments to troops maintaining a high level of combat readiness. For this compensation, they could use a general award fund, beginning on 1 January 1991, to pay servicemen up to 50 percent of the established norms, which means that the maximum amount has been raised from 350 to 525 rubles for such compensation.

Decisions to increase the military's material support made it possible to raise the salary of a company commander to that of a regiment commander, effective 1 January 1991. The salary for a hospital surgeon has increased to that of the chief of the hospital, and the pay for a senior pilot of a supersonic aircraft to that of the commander of an air squadron.

In accordance with the new USSR Law on Pensions, pensions are awarded to officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel after 20 years of service. The pensions are equal to 40 percent of their wages, and for each year of service beyond 20, they are to receive 3 percent more of their wages, up to 75 percent of their pre-retirement salary. This law calculates pensions using three basic types of monetary allowances: wages based on military rank; wages based on rank plus an additional percentage for the length of service, which could total up to 700 rubles considered per month; and above this amount, a 50 percent monetary allowance is used. As a result, pensions will be considerably higher than they are at present.

The law establishes that people who continue to work will receive their full pensions, regardless of what they earn. And, so that retirees can maintain their standard of living, their pensions will be adjusted annually based on wage increases and changes in the cost of living index. All the provisions of this law will ensure that pensions paid to military retirees will increase 30 to 40 percent. Implementing this law will cost 2.1 billion rubles in additional funds.

There are some other miscellaneous benefits as well. During active military duty, servicemen have the right to travel at MoD expense during leave (for commendations, illness, or family reasons), and when retired or discharged, they have the right to free transportation on all forms of intra-city transportation (except taxis). Also, letters from soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and sergeant-majors as well as packages containing their

clothes are mailed free. Letters addressed to them are also sent free. And, for conscripts who have children, during their active military duty, the mothers will be paid benefits of 35 rubles per month.

No more than a month after a conscript's wife applies, the executive committees of local People's Deputies Councils are obligated to set up their children in available nurseries, kindergartens and day care, regardless of the departmental affiliation of these preschools. These executive committees are also obligated in the same period of time to find employment for wives of conscripts called up for active duty.

Finally, these executive committees as well as the leaders of enterprises, organizations, collective farms, and educational institutions must employ discharged conscripts, taking their specialty into consideration, no more than a month after their application.

In accordance with the Soviet President's instructions, a draft program for social guarantees for servicemen and their families has been worked out and has been presented for review to the USSR Council of Ministers. The program calls for increasing the wages of conscripts in 1991 to 20-50 rubles per month, depending on their assignments, instead of 5-23 rubles. In 1991, supplements for basic food expenses will be raised to reflect the real cost of these food items (50 rubles per month). In 1992, military personnel will receive higher pay for serving in a number of remote locations. Compensatory wages are to be paid to servicemen and their families in the event the former are wounded, seriously injured, or killed when performing military service during peacetime. Finally, this program calls for improving food supplies to conscripts, introducing new uniforms for servicemen, and expanding a number of benefits in medical care.

3. Conclusions on Social Protection Measures

While this is fairly dry statistical information, it does illustrate the approaches and dynamics involved in solving problems related to the social protection of servicemen and their families. The key conclusions that can be drawn from this are the following.

First, the efforts described here do not represent the only ways of providing social protection for servicemen and their families. Indeed, they cannot solve these problems completely.

Second, the potential of these efforts, nevertheless, significantly exceeds everything that has been done along these lines several years ago.

Third, society must significantly step up its efforts in the area of the social protection for Soviet servicemen so as to bring military reform to its logical conclusion.

VII. MILITARY-POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF REFORM

Reforming the Soviet defense complex is a complicated social matter involving economic, political, social, legal, and military aspects. The military aspect encompasses both military-political and military-technical considerations, but within the framework of a sociological analysis of military reform, the military-political issues are of particular interest. The issues of this nature are too numerous to address adequately in the scope of a chapter, so this discussion focuses on just three military-political issues that are the most important for reforming the USSR's military mechanism: selecting the method for staffing the USSR Armed Forces; changing priorities in Soviet military affairs; and society's attitude toward alternative service.

A. ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR STAFFING THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

The methods used to staff today's militaries differ throughout the world. Some countries have universal military duty (conscription), while others have professional volunteer forces. France is considering a mixed system that incorporates at least both these staffing methods. The United States combines the volunteer system with the principle of pay for service; about 50,000 foreign citizens have voluntarily enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Within the context of Soviet military reform, the staffing method has become a central issue, and one which commands the attention of virtually everyone who is looking at and participating in military reform. The main topic of discussion has been whether to retain the principle of universal military service or to replace it with a volunteer system.

The principle of hiring people--of recruiting citizens from other states for military service--was immediately rejected by virtually everyone in the USSR and was not seriously considered.¹ There are several reasons for this reaction. The Soviet Union has never really hired mercenaries to create massive military forces. Moreover, the Soviet people do

¹ Polls conducted in a number of regions of the USSR show that many people do not differentiate between mercenary armies and volunteer forces; among those who do recognize this distinction, people rejected the former option 98 percent of the time.

not psychologically accept this idea. It would also be impossible, given today's political climate in the world and in the USSR, to have military forces made up of citizens from other countries that would be called upon to protect the Soviet people and ensure their security. Finally, the USSR does not have the resources or the money to support a mercenary army.

Instead, Soviet military specialists have focused on the principles of universal military service and professional volunteer formations to determine which is optimal given the new political and security environment. The analysis has addressed three important questions: What are the priorities and strengths of each method? What are the weaknesses of each? Is there a real possibility of exploiting either method's advantages as the USSR carries out its military reform? The analysis has also considered whether today, as perhaps never before, the Soviet Union needs an international, extraterritorial armed force.

1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Universal Military Service

There can be many advantages to relying on universal military service (conscription) in staffing the armed forces. First, it ensures that an overwhelming majority of men serve in the military, where they acquire the skills and experience of executing combat missions. In other words, it creates a broad social base to resolve defense tasks and ensure the security of the country. With this staffing method, there is not only a massive people's army, but also massive reserves, as evident during World War II and other wars.

Second, countries whose armed forces are based on conscription can most easily mobilize their reserves for conducting wars that require large human resources.

Third, the principle of universal military service, if it is done correctly, puts people from all social groups and nationalities on an equal footing. Hence, the resulting military is firmly connected with the people, and in the case of a multinational country--with all the peoples of the country. In such a case, the military serves to consolidate different nationalities and to internationalize public life. Sociological research, repeatedly conducted in the Soviet Armed Forces, shows that more than 90 percent of those drafted were convinced of the military's internationalizing and consolidating role. Admittedly, this figure has decreased to 60 to 68 percent as a result of obvious interethnic problems in the USSR, but it still remains fairly high. Approximately the same percentage of people believe it necessary to preserve the consolidating role of the Armed Forces in Soviet society in the future.

Fourth, having a conscripted force makes it possible for most men to learn modern specialties and modern technology, since the armed forces obviously use the latest scientific and technological achievements. More than 54 percent of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and warrant officers increase their technological capabilities during military service, which thereby establishes a basis for increasing society's technological level. Unfortunately, this has not been done effectively in the Soviet Union, especially in recent years. The Armed Forces had the greatest effect on increasing Soviet society's technological level during the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Since the end of the 1970s, its influence has become weaker and weaker.

Fifth, universal conscription creates the conditions that foster mutual appreciation and integration among various cultures. Sociological analysis indicates that virtually all servicemen in the multinational armed forces are acquainted with some cultural aspects of other peoples; indeed, 74 percent have said that they learn about other cultures for the first time during their military service.

Sixth, the armed forces play an important role in social stabilization, and this role is broadened under universal conscription. It is not a question of putting society in order, but of establishing in young people physical and moral qualities that raise the overall health of society. In this connection, young people in the military say 83 percent of the time that they have become physically stronger, and 62 percent morally stronger. Also of those young people in the military who had previously been convicted of a crime, 57 percent do not subsequently become criminal repeaters.²

But despite these advantages of universal conscription, there are weaknesses as well. For example, universal conscription enlists not only people who subscribe to, indeed idealize, military service (in recent years, only 17 to 18 percent of those in the military), but also those who, on their own, would eschew military service.³ This latter group has been growing in size. Moreover, universal conscription generally does not exclude citizens with criminal records. In fact, this has been one of the main reasons for the spread of non-regulatory behavior and criminal violations in the Armed Forces.

Another disadvantage of a conscript force is that its quality is largely influenced by social, demographic, ethnic, class, and political relations. For example, a more than 30

² Data from the Center for Social and Psychological Issues under the Main Military-Political Administration of the USSR Armed Forces, December 1990.

³ Ibid.

percent increase in crime in Soviet society in 1989-90 coincided with increased criminal activity in the armed forces.

The Soviet military is also affected by a complicated demographic situation, heightened political struggle, and interethnic tensions. The results of the 1990 drafts, discussed earlier, provide clear evidence of the effects of such problems. It is not difficult to understand that armed forces staffed on a volunteer basis are less subject to such effects.

In addition, universal conscription strains society by taking people out of the civilian economy and civilian life for a period of time. As it is currently implemented in the Soviet Union, universal conscription creates destabilizing periods twice a year, each spring and fall when men are drafted into and discharged from military service. Certain intellectual forces are diverted from creative work during their conscription, and some conscripts returning to the civilian economy find that they have lost some of their qualifications after 2 years absence.

A final disadvantage of universal conscription is the increasingly limited duration of a conscript's service because of economic constraints. This pattern has been quite evident in recent years in many countries, including the USSR. During the last 15 years alone, the question of reducing the length of service in the Soviet Union has been raised twice. In 1968, it was reduced from 3 to 2 years in the army and from 4 to 3 years in the navy. In connection with current military reform efforts, consideration is being given to reducing these terms to 18 and 24 months, respectively. Obviously, the relatively short amount of service time affects the conscript's level of professional skill. Personnel in volunteer forces have a greater opportunity to attain a higher level of professionalism than do personnel in a conscript military. Nevertheless, one cannot conclude that servicemen in volunteer forces are always more professional than those in a conscript force. For example, at the annual competitions conducted in NATO on combat skills, the winners have repeatedly been Dutch officers and soldiers, who are not volunteers.

2. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Volunteer Force

In addition to the brief references to volunteer forces in the preceding section, it is necessary to look more substantively at the advantages and inadequacies of such a force. In terms of its advantages, above all, a volunteer force is more democratic than a conscript force. Every person is allowed to decide for himself whether to serve in the military.

Similarly, volunteer forces can be selective in who they accept into military service. Admittedly, this selectivity is possible only when there is a broad social base from which to choose. In turn, a large reserve force is possible only if the military is very popular.

Volunteer forces find it easier to solve troop discipline problems and to regulate people's behavior. This is accomplished mainly by appealing to their material interest in executing the tasks entrusted to them.

Contract service in a volunteer force, which lasts longer than a draft term, means that there is more time to improve the servicemen's military skills. In this connection, there is a greater potential to properly master the latest types of weapons and combat equipment. After all, enlisted personnel and sergeants in a volunteer army master two or three generations of weapons and equipment during 10 to 15 years of contract service.

These are hardly all of the advantages of this method of staffing armed forces, which are well known to American readers. They are also familiar with the problems of a volunteer system, such as--

- the fact that many people do not gain the experience of military service and are therefore unprepared to execute defense missions.
- the need to constantly increase funds to provide incentives to those under contract.
- the creation of a fairly costly system for training reserves in order to expand the social base of people trained to address military tasks.
- the retention of mechanisms to ensure that, if necessary, the transition could be made to staffing the armed forces with conscripts. The United States has such a mechanism.

In short, this method has its problems, as do all the others. A comparative analysis of these two staffing methods, combined with the tasks of modern Soviet military reform, has led to the conclusion that the optimal method would integrate the advantages of both systems, conscripts and volunteers. The result is the idea of shifting to a mixed staffing method for the Soviet Armed Forces.

B. THE ADVANTAGES OF A MIXED STAFFING METHOD IN THE USSR

During military reform, the introduction of substantial changes to the method of staffing the Soviet Armed Forces is the result of a number of objective reasons. The Soviet Union has experienced many difficulties in trying to enforce the principle of universal

conscription, even before perestroika. But since that time, these difficulties have become particularly obvious and there are objective indications that the potential for adhering to this principle is increasingly limited.

1. Difficulties of Continuing a Conscription System

It has already been noted that many young Soviet men of draft age are not entering military service, which contradicts the very essence of the principle of universal military duty. This is not to say that every single draft-age man must be brought into the military; no country with a conscript force does this. The aim is to draft approximately 70 to 80 percent of the conscriptable pool, but in the Soviet Union in recent years, scarcely 40 percent have been drafted. For this very reason, many people have been asking, not without foundation: Is the principle of universal military duty working if such a low percentage of draft-age men are entering military service? Several reasons underlie this low draft turnout, including the following: the health of young men; their unwillingness to serve in the army; the failure to resolve social issues that are the basis for all possible deferments; and criminal violations.

Moreover, the complicated demographic situation, which will not be resolved until 1994, substantially limits the potential for universal conscription. A large military based on universal service combined with demographic constraints means that men in poor health or with criminal records are brought into the armed forces. This cannot help but affect the troops' life and combat readiness. This is one of the fundamental reasons for non-regulatory behavior and hazing (*dedovshchina*) in the military.

Also affecting the viability of the current staffing system is the Union's exemption of college students from military service. As soon as this decision went into effect, the military lost 173,000 qualified conscripts. And during each subsequent draft, several tens of thousand of draft-age young men have thus been exempted from military service.

The draft process has also become considerably more complicated with the exacerbation of interethnic tensions in the country, as previously noted. After several republics adopted laws on the formation of their own national military forces and on their youths serving only in their own republics, the foundations of universal military service were additionally weakened. The numbers of those reporting for the draft fell further, with the result that the armed forces were 400,000 men short in the fall of 1989.

Drafting people who have a poor command of the Russian language obviously creates serious difficulties in the Soviet Armed Forces. This is reflected in the effectiveness of troop control, combat training and personnel education, as well as in the troops' ability to master combat equipment and weapons. In recent years, the number of conscripts from the Asian and Caucasus republics has grown significantly. In certain units and divisions of the Ground Troops, they make up 35 to 40 percent of the troops. At the same time, the number of officers representing these regions' indigenous population has decreased significantly.

In addition, problems and contradictions have arisen between the principle of universal military service and the new economic relationships taking shape in the USSR. For example, there have been difficulties in calling up reservists for training. People are unwilling to let specialists from economic enterprises go into reserve training since this weakens the enterprises' economic potential. The reservists themselves are also unwilling to leave their jobs even for a short period of time because this frequently means losing high-paying wages and the collectives do not understand that the reservist is supposed to be paid an average month's salary for being called up.

Finally, several political groups have opposed the principle of universal military service and have led an offensive against it. Many Soviet people have become convinced that a military based on universal military service has no future. Thus, it is necessary to consider public sentiments which want to change the method of staffing the Soviet Armed Forces.

All these factors objectively limit the potential for the Soviet Armed Forces to continue to be based exclusively on the principle of universal military service. The situation demands change--finding a better staffing method that combines the strengths of a universal draft, which the Soviet Union cannot renounce because of the existing economic and political situation, with elements of volunteer staffing for the military.

2. The Case for a Mixed Staffing Method

There have been repeated sociological surveys conducted in the Soviet Union about public attitudes toward the principle of military obligation versus possible volunteer staffing of the Soviet Armed Forces. In the spring and fall of 1989 and the first half of 1990, generally up to 80 percent of respondents leaned toward a volunteer force, but they did not cite any substantive arguments or facts to support their position. When the experiment was repeated after the merits of these staffing principles were argued, 60 to 75 percent of

respondents who had no direct connection with military service changed their opinion and gave priority to a mixed method. Servicemen changed their positions even more radically: 85 to 87 percent agreed that in the USSR's existing situation, the most promising option was the mixed staffing method. Economic, political, and social arguments played a decisive role in changing their minds.

Thus, increasing number of people understand that, objectively, there can be no pause in military development. Such a pause, caused by a sharp shift from one staffing method to another, would be fraught with unforeseen consequences. Hence, a new method can and must build on the old one, taking and using its strengths.

Moreover, the force of social inertia must be considered. Those institutions that ensure the functioning of the universal draft cannot be immediately refocused to another system. And despite the public's shift toward a preference for a volunteer force, some social support for universal military service still exists, primarily among those who served in the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1950s to 1970s. An overwhelming majority in this group is convinced that each man must be ready to defend his country. The generation of the 1930s-1940s, which fought in World War II, is even stronger in its support of universal conscription.

In addition, the draft cannot be rejected and another method immediately adopted because the USSR has no experience in using other military staffing methods. Nor can the experience and methods that work in other countries be automatically transferred to the Soviet Union. But perhaps even more compelling is the USSR's lack of the monetary resources or economic base to transition to a new method of staffing the armed forces.

In short, a mixed staffing method meets the needs of the existing situation in the USSR, but it also offers the flexibility to accommodate new requirements. The military-political situation is dynamic and changeable, so that in certain conditions priority will be placed on one staffing method, while in other conditions the other method will be emphasized. Proponents of this approach seek to--

- integrate the advantages of draft and volunteer forces.
- interpret critically the country's experience in military development and single out the strengths, including those due to staffing the armed forces on the basis of universal military service.
- unite the potential of what would seem to be two opposing staffing methods.

- select the optimal path for combining volunteer staffing with the realities of the country and the people.

Public opinion and sociological science did not immediately conclude that a mixed staffing method was to be the answer. Thinking on this issue progressed through several stages.

The first stage lasted until 1985. Before the start of perestroika, the idea of universal military service reigned absolute. Proposals to change the method of staffing--to combine universal military service with volunteer structures--surfaced only episodically and were, for all intents and purposes, rejected both by officials and the public.

The second stage lasted from 1985 to 1987. It was characterized by an increased level of openness about army life and by a critical attitude toward interpreting history and the process of military development in the USSR. Soviet society came to the conclusion that issues related to military development either had not been resolved or had been resolved incorrectly. Thus, the principle of universal military service became subject to ever greater pressure, as many began to connect the inadequacies of Soviet military development with this principle. By the end of this period, up to 40-43 percent of respondents advocated changing the method of staffing and transitioning to a volunteer Armed Forces.

The third stage, from 1987 to 1989, saw society show a much greater interest in having a volunteer force. By the end of this time, this idea had become the top priority. During this period, one could see a transition from a populist, emotional approach to military development issues to a deeper, more scientific elaboration of them. People and groups also emerged who consistently defended the idea of a mixed staffing principle; they comprised between 27 and 31 percent of various collectives. Admittedly, while supporting the idea of giving priority to a mixed staffing principle, many of them believed that the emphasis should still be placed more on the volunteer component.

The fourth stage has been in effect since mid-1989. It has been characterized by a deeper scientific elaboration of military reform issues, the development of its concepts, and a scientific foundation for giving priority to a mixed method of staffing the Soviet Armed Forces. During this period, society has developed and adopted a mechanism for transitioning to a mixed staffing principle. It provides for--

- the partial, experimental use of volunteers in the Soviet Armed Forces. For example, in 1991 volunteer units and formations will function in all branches

of the armed forces, while conscription will be retained as the main staffing principle.

- eventually increasing the formation and use of volunteer forces if the experience of these first volunteer formations so warrants.
- basing all the main combat structures of the Soviet Armed Forces on the volunteer principle when the experiments have proved its efficacy. Auxiliary structures would continue to be created based on conscription.
- the possibility of completely transitioning to a volunteer principle for staffing the Soviet Armed Forces. However, many economic, political, and military-political circumstances have added doubt about whether a complete transition to this principle could be accomplished in the near future.

C. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE: POSSIBLE OPTIONS

It is necessary to examine issues related to the introduction of alternative service since the draft MoD Military Reform Plan proposes this step, which is quite radical in Soviet military development. The document addresses this issue in "The Introduction of Non-Military (Alternative) Service" (p. 13); furthermore, "The USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service provides for alternative (non-military) service for male citizens who, because of religious convictions, cannot (or will not) perform active military service within the Soviet Armed Forces."⁴

The proposal to introduce alternative service is truly radical since, for one thing, such an institution has not existed in the USSR for many years. In addition, even today, public opinion is quite actively resisting the introduction of non-military service. According to sociological data, 3 out of 10 respondents support the introduction of alternative service, 4 are undecided, and 3 are openly opposed to non-military service. In short, there is still no overt support for this idea, although support is on the rise. For example, a year and a half ago, only 12 to 15 percent of respondents understood and supported the introduction of non-military service, while 56 to 58 percent of those polled were opposed to the idea.⁵

Permanent military personnel (officers and warrant officers) have also substantially changed their attitude toward alternative service. When this problem was first being

⁴ *Kontsepsiya voennoi reformy. Proekt. [The Military Reform Plan. Draft.]* (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1991), p. 21.

⁵ Research conducted in January 1991.

worked out, they persistently resisted those who advocated non-military service. This was not a case of military conservatism, which some would like to believe, but professional concern about the future of the Soviet Armed Forces and their defense capabilities. Thus, for example, in the second half of 1989, more than 85 percent of officers and warrant officers polled believed that alternative service would not help solidify the country's defense.⁶ In contrast, a more in-depth analysis since then led an increasing number of officers and warrant officers to conclude that, despite the additional problems associated with introducing alternative service, without it, military reform will not apparently happen. This change in thinking is evident in the fact that the first drafts of the MoD's Military Reform Plan did not contain proposals for non-military service, whereas the latest versions have. This is not because it has become popular nor is it a retreat by the military under pressure from radical social forces. There are objective factors behind this change.

First, the growing democratization of society and the retention of the principle of universal military service makes it necessary to find a way of effectively combining them. Democratization increases people's level of freedom in all areas, including in military service. Thus, as this process has become part of Soviet society, the number of young men not wishing to serve in the armed forces has grown. At the same time, greater freedom does not abolish the need to observe existing national laws, including the Law on Universal Military Duty and Military Service. The search for a "consensus" between these largely contradictory phenomena is apparently possible only by introducing alternative service.

Second, the attitude toward religion changes in a democratizing society. Hence, men have more opportunities to refuse service with weapons because of religious reasons (those who are members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, for example). Some people refuse service with weapons for ethical reasons (such as, pacifists and Tolstoyites). It is difficult for military men to concede such convictions, however, because they undermine the country's ability to maintain its defense potential at the proper level. At the same time, introducing alternative service could solve two socially important issues: to remove unnecessary tensions caused by fulfilling the law on universal military service and to include young men who are believers and pacifists in socially beneficial activities for the good of Soviet society. This is just what the draft Law on Alternative Service in the USSR envisages.

⁶ Ibid.

Third, objectively the foundations for non-military service in the Soviet state have already been established. They have taken shape over many years, and although they have not been called alternative service, they are close to it. These are the sections of the Soviet Armed Forces where servicemen conduct their military service without weapons: military-construction units, railroad troops, soldiers working in military state farms and in a number of road units, etc. Taking the military-construction and railroad troops out of the Soviet Armed Forces, as provided for in the draft Military Reform Plan, will greatly reinforce the basis for transitioning to alternative service.

Fourth, recent demographic problems and the health of draftees have helped stimulate the introduction of service without weapons. Many cannot serve in combat units of the Soviet Armed Forces because of health reasons, but they could participate in state alternative service with fewer tasks and less physically demanding work than in the military.

Fifth, interethnic tensions are also giving impetus to the idea of alternative service. Clearly, most evasions of military service during the two 1990 drafts are in one way or another the result of interethnic, or more precisely inter-republic, relations. In addition, a number of republics have already adopted laws on alternative service, laws which essentially contradict union legislation and have been one of the stimulants undermining universal military service. These republic-level efforts are dangerous for military development, something that an increasing number of Soviet people understand. Nevertheless, they have been adopted and therefore must be considered.

Some of the first such laws were adopted in Latvia and Estonia: the Latvian SSR law "On Alternative (Work) Service" of 1 March 1990 and the law "On Work Service in the Estonia SSR" of 15 March 1990. These laws are very similar in content to those in a number of countries (such as Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands) where alternative service has long existed.

It is also important to understand the level of public awareness about alternative service in these and other countries. Society is becoming more informed about alternative service and people comprehend all its pros and cons. Public information and awareness about the previous existence of alternative service in Russian and Soviet society has been considerably revived, especially as regards its introduction.

Citizens of the RSFSR were granted this possibility for the first time in the history of the Soviet state by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the Separation

of the Church" (1918), where in paragraph six, they were granted the possibility of replacing "one civic obligation with another on a case-by-case basis" in accordance with the court's decision. This blanket rule was later developed by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (1919) "On Freedom from Military Obligation Due to Religious Convictions." One of those who wrote this decree was V. I. Lenin. This document states that a "united council of religious communities" has the right to raise before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee the question of completely exempting people "from military service without replacing it with another civic obligation, if it can be specifically proven that the latter is impermissible not only on the basis of religious convictions, but also sectarian literature and the personal life of the individual." Obviously, the content of the Decree was very democratic. It also gave "people who cannot participate in military service . . . the right to perform for the duration of a draft . . . medical service primarily in hospitals or other appropriate beneficial work as the draftee selects, according to a decision of the people's court." The amendment to paragraph six of the Decree says that no one can avoid their public duty by citing their religious beliefs. The amendment pointed to the possibility of replacing one civic duty with another, with each case being decided by a court.

Continuing the historical overview, in 1920, a Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, "On Freedom from Military Service for Religious Convictions," was adopted. The possibility of being exempt from military service for religious convictions legally existed in the USSR until 1 September 1939. Admittedly, few people used this right. Thus, there is a history of alternative service in the Soviet Union, which has played a catalyzing role in its revival today.

It should also be noted that an increasing number of communists understand the need to introduce alternative service. CPSU representatives working in the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the Supreme Soviets of the republics, and in the Ministry of Defense have repeatedly discussed this point.

Sixth, international legal documents, which provide for the possibility of introducing alternative service, have been revived and are affecting public awareness of this issue. These documents are: Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights;⁷ working materials from the

⁷ See, for example, Resolution 1989/59 of 8 March 1989, "Renouncing Military Service for Reasons of Conscience."

Paris meeting of the "Confederation on the Human Dimension" (1989); as well as Article 18 of the International Law on Civil and Political Human Rights (1966).

In short, the political, social, historical, and legal bases for introducing alternative service have taken shape in the USSR to a certain extent. These foundations increase the probability that it will be introduced in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it would hardly be accurate to assume that the introduction and implementation of alternative service is going smoothly and without problems.

One of the problems that has emerged is the fact that Soviet society still quite strongly opposes alternative service. Some of the reasons for this opposition are: uncertainty that alternative service will contribute to the country's defense potential (59 percent of respondents); fear that alternative service will be used to solve political tasks, such as satisfying the nationalist ambitions of certain groups (22 percent); and the lack of proper experience in solving military development tasks with the help of alternative service (6 percent).⁸

Another problem is that attitudes toward the introduction of alternative service have developed very unevenly in various regions of the Soviet Union. As noted above, Latvia and Estonia have already adopted laws on this issue, although the deteriorating political situation in the Baltics in early 1991 caused some diminution of interest in implementing alternative service in these republics. At the same time, other regions of the country--such as Russia--are paying increasing attention to this problem.

Also, research indicates that the level of support for alternative service among young people is 1.7 times higher than among middle-age and old people. In addition, urban youth support alternative service more consistently than those in rural areas (6 out of 10 versus 2 or 3 out of 10). Among urban youth, the greatest supporters are students (7 or 8 out of 10).⁹ As a rule, young people who have served in the Armed Forces are opposed to alternative service, even those not completely satisfied with their experience in the military. Polls indicate that the young men who were satisfied with their military service truly understood the necessity and expediency of it; therefore, they are not inclined to accept the idea of alternative service. Those who encountered difficulties during their service and are unhappy with the experience are frequently opposed to alternative service,

⁸ See footnote 5.

⁹ Ibid.

reasoning that "If it was difficult for me, then let it be difficult for others; they shouldn't be able to perform alternative service."

In addition, the emergence of armed paramilitary formations in a number of regions of the Soviet Union has substantially affected attitudes toward alternative service. On the one hand, fears about threats emanating from these formations have forced many people to emphasize the importance of military service in the Armed Forces (they see the military as an institution that can protect their interests and stabilize the situation as paramilitary formations become more active). On the other hand, there are those who advocate supporting armed paramilitary formations (they are still a minority) and who have opposed introducing alternative service because it narrows their source of manpower. Hence, the growing number of armed paramilitary formations creates its own kind of threat to the introduction of alternative service.

Finally, the documents of political groups in the USSR show that the Moscow People's Front, the Democratic Alliance, the People's Fronts of Latvia and Belorussia, the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists, *Sajudis*, and *Shchit* all advocate the introduction of alternative service. This does not mean that all other political structures in the USSR oppose alternative service, although there are some that do. In this context, it should be emphasized that among the political groups who have declared their support for alternative service, their methods differ. For example, some believe it possible to grant the right of alternative service only for religious-ethnic reasons (the Moscow People's Front); others, only for religious, political or pacifist convictions (the People's Front of Latvia); and still others, simply for any personal convictions (*Sajudis*). The practical importance of these differences is clear.

As has already been noted, the draft MoD Military Reform Plan proposes introducing alternative service for those people who refuse military service only for religious reasons. This approach seems to be the most appropriate one considering the current political situation. Indeed, if political reasons were included for non-military service, there could be vast consequences for military reform. Still, it is logical to assume that the reasons for alternative service could be expanded to include ethical reasons.

Political groups also differ in their interpretations of the purpose of alternative service. For example, people in the Democratic Alliance see it as a way of replacing universal military conscription and of transitioning to a professional army; the Confederation of Anarchists and Syndicalists qualify alternative service as a temporary

measure until the Armed Forces are reorganized, that is, while the military is being reformed. Based on other countries' experience, where alternative service exists together with universal military conscription, it seems likely that the Soviet Union will follow this same pattern.

Recently people have been actively working on developing a union law on alternative service, frequently in connection with work on military reform. While many difficulties remain, it can be assumed that alternative service will begin to function in the near future. It will be one element of the Soviet military reform effort.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

This is virtually the first integrated scientific-sociological interpretation of modern military reform in the USSR. Admittedly, the sociological material in this paper does not reflect all aspects of military reform. Nor was this paper able to reconstruct an absolutely objective picture of reform, given the mobility and dynamism of the reform process. Nevertheless, it has managed to show the main trends in the development of the reform process of the Soviet Union's defense complex. Clearly, more work remains to be done on the various social aspects of military reform.

As a way of conclusion, a few impressions of the future prospects of Soviet military reform are in order, although forecasts about policy and military affairs are difficult and not always useful. This is not so much a forecast as a suggestion: to think about who and what could hinder the reform of the Soviet defense complex. The factors that are currently complicating military reform could increase in the future.

First, the Soviet Union lacks a proper economic foundation for reform; it does not have the money to make the necessary changes. Moreover, the economic situation is not improving. If the country does not overcome its economic crisis in the next few years, the reform process will become substantially more difficult--and could come to a complete stop.

Second, military reform is being implemented in an extremely complicated political environment. Political passions are heating up and various political forces are fighting for influence in the Armed Forces. While today's political pluralism accords fully with the process of democratization of Soviet public life, the low level of political culture of the leaders from many political organizations contradicts this process. As a rule, these leaders do not hold constructive, civilized discussions with each other about military reform; rather, they simply advance their own political ambitions and claim to have a monopoly on the truth. Such an approach creates many repercussions that negatively influence the military reform process.

Third, Soviet military reform has also been complicated by the low level of the country's social development, which lags behind the advanced countries. There have not

yet been improvements in this area, including for military men. The difficulties of military service objectively compound living condition problems. This reduces people's participation in the reform process.

Fourth, there are spiritual and ideological difficulties impeding military reform. The transition from a pluralism of opinion to ideological pluralism, and the introduction of ideas that are unrealistic--or frequently outright lies designed to create sensationalism--have today engendered massive difficulties in the work of military personnel.

In addition, the failure to develop proper theoretical guarantees before initiating military reform continues to lead to mistakes. As just one illustration, not one integrated scientific-theoretical work has been published on the problems of modern military reform.

A fifth problem is the failure to establish legal guarantees for military reform. The absence of such guarantees objectively impede this entire reform process.

Finally, nationalist and separatist actions, which have recently become especially strong, are seriously affecting military reform. In the existing situation, this is the most dangerous factor capable not only of hindering, but even arresting military reform.

These are certainly not all of the factors that can impede the reform of military development in the Soviet Union. There are also subjective factors that are capable of negatively affecting the course of military reform.

As a rule, when the "opponents" of military reform are discussed, one category of people is named: conservatives. These are people who cling to the past and do not want to accept the present or to take the necessary future steps. They exist not only within the state, party, and military leadership, but in all Soviet social strata. Their views are based on honest misconceptions and satisfaction with their previous role in solving military development issues in the USSR. And while such views are short-sighted and unrealistic, these people should not be judged too severely. Their thoughts and actions have been molded by the past. Indeed, many of these people have suffered and fought for their right to be conservative; previously they were some of the greatest innovators in transforming military affairs. But they have remained innovators and revolutionaries of the past. In short, yesterday's innovators have become today's conservatives.

Sociological analysis shows that the main danger to military reform comes not from this group of people, but from those who call for military reform and demand its immediate implementation. Such people adopt a populist approach to the problems of reforming the

Armed Forces. They raise problems of military development at various meetings, focus attention on reform problems, and mainly make reform the subject of emotional rather than rational work. Largely because of this kind of approach, military development and reform began to be worked out in a dilettantist way. These people refused to allow military institutes, departments, and scientists to work on reform problems. Hence, the people's faith in the research and work on military reform done by specialists at the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Main Military-Political Administration, and military scientific-research institutes began to fall.

This does not, of course, mean that military reform issues should not be discussed at meetings. The point is that such discussions should take place not only at meetings, but also within specialized institutions. Moreover, when public discussions are held, they should be constructive and business-like. It is important that the approaches be realistic and that they not distort the processes currently underway in the USSR. This applies to Western sociologists, political scientists, economists, and journalists, as well as Soviet citizens.

The cause of military reform is also impeded by those who, while justifiably demanding an improvement in existing legislation, have incited people not to obey the current laws. Another negative influence is created by those who have approached the treatment of military history and military development in the USSR destructively. This destructiveness is now being overcome, but with considerable difficulties and problems.

Among the forces impeding military reform, there are those who automatically criticize the modern mechanism of Soviet military development. While constructive criticism of inadequacies in this area would certainly contribute to military reform, overt faultfinding has eroded the prestige of the Soviet Armed Forces in society. Some people probably believe that the military's loss of prestige is also a catalyst for reform. To a certain extent, this is true. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the military's reduced prestige and the artificial emphasis only on its negative aspects has materialized in the activities of many people and social institutions which do not support the reform of the country's defense complex.

In short, military reform in the USSR is evolving within a complex environment. Its future prospects depend on many factors, above all on processes inside the USSR and elsewhere in the world, mainly in the military-political, economic, and social areas of public life. The reform process is a dynamic one and requires the constant attention of

Soviet and foreign scientists. Today's military reform effort is aimed at creating a Soviet defense complex that is adequate for the modern political process, which is characterized by hopes for peace and further reductions in international tensions.